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Bradshaw v. City of New York

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Dec 7, 2021
21-CV-10142 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2021)

Opinion

21-CV-10142 (LTS)

12-07-2021

JAY BRADSHAW, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al, Defendants.


ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(G)

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Upstate Correctional Facility, brings this action pro se. Plaintiff also requests to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Plaintiff is barred, however, from filing any new action IFP while he is a prisoner. See Bradshaw v. City of New York, ECF 1:18-CV-8215, 40 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2019) (granting defendants' motion to revoke Plaintiff's IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). That order relied on the “three-strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which provides that:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action [IFP] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Although Plaintiff has filed this new action seeking IFP status, his complaint does not show that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights during their criminal investigation of him. Because these allegations do not suggest that Plaintiff is in imminent danger of serious physical injury, he is barred from filing this action IFP.

An imminent danger is one “existing at the time the complaint is filed.” Malik v. McGinnis, 293 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2002). A danger “that has dissipated by the time a complaint is filed” is not sufficient. Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2009).

CONCLUSION

The Court denies Plaintiff's request to proceed IFP, and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice under the PLRA's “three-strikes” rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff remains barred from filing any future action IFP while he is in custody, unless he alleges that he is under imminent threat of serious physical injury. Id.

Plaintiff may commence a new action by paying the filing fee. If Plaintiff does so, that complaint will be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to dismiss any civil rights complaint from a prisoner if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Court may bar any vexatious litigant (including a nonprisoner) from filing future actions (even if the filing fee is paid) without first obtaining leave from the Court. See In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 227-30 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing sanctions courts may impose on vexatious litigants, including “leave of court” requirement).

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.

SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Bradshaw v. City of New York

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Dec 7, 2021
21-CV-10142 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2021)
Case details for

Bradshaw v. City of New York

Case Details

Full title:JAY BRADSHAW, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al, Defendants.

Court:United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Dec 7, 2021

Citations

21-CV-10142 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2021)