Opinion
6023 Appellate Case 2020-000260
08-30-2023
Ingrid G. Brantley, Respondent, v. Dennis E. Brantley, Sr., Appellant.
Gregory S. Forman, of Charleston, for Appellant. Peter George Currence, of McDougall, Self, Currence & McLeod, LLP, of Columbia, and Jordan Christopher Calloway, of McGowan Hood Felder & Phillips, of Rock Hill, both for Respondent.
Heard March 9, 2023
Appeal From Richland County Monét S. Pincus, Family Court Judge
Gregory S. Forman, of Charleston, for Appellant.
Peter George Currence, of McDougall, Self, Currence & McLeod, LLP, of Columbia, and Jordan Christopher Calloway, of McGowan Hood Felder & Phillips, of Rock Hill, both for Respondent.
OPINION
WILLIAMS, C.J.
In this domestic matter, Dennis E. Brantley, Sr. (Father) argues the family court erred by (1) overstating Father's income when calculating child support, retroactive child support, and unreimbursed medical expenses; (2) holding Father responsible for 85% of the two younger children's extracurricular activity expenses; (3) finding Father in contempt for failing to inform Ingrid G. Brantley (Mother) of his new address before moving and enrolling their eldest son at a new high school; and (4) requiring Father to pay $75,000 in attorney's fees and costs. We affirm as modified in part and reverse in part.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Father and Mother were married on May 16, 1999, and divorced on September 26, 2016. During their marriage, the parties had three children: D.B. (Oldest Son) as well as G.B. and H.B. (the Twins). Mother and Father's divorce decree incorporated as a court order a "Partial Marital Settlement Agreement" establishing custody, visitation, and other arrangements for the children's care.
Mother and Father stipulated their individual gross monthly incomes as $3,000 and $10,000, respectively. Accordingly, Father agreed to pay $750 per month in child support to Mother along with accepting responsibility for the children's health insurance premiums (valued at $397 per month) and 77% of the children's unreimbursed medical expenses and extracurricular activity expenses. The agreement also imposed behavioral requirements and restrictions on both Mother and Father, including keeping each other informed of their permanent address and to provide ninety days' notice of "any intention to move his or her residence."
Mother initiated this action on April 12, 2018. Mother alleged Father's new relationship with his then-girlfriend, Paula Cobb, and potential relocation plans were straining his relationship with the Twins. Mother sought a change in custody, a recalculation of child support, and attorney's fees and costs. Father answered and counterclaimed on May 30, 2018, seeking sole custody, child support from Mother, reimbursement from Mother for previously incurred expenses, and fees.
During a May 30, 2018 hearing, the family court determined Father's move and its effect on the children's school enrollment warranted an investigation to determine whether the parties' previous custody arrangement should be changed. The temporary order further required the children stay in their current schools for the remainder of the 2017-18 academic year. Additionally, on June 7, 2018, the family court appointed Richard G. Whiting (Guardian) as the children's guardian ad litem. Following a hearing on August 9, 2018, the family court modified the temporary order (Temporary Order) by granting Father primary physical custody of Oldest Son and Mother primary physical custody of the Twins.
Father filed a contempt action against Mother on July 2, 2018, alleging Mother refused to comply with the Temporary Order by failing to provide ninety days' notice of her intention to move, failing to reimburse out-of-pocket healthcare expenses, and failing to reimburse extracurricular expenses. Mother also filed a contempt petition alleging Father failed to comply with the Temporary Order by refusing to provide Mother with his new address upon relocation and enrolling Oldest Son in Chapin High School prior to receiving a determination from the court as to where the children would attend school for the 2018-2019 school year.
The family court held a trial on March 5-7, May 6-7, and July 29-30, 2019, before Judge Monét S. Pincus. During trial, conflicting testimony arose regarding Father's gross annual income. Father is a self-employed businessman deriving income from three separate businesses. As a result, Father's tax returns and supporting financial documents were necessary in determining his gross annual income. However, this determination became difficult due to Father's financial documents containing numerous errors and omissions such as miscategorization of rent payments, income, business versus personal expenditures, and certain real property.
Mother then presented expert testimony from accountant and certified fraud examiner Christopher Leventis, who attempted to calculate Father's annual gross income. Leventis reviewed Father's personal accounts as well as other relevant financial documents, including his bank statements, credit card statements, and personal tax returns. In his report, Leventis determined Father's gross income to be $202,233 for 2017 and $124,743 for 2018. However, Leventis noted that without Father's 2018 tax return and other supporting documentation, his 2018 income determination was incomplete and opined Father's 2018 income was likely higher.
Leventis was qualified as an expert in certified public accounting and as a certified management accountant and a certified fraud examiner.
In its November 8, 2019 final order, the family court found Father was a non-credible witness and his pretrial conduct and trial testimony failed to offer the cooperation necessary to aid the court in resolving the parties' dispute. Specifically, the family court stated:
Father's lack of credibility, the lack of supporting documentation from Father regarding his income, the errors and inconsistencies on Father's Financial Declarations and tax returns, Father's personal expenditures, and the fact that multiple tax returns for multiple years were admittedly inaccurate, weighed
heavily in the Court's decision to adopt the income Mr. Leventis attributed to Father.
The family court found Father's annual gross income for 2017 was $203,067 and that his 2018 income was consistent with this figure. Accordingly, Father was ordered to pay $1,530 per month in child support as well as a total of $12,760 in retroactive child support. Using these gross income determinations, the family court also ordered the parties to split the children's unreimbursed healthcare costs, with Father paying 85% and Mother paying 15%.
Further, the family court found Father in contempt for willfully violating the Partial Marital Settlement Agreement by failing to provide Mother proper notice of his move to Chapin or his permanent address there, exposing the Twins to overnight visits with his girlfriend on multiple occasions, and by enrolling Oldest Son in Chapin High School for the 2018-19 school year. The family court also found Mother in contempt for failing to provide Father ninety days' notice of her intention to move her residence; failing to reimburse out-of-pocket healthcare expenses; and partially in contempt for failing to reimburse costs of extracurricular expenses.
The family court determined an award of attorney's fees to Mother was warranted based upon Father's substantially greater ability to pay his fees; Mother's beneficial results on most issues; Father's substantially higher income; and the potential negative impact to Mother's standard of living. In determining the reasonableness of the award, the family court found this case was complicated due to the issues associated with Father's financial declarations and the fractured relationships of the parents and children. Specifically, the family court found (1) Father's actions increased the extent and difficulty of the services rendered in this case by denying certain events occurred and (2) Father's lack of credibility regarding his Financial Declarations, tax returns, and bookkeeping increased the nature, extent, and difficulty of the attorney's work in this case and required Mother to hire a forensic accountant to determine his income. Further, Mother obtained beneficial results in proving Father understated his income and on the issues of child support and custody. As a result, the family court found Father responsible for $75,000 in attorney's fees and costs but permitted Father to deduct $988.18, which Mother owed him for medical costs and extracurricular costs.
Father filed a motion to reconsider on November 18, 2019. On January 7, 2020, the family court entered an amended final order making some minor changes to its earlier order. This appeal follows.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
I. Did the family court err in determining Father's income and child support determination?
II. Did the family court err in ordering Mother and Father to split extracurricular activity expenses?
III. Did the family court err in finding Father in contempt?
IV. Did the family court err in awarding attorney's fees and costs to Mother?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The appellate court reviews decisions of the family court de novo." Clark v. Clark, 423 S.C. 596, 603, 815 S.E.2d 772, 776 (Ct. App. 2018). "The appellate court generally defers to the findings of the family court regarding credibility because the family court is in a better position to observe the witness and his or her demeanor." Id. "The party contesting the family court's decision bears the burden of demonstrating the family court's factual findings are not supported by the preponderance of the evidence." Id.
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Child Support
A. Income Determination
Father argues the family court erred in determining his income because it improperly found he lacked credibility regarding his financial declarations and improperly qualified and relied on Leventis. As a result, Father contends the family court's calculations of child support, retroactive child support, unreimbursed medical expenses, and Mother's medical reimbursement are all rooted in error. We disagree.
Father defends attacks on his credibility by arguing that contrary to the family court's findings, he did not present consistently inaccurate information about his income. Rather, Father contends any errors in his financial disclosures were either inadvertent or immaterial. Regarding Leventis, Father argues the family court's reliance on his testimony was misplaced for two reasons. First, the court erred in qualifying Leventis as an expert in certified fraud examination because he did not have his certification for financial forensics for accountants. Second, Leventis's income calculations contained numerous factual errors and were based on assumptions and speculation.
"Ordinarily, the family court determines income based upon the financial declarations submitted by the parties." Spreeuw v. Barker, 385 S.C. 45, 65, 682 S.E.2d 843, 853 (Ct. App. 2009). "However, whe[n] the amounts reflected on the financial declaration are at issue, the court may rely on suitable documentation to verify income, such as pay stubs, receipts, or expenses covering at least one month." Id.; see also S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 114-4720(A)(4) (Supp. 2022) (providing that when a parent is self-employed, "gross income is defined as gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation, including employer's share of FICA" and the court should carefully review income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a business to determine actual levels of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child support obligation). Thus, the family court was required to determine whether the financial declarations submitted by the parties were reliable, and if not, what available information and documentation was credible in an attempt to verify income.
In Spreeuw, this court found that the evidence presented at trial and the father's own testimony revealed his financial declaration did not accurately reflect his gross income for that year, and therefore, this court was justified in questioning the veracity of his financial declaration in determining his gross income. 385 S.C. at 66, 682 S.E.2d at 853. As a result, this court found the family court did err in making its income determination based upon the only reliable evidence presented. Id. at 67, 682 S.E.2d at 854. This court further stated:
Father's refusal to provide the family court with a meaningful representation of his current income precludes him from complaining of the family court's ruling on appeal. Lastly, even if the family court erred in determining Father's gross income, such error was caused by Father's failure to provide the court with accurate financial information.Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Father argues the family court's income determination is based predominantly on inaccurate assumptions about Father's financial records and business practices. The family court found Father's financial declarations were not credible or reliable due to Father's admitted inaccurate information and omissions on multiple financial documents. As a result, the family court was required to look for any other potentially accurate information. This information came through the only expert testimony in the record-Leventis. Father then argues the family court erred in relying on Leventis's testimony because Leventis lacked a certification for financial forensics for accountants. However, Leventis was qualified as an expert in certified public accounting, certified management accounting, and certified fraud examination. Father attempts to discredit Leventis's testimony by arguing he lacked one certification for one of the categories he was qualified. The record demonstrates that Leventis reviewed the financials Father provided, including his bank statements, credit card statements, and tax returns.
Father admits (1) he produced inaccurate information on his claimed child expenses, (2) he made accounting mistakes on his tax returns, and (3) he failed to list property on his financial declarations.
The bulk of Father's arguments regarding inaccurate assumptions made by the family court and Leventis seem to quibble with the categorization of certain expenses and Leventis's lack of communication with Father, his bookkeeper, and his CPAs.
However, Father at no time substantiates his arguments with sufficient documentation demonstrating obvious error on part of either the family court or Leventis Therefore, Father's arguments fail due to his inability to supply the court with any meaningful representation of his income See Patrick v Britt, 364 S.C. 508, 513, 613 S.E.2d 541, 544 (Ct App 2005) (affirming the family court's determination of father's income when he refused to provide the court with any meaningful representation of his current income); Cox v Cox, 290 S.C. 245, 248, 349 S.E.2d 92, 93 (Ct App 1986) ("A party cannot complain of an error which his own conduct has induced"); Rish v Rish by and Through Barry, 296 S.C. 14, 17, 370 S.E.2d 102, 104 (Ct App 1988) (Bell, J, concurring) (stating that the court of appeals "does not sit to relieve self-inflicted wounds"); Gore v. Gore, 288 S.C. 438, 440-41, 343 S.E.2d 51, 52 (Ct. App. 1986) (denying relief when husband's conduct was to blame for the predicament in which he found himself). Moreover, the record shows the family court found Leventis's proposed figure was a proper determination of Father's income only after finding (1) Father failed to provide credible evidence supporting a lower income and (2) Leventis's figure was consistent with the expenses it reviewed in Father's 2017 bank records. Therefore, we find the family court did not err in relying upon Leventis's testimony when determining Father's income for purposes of child support.
However, in its order, the family court found Father's gross income for 2017 to be $203,067 and that his income for 2018 and 2019 "should remain on track as it was in 2017," as he still owned and operated the same business he did in 2017 along with new income streams from his father's business and other real estate holdings he inherited. This finding is not in alignment with Leventis's conclusion that Father's income for 2017 was $202,234.46 and for 2018 was $124,743. Thus, we modify the family court's income determination for 2017-2019 to match Leventis's 2017 determination of $202,234.46.
Leventis acknowledged he was unable to provide a complete analysis of Father's income for 2018 as he was unable to review Father's tax return.
Because this finding is dispositive, we need not address Father's arguments as to his income calculation for retroactive child support and unreimbursed medical expenses. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (finding this court need not address issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive).
B. Extracurricular Expenses
Father argues that although the family court's final order did not address extracurricular expenses for the children and Mother did not file a motion for reconsideration, in considering Father's motion for reconsideration, the family court, sua sponte, required Father to contribute 85% of the twins' extracurricular expenses. Father argues the family court's final orders supersede the parties' prior agreement and the parties' prior agreement on extracurricular activities was no longer operable. Father contends there was no testimony that he agreed to pay child support plus a portion of the twins' extracurricular activities. Thus, Father argues the family court could not modify its original final order pursuant to Rule 60(a), SCRCP. We disagree. In its final order, the family court stated "the parties agreed to divide extracurricular expenses." Father then asked the court to "make it clear whether and how any extracurricular expenses are to be divided." In response, the family court clarified its final order and stated the "parties shall continue to divide the cost of such expenses pro-rata per the Guidelines (now 85% Defendant/15% Plaintiff)." Therefore, the family court's ruling on extracurricular activity expenses was procedurally proper.
Father next argues South Carolina's child support guidelines already address recreational expenses as being one of the expenses considered in determining the appropriate support obligation. Thus, Father argues that to require him to pay additional child support to cover an expense the guidelines already anticipate is a deviation from the child support guidelines and obligates Father to pay twice for these expenses. As such, Father contends the family court did not follow proper procedure because the family court failed to make "written findings that clearly state the nature and extent of the variation from the guidelines."
"When determining the appropriate child support amount, the family court considers the Guidelines." Jackson v. Jackson, 432 S.C. 415, 426-27, 853 S.E.2d 344, 350 (Ct. App. 2020); see also S.C. Code Ann. §§ 43-5-580(b) (2015), 63-17-470 (2010); S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 114-4710 (Supp. 2022). "Regulation 114-4710 and subsection 63-17-470(C) list factors unaccounted for by the Guidelines that the family court is required to consider when determining whether to deviate from the Guidelines." Id. at 427, 853 S.E.2d at 350. S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 114-4710(B)(12) states:
The court may deviate from the guidelines based on an agreement between the parties if both parties are represented by counsel . . . . The court still has the discretion and the independent duty to determine if the amount is reasonable and in the best interest of the child(ren).
Here, the record demonstrates the parties agreed to divide extracurricular expenses in their divorce decree, and Father agreed to be solely responsible for the cost of travel ball. Therefore, the family court did not err in deviating from the Guidelines.
II. Contempt
Father argues the family court erred in finding him in contempt for failing to notify Mother of his proposed move to Chapin and for enrolling Oldest Son at Chapin High School for summer school and the 2018-2019 school year. We reverse only as to the contempt finding for enrolling Oldest Son at Chapin High School.
A. Intent to Move and Permanent Addresses
The partial marital settlement agreement contained two mandates on parental relocation: "Each parent shall keep the other advised as to their permanent address, e-mail address, home, cell, and work phone numbers" and "Each parent shall give the other ninety (90) days' notice of any intention to move his or her residence."
Father argues that on March 7, 2018, Father notified Mother that he was planning on moving on or after May 15 and that he did not move until July 2018. Father argues he did not know when he would be moving and no court order required him to notify Mother of his new address until he permanently moved.
The family court found Father in contempt because the evidence presented demonstrated that, unbeknownst to Mother, Father and his then-girlfriend entered into a lease for a residence in Chapin on March 13, 2018. Father failed to give Mother the address when they exchanged emails on the issue. The family court found that the only specific information Father provided Mother regarding an impending move was in an email from March 7, 2018.
A party is guilty of contempt when he willfully disobeys a court order. Burns v. Burns, 323 S.C. 45, 48, 448 S.E.2d 571, 572-73 (Ct. App. 1994). "A finding of contempt is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is without evidentiary support." Id. Once the party seeking a contempt finding makes a prima facie showing by pleading the order and demonstrating noncompliance, "the burden shifts to the respondent to establish his defense and inability to comply." Noojin v. Noojin, 417 S.C. 300, 307, 789 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Eaddy v. Oliver, 345 S.C. 39, 42, 545 S.E.2d 830, 832 (Ct. App. 2001)).
The family court did not err in finding Father in contempt for failing to provide the required notice to Mother of his intent to move. The partial marital settlement agreement specifically required, "Each parent shall keep the other advised as to their permanent address," and "Each parent shall give the other ninety (90) days' notice of any intention to move his or her residence." It is apparent that Father had the premeditated intention of moving. Although he gave Mother notice of this intention on March 7, he specifically stated "it is my intention to move, on or after May 15." However, the record demonstrates Father signed a lease agreement on March 13, 2017, for a one-year lease in Chapin. The record further demonstrates that Father was aware of the requirements of the partial marital settlement agreement and willfully disobeyed it by failing to provide 90 days notice of his intent to move. See Welchel v. Boyter, 260 S.C. 418, 421, 196 S.E.2d 496, 498 (1973) (to support a contempt finding, language of a court order "must be clear and certain rather than implied"); Campione v. Best, 435 S.C. 451, 460, 868 S.E.2d 378, 382 (Ct. App. 2021) (holding that "failure to obey [a court order] is not excused just because a party dons blinders and convinces himself a court order does not mean what it plainly says").
B. School
The family court's June 13, 2018 temporary order required the children to finish the school year in Richland School District Two. Further, the family court "f[ound] it is in the best interests of the children for this case to be 'fast[-]tracked' in order for a determination to be made as to the children's school enrollment prior to school resuming in August." Mother argued Father was in contempt of this provision for enrolling Oldest Son at Chapin High School in a "credit recovery" summer school program for 2018. Father argues Oldest Son finished his school year at Blythewood and Father did not remove him from Richland School District Two until after the school year ended. Further, Father argues there is nothing in the court's temporary order that prevented him from enrolling Oldest Son in summer school. Father argues that although Oldest Son attended summer school in Chapin, it did not mean he would necessarily attend there in the fall.
We find the family court erred in holding Father in contempt for enrolling Oldest Son in summer school at Chapin High School. As noted earlier, "[c]ivil contempt occurs when a party willfully disobeys a clear and definite court order." Campione, 435 S.C. at 457, 868 S.E.2d at 381. The language of the temporary order needed to be "clear and certain rather than implied." Welchel, 260 S.C. at 421, 196 S.E.2d at 498. The family court's temporary order specifically required the children to finish the remainder of the school year in Richland School District Two and noted that the case was to be "fast-tracked" to determine future school enrollment. While it can be implied that this order restricted the parties from enrolling the children elsewhere, it does not specifically say so. As such, the evidence fails to demonstrate that Father willfully disobeyed the court's order. See Campione, 435 S.C. at 459, 868 S.E.2d at 382 ("We acknowledge a party who attempts in good faith to comply with a court order should not be held in contempt."). Therefore, we reverse the family court's finding that Father was in contempt for enrolling Oldest Son at Chapin High School for summer school and the following school year.
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES & COSTS
Father argues the family court made numerous errors and omissions in its attorney's fee award along with greatly overstating his income. Thus, Father argues these errors, at minimum, provide the basis to reduce the attorney's fee award. In the alternative, Father argues that although the family court found he "has substantially greater ability to pay his fees than Mother," Mother has only incurred $90,591 in fees and costs while Father has incurred $248,761.25. Father argues that because Mother did not claim to owe any outstanding fees and was able to pay her ongoing fees, the family court's findings that "Mother's standard of living would be affected substantially" and "[t]he effect on Father's standard of living is much less than that of Mother" are not justified. Even with their income disparity, Father contends he does not have a greater ability than Mother to pay his fees and there was no justification for a finding that a financial expert was required to determine his income. Furthermore, Father argues the family court erred in requiring him to pay fees equivalent to 37% of his imputed annual income.
In determining whether to award attorney's fees and costs, a family court must consider: "(1) each party's ability to pay his or her own fee; (2) the beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial conditions; and (4)the effect of the fee on each party's standard of living." Srivastava v. Srivastava, 411 S.C. 481, 489, 769 S.E.2d 442, 447 (Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Farmer v. Farmer, 388 S.C. 50, 57, 694 S.E.2d 47, 51 (Ct. App. 2010)). If fees are warranted, the court then considers the following factors set forth in Glasscock v. Glasscock, 304 S.C. 158, 403 S.E.2d 313 (1991) when determining the amount: "(1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5)beneficial results obtained; and (6) customary legal fees for similar services." Srivastava, 411 S.C. at 489, 769 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Farmer, 388 S.C. at 57, 694 S.E.2d at 51).
"A party's ability to pay is an essential factor in determining whether an attorney's fee should be awarded, as are the parties' respective financial conditions and the effect of the award on each party's standard of living." Rogers v. Rogers, 343 S.C. 329, 334, 540 S.E.2d 840, 842 (2001). An attorney's fee award is excessive when it represents a substantial portion of the paying spouse's gross annual income. See Srivastava, at 490, 769 S.E.2d at 447 (finding an attorney's fee award representing 90% of the paying spouse's gross annual income was excessive); Rogers, 343 S.C. at 334, 540 S.E.2d at 842 (finding an attorney's fee award representing 16% of the paying spouse's annual income was excessive). Although the ability to pay is an essential factor, "if the case [] presents an added dimension of an uncooperative spouse who hampers a final resolution of the issues in dispute, we will not reward an adversary spouse for such conduct." Blackwell v. Fulgum, 375 S.C. 337, 346, 652 S.E.2d 427, 431 (Ct. App. 2007).
When presented with similar facts, this court found an attorney's fees award representing approximately 40% of the father's annual income was not excessive in large part due to the father's uncooperative conduct. See Spreeuw, 385 S.C. at 72- 73, 682 S.E.2d at 857 (finding an award of attorney's fees was appropriate when the father's "uncooperative conduct in discovery and his evasiveness in answering questions with respect to his financial situation . . . greatly contributed to the litigation costs"). Based upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, the family court did not err in awarding attorney's fees. The family court's order went through a detailed analysis of both the E.D.M. and Glasscock factors in determining whether to award attorney's fees and the total amount to award.
Highlighted in this analysis is the family court's determination that this case was complicated due to split custody, ongoing parent-child relationship issues, and allegations of parental alienation. Further, the family court found that Father's evasive behavior, inaccurate disclosures, and a general lack of credibility increased the extent and difficulty of this case. The lynchpin of the award stems from Father's credibility problems and failure to be forthright during trial. The family court noted "[r]ather than providing a direct answer when it became clear that he had the information, it took several questions to elicit the information" and even then Father's answers were evasive and vague. Father admitted there were multiple mistakes and inaccuracies across his tax returns accompanied by "sloppy bookkeeping." The family court stated that it relies heavily on financial declarations, especially in cases in which a party's income is in dispute, and any inaccuracies are taken seriously and can cast doubt on the veracity of the documents. Throughout the trial, the record demonstrates that Father failed to update discovery responses or provide supporting documentation for many of his arguments and claims. Based on the foregoing, we find the family court's award of attorney's fees and costs to Mother was appropriate when considering the relevant factors. Thus, we affirm the family court's award.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we MODIFY the family court's income determination to match Leventis's 2017 determination, REVERSE the family court's finding Father in contempt for enrolling Oldest Son at Chapin High School for summer school and the following school year, and AFFIRM the remainder of the family court's order.
GEATHERS and VERDIN, JJ., concur.