Opinion
746 C.D. 2019
09-10-2021
Lawrence Brandon, Appellant v. Tax Claim Bureau, Director, JoAnn Ranck
OPINION NOT REPORTED
Submitted: July 16, 2021
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, JUDGE
Lawrence Brandon (Appellant) appeals, pro se, the order of the Cambria County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) denying his request to set aside the March 29, 2019 tax sale of the property located at 409 Cedar Street, Johnstown, Cambria County (Property), pursuant to the Real Estate Tax Sale Law (Tax Sale Law), on the basis that he did not have standing to contest the sale. We affirm.
Act of July 7, 1947, P.L. 1368, as amended, 72 P.S. §§5860.101-5860.803.
On April 16, 2019, Appellant filed a petition to set aside the tax sale of the Property, and to grant him a hearing to determine if the notice requirements of the Tax Sale Law had been satisfied prior to the sale because they "apply to interested parties, creditors and mortgagee[s.]" Certified Record Item 5 at 2. At the trial court hearing, Appellant asserted that the Property was owned by his late aunt, Naomi Spears, and that his mother was the beneficiary of his late aunt's estate. N.T. 5/13/19 at 1-2. When counsel for the Tax Claim Bureau asserted that Appellant did not have standing to file his petition, Appellant stated: "Once my mother died, the Power of Attorney died." Id. at 4-5. Nevertheless, Appellant asserted that he had standing to contest the sale based on a power of attorney that was executed by his mother as the executrix of his late aunt's estate. Id. Ultimately, on May 14, 2019, the trial court issued an order denying Appellant's petition based on his lack of standing.
"N.T. 5/13/19" refers to the transcript of the trial court's May 13, 2019 hearing.
Appellant then filed the instant appeal of the trial court's order, outlining how the various provisions of the Tax Sale Law were violated in this case. See Appellant's Brief at iv, vi, 1-4. However, in his appellate brief, Appellant does not address his standing to file the petition in the first instance. As a result, he has waived any allegation of trial court error in this regard. Moreover, if we were to address the merits of this issue, we would affirm the trial court's order denying the petition based on that portion of the thorough and well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Norman A. Krumenacker, III, in the matter of Brandon v. Tax Claim Bureau, Jo Anne Ranck, Director (C.P. Cambria, No. 2019-1175 Civil Division, filed August 5, 2019), addressing Appellant's lack of standing to file the petition.
"A challenge to standing raises a question of law, therefore 'our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary as we may examine the entire contents of the record.'" In re Administrative Order No. 1-MD-2003 , 936 A.2d 1, 7 n.4 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted).
See Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa. Super. 2005) ("Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.") (citations omitted).
Pa. R.A.P. 2111(a)(4) provides that "[t]he brief of the appellant . . . shall consist of the following matters, separately and distinctly entitled and in the following order: Statement of the questions involved." In turn, Pa. R.A.P. 2116(a) states, in relevant part:
The statement of the questions involved must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement will be deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein. No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.See also Faherty v. Gracias, 874 A.2d 1239, 1245 (Pa. Super. 2005) ("As the rule explicitly declares and our case law binds, this rule is 'in the highest degree mandatory, admitting of no exception.' Yet, [the] appellant's argument does not even suggest how the trial court erred. This substantially impedes our ability to effectively review [the] appellant's claims . . . .") (citations omitted).Additionally, Pa. R.A.P. 2111(a)(8) provides that "[t]he brief of the appellant . . . shall consist of the following matters, separately and distinctly entitled and in the following order: Argument for appellant." In turn, Pa. R.A.P. 2119(a) states that "[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part . . . the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent." See also Commonwealth v. Spotz, 716 A.2d 580, 585 n.5 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070 (1999) (holding that the failure to develop an issue in an appellate brief results in a waiver); Browne v. Department of Transportation, 843 A.2d 429, 435 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) ("At the appellate level, a party's failure to include analysis and relevant authority results in waiver.").
Accordingly, the trial court's order is affirmed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10 th day of September, 2021, the order of the Cambria County Court of Common Pleas dated May 14, 2019, is AFFIRMED.
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