¶ 8. Hicks argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hicks was a convicted felon because the evidence presented was insufficient to establish that Hicks was the Mark Hicks convicted in court files number 7532 and 7866. The State disagrees, relying on Jensen's testimony as to the information contained in the court file and the certified final judgment and sentence of the court in cause numbers 7532 and 7866 introduced into evidence, as well as this Court's holding in Branning v. State, 224 So.2d 579, 580 (Miss. 1969). In Branning, 224 So.2d at 580, the State sought to increase the criminal penalties against Branning, pursuant to Section 6866 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1968), since this was his third offense.

Appellant argues that inasmuch as his prior convictions occurred before January 1, 1977, the date section 99-19-81 became effective, the application of the sentencing enhancement statute constitutes an ex post facto law in violation of the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10. In Branning v. State, 224 So.2d 579 (Miss. 1969), this Court addressed an analogous contention with respect to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act 1962. Defendant Branning was given an enhanced sentence under the Act and argued on appeal that since his prior convictions occurred before the passage of the Act, the application of the enhanced sentence provision constituted an ex post facto law. This Court rejected that argument and upheld the sentence, stating:

Smith v. State , 465 So.2d 999, 1003 (Miss. 1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Branning v. State , 224 So.2d 579, 580–81 (Miss. 1969) ). It is not an "ex post facto" punishment for his prior burglary.

It is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive one." Smith v. State, 465 So.2d 999, 1003 (Miss. 1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Branning v. State, 224 So.2d 579, 580-81 (Miss. 1969))

" Smith v. State, 465 So. 2d 999, 1003 (Miss. 1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Branning v. State, 224 So. 2d 579, 580-81 (Miss. 1969)). Chism's life sentence—the one for which he seeks leave to file a PCR motion—is not retroactive additional punishment for his 2009 conviction. It is an enhanced penalty for his 2016 conviction.

1985); (2) the commutation of prison time statute which was in effect at the time the prisoner was sent to prison as opposed to the statute that was in effect at time prisoner was sentenced; Post v. Ruth, 354 So.2d 1111, 1112 (Miss. 1978); and (3) the Uniform Narcotics Drug Act, which provided for more severe punishment for a third drug related offense, even though the defendant's first two convictions occurred prior to the enactment of the Act; Branning v. State, 224 So.2d 579 (Miss. 1969). In each of the previous cases we held that the defendant had not been subjected to an ex post facto law in violation of U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10.

1973); McGowan v. State, 269 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1972); Branning v. State, 224 So.2d 579 (Miss. 1969). 39 Am.Jur.2d Habitual Criminals, etc., § 20, (1968).

The records did furnish a presumption of such identity, however, which could have been easily overcome if erroneous. See: Branning v. State, 224 So.2d 579 (Miss. 1969); Goldsby v. State, 240 Miss. 647, 123 So.2d 429 (1960); and 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 103, pp. 180-82 (Torcai ed. 13th ed. 1972). We do add the State would be well advised to be prepared to go further than mere records, however, especially where the name is not unusual or uncommon.

1973); McGowan v. State, 269 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1972); and Branning v. State, 224 So.2d 579 (Miss. 1969). (310 So.2d at 910)

1973); Ladnier v. State, 273 So.2d 169 (Miss. 1973); McGowan v. State, 269 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1972); and Branning v. State, 224 So.2d 579 (Miss. 1969). In a case involving Tennessee statutes on habitual offenders, the United States Supreme Court in Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S.Ct. 1, 99 L.Ed.