It is negligence of the defendant and not the fact of injury which authorizes recovery. Brand v. Pope, 103 Ga. App. 489, 491 ( 119 S.E.2d 723); Fair v. Huddle, 98 Ga. App. 466, 469 ( 106 S.E.2d 72). But we do not agree with the defendants' contention that the fact that the injury was connected with a glass-door unit of a type which is widely used in most modern residential buildings is determinative of the case and requires a finding that there can be no negligence attributable to defendants as a matter of law. We can not say that glass doors or glass panels in general are not perils requiring no precautions or warnings.

See Wittenberg v. 450 Capitol Assocs., 207 Ga. App. 260, 264 ( 427 SE2d 547) (1993) ("Where the distraction [or in this case concealment] is self-induced, it may not excuse one's failure to exercise ordinary care for one's own safety."); Kahn v. Graper, 114 Ga. App. 572, 577 (2) ( 152 SE2d 10) (1966) ("an allegation that the alleged peril was concealed by darkness [does not] meet the requirements for alleging the existence of a mantrap or hidden peril, or of wanton and wilful negligence"). See Brand v. Pope, 103 Ga. App. 489, 492 ( 119 SE2d 723) (1961) (affirming dismissal on general demurrer plaintiffs complaint alleging no defect other than allowing sliding glass door to be closed without prior warning to plaintiff). Although Brand was distinguished by Moody v. Southland Investment Corp., 126 Ga. App. 225, 232 (1) ( 190 SE2d 578) (1972), on the ground that Brand failed to develop the distinction between plate glass and tempered safety glass, the instant case does not turn on such a distinction.

Remedial legislation is found in Ga. L. 1970, pp. 151-153, as amended ( Code Ann. § 92A-2001 et seq.); but since this legislation was not in effect at the time of the injury complained of, and hence will not support a finding of negligence per se, the question before us is whether the evidence otherwise would have authorized a finding of negligence on the part of defendant landlord in maintaining the sliding door with sheet glass without decals or other markers to indicate when the door was closed. The trial judge apparently felt that since sheet glass was frequently used in this type construction, the question as to negligence in this regard was doubtful; that even if transparent tempered glass had been used, plaintiff, under the circumstances of the case, would nevertheless have walked into the door and perhaps suffered a bruise; and, more importantly, that he felt Brand v. Pope, 103 Ga. App. 489 ( 119 S.E.2d 723) required him to direct the verdict for defendant. "An Act to prohibit the use, sale, fabrication, assembly, glazing, installation of products commonly known as sliding glass doors, entrance doors, fixed glazed panels, storm doors, shower doors; tub enclosures or other glazed structures for use in hazardous locations, or on any public bus or train unless they contain safety glazing material; to define terms; to require certain labeling; to require posting, painting or marking of certain doors; to provide penalties; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes."

The jury might also have been authorized to find that the failure to extend the guardrail produced conditions which were less safe than those provided by ordinarily prudent owners or occupiers of land for their invitees. Pettit v. Stiles Hotel Co., 97 Ga. App. 137 ( 102 S.E.2d 693); Brand v. Pope, 103 Ga. App. 489, 491 ( 119 S.E.2d 723). In Taff v. Harris, 118 Ga. App. 611 ( 164 S.E.2d 881), it was held that the failure to place guardrails on the entrance porch of a dwelling was not negligence. While the absence of guardrails may have been held not to constitute negligence in the Harris case, it cannot be said that as a matter of law this would never be negligence. Whether or not this failure was negligent would have to be determined upon the circumstances of each case.

Floor coverings, such as the carpet used here, are likewise common in use and their use is not, of itself, negligence. Gibson v. Consolidated Credit Corp., 110 Ga. App. 170 (1) ( 138 S.E.2d 77). And see Holloman v. Henry Grady Hotel Co., 42 Ga. App. 347 ( 156 S.E. 275); Brand v. Pope, 103 Ga. App. 489, 491 ( 119 S.E.2d 723); Taff v. Harris, 118 Ga. App. 611 ( 164 S.E.2d 881); Goodwin v. Mullins, 122 Ga. App. 84 ( 176 S.E.2d 551). "The plaintiff had no right to complain of the absence of an accommodation of an unusual kind." Tinley v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 70 Ga. App. 390, 394 ( 28 S.E.2d 322), and see Pettit v. Stiles Hotel Co., 97 Ga. App. 137 ( 102 S.E.2d 693).

Watson v. C. S. Bank, 103 Ga. App. 535, 536 ( 120 S.E.2d 62). Before a recovery is authorized for the plaintiff in an action against a homeowner for injuries suffered by the plaintiff while in the home it must be shown that the conditions allegedly causing the injuries were less safe than those provided by ordinarily prudent homeowners for their invitees. Brand v. Pope, 103 Ga. App. 489, 491 ( 119 S.E.2d 723). Accord: Taff v. Harris, 118 Ga. App. 611 ( 164 S.E.2d 881); Pettit v. Stiles Hotel Co., 97 Ga. App. 137 ( 102 S.E.2d 693). And, if the object over which the plaintiff falls is not hidden, camouflaged, defective, or intrinsically unsafe, and is conspicuous, obvious, and apparent so that an ordinarily prudent landowner would not reasonably anticipate danger from its existence or location to a person in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, there is no liability on the part of the landowner or occupier. See, e.g., Lane Drug Stores v. Story, 72 Ga. App. 886 ( 35 S.E.2d 472) (stool in aisle of defendant's store); DeLay v. Rich's, Inc., 86 Ga. App. 30 ( 70 S.E.2d 546) (footstool in aisle of defendant's shoe department); Tinley v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 70 Ga. App. 390 ( 28 S.E.2d 322) (scales in aisle of defendant's store); National Bellas-Hess Co. v. Patrick, 49 Ga. App. 280 ( 175 S.E. 255) (planks in aisle of defendant's store); McMullan v. Kroger Co., 84 Ga.

See Pettit v. Stiles Hotel Co., 97 Ga. App. 137 ( 102 S.E.2d 693), and citations." Brand v. Pope, 103 Ga. App. 489, 491 ( 119 S.E.2d 723). There is no absolute duty on the part of the owner of premises to illuminate steps in the absence of any contractual or statutory obligation or some unusual or dangerous condition existing which requires special warning. See Maloof v. Blackmon, 105 Ga. App. 207, 208 (2) ( 124 S.E.2d 441) and cit.; Kreiss v. Allatoona Landing, Inc., supra, p. 432.

No evidence of any kind was offered by the plaintiff in opposition to the motion. It is urged in the defendants' brief that the case of Brand v. Pope, 103 Ga. App. 489 ( 119 S.E.2d 723) controls this case and demands affirmance of the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment. The Brand case was brought to recover for injuries sustained when the plaintiff walked through a glass door.

4. The defendant urges that the petition is fatally defective, and the trial judge properly sustained the general demurrer attacking it, for the reason that there are no allegations which state that the steps complained of were less safe than other similar steps maintained by similar charitable organizations or churches, citing the case of Brand v. Pope, 103 Ga. App. 489, 491 ( 119 S.E.2d 723). The Brand case does not support this contention.

In the instant case, Emily Waugh had never before entered a room in the defendant motel nor had used the east door adjoining the panel for that purpose.         In Rosenberg v. Hartman, supra; Acme Laundry Co. v. Ford, Tex.Civ.App., 284 S.W.2d 745 (1955); Snyder v. Ginn, 202 Va. 8, 116 S.E.2d 31 (1960); Brand v. Pope, 103 Ga.App. 489, 119 S.E.2d 723 (1961) wherein recovery was denied to the party who collided with the glass door or panel, the plaintiff was an adult. In A. C. Burton Co. v. Stasny, supra, the injured individual was sixteen years of age.