Opinion
Case No. 20020634-CA.
Filed July 1, 2004. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Third District, Sandy Department, The Honorable Sandra Peuler.
D. Bruce Oliver, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Kirk A. Cullimore and Lisa M. McGarry, Sandy, for Appellee.
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Eric H. Fox appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Brandywine Apartments (Brandywine), which concluded that Fox was in unlawful detainer and ordered him to pay damages to Brandywine.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "When determining the propriety of a trial court's grant of summary judgment, `we review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, affording those legal conclusions no deference.' Additionally, `"we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."'" Nyman v. Anchor Dev., L.L.C., 2003 UT 27, ¶ 7, 73 P.3d 357 (citations omitted). "`Whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous is a question of law which we review for correctness.'"Oliphant v. Estate of Brunetti, 2002 UT App 375, ¶ 14, 64 P.3d 587 (citation omitted).
"The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intentions of the parties to the contract." When interpreting a contract, "we look to the writing itself to ascertain the parties' intentions, and we consider each contract provision . . . in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." "If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law."
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ¶ 17, 84 P.3d 1134 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). "`Contract language may be ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or if the terms used to express the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible meanings.'" Oliphant, 2002 UT App 375 at ¶ 14 (citation omitted).
In this case, an examination of the disputed provisions of the lease shows that there was no ambiguity among these provisions. Both Fox and Brandywine agreed to amend the lease term to provide that Fox would be a tenant-at-will, and the five-day notice had the effect of terminating that tenancy. However, neither party amended the portion of the lease that stated that upon the end of the lease term, the lease "will automatically renew on a month-to-month basis." Furthermore, a provision within the lease agreement providing Brandywine an additional fifty dollars a month should the lease become a month-to-month lease was filled in. Examining the four corners of the document, we conclude, as matter of law, see Green River Canal Co., 2003 UT 50 at ¶ 17, that the lease agreement unambiguously provided that upon termination of the tenancy-at-will, the lease reverted to a month-to-month lease.
We reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in its entirety and remand for such further proceedings as may be necessary.
WE CONCUR: Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge and William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.