Opinion
Record No. 0260-93-3
Decided: May 10, 1994
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOTETOURT COUNTY, George E. Honts, III, Judge
Affirmed.
Wayne D. Inge for appellant.
Janet F. Rosser, Assistant Attorney General (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Barrow, Coleman and Koontz
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Jerry Wayne Bradley (Bradley) appeals his conviction by a jury for grand larceny in violation of Code Sec. 18.2-95. Bradley concedes the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he participated in the theft of a trailer containing seven hundred cases of beef. In this appeal, he contends that the Commonwealth failed to adduce evidence showing that the value of that meat exceeded two hundred dollars, rendering his crime petit larceny. We disagree and affirm Bradley's conviction.
The parties are familiar with the facts of this case. Accordingly, we restate only those facts necessary to explain our holding. Eugene Flinchum (Flinchum) testified that he and Bradley participated in the theft of a truck load of meat belonging to the Doughtie Foods Company (Doughtie). Flinchum further testified that he and Bradley took some of the meat to a flea market in Roanoke County and sold some of the meat to "a man named Joe" for eight hundred dollars and sold several roasts to another individual for fifty dollars.
John Ewing, Jr. (Ewing), security manager for Doughtie, testified that the stolen meat belonged to his employer. He testified that the retail value of the meat was between seventeen thousand dollars and twenty thousand dollars. Referring to an invoice, which was not introduced into evidence, Ewing further testified that the wholesale cost of the beef to his employer was one dollar and forty-eight cents per pound and that the total weight of the shipment was eight thousand four hundred and thirty-six pounds.
On cross-examination, Ewing testified that he would not, in the normal course of his business duties, have knowledge of the price of meat or other goods purchased and sold by his employer. He further testified that when called upon to present evidence in court about the value of goods stolen from his employer, he consulted with other employees to determine the value. In this instance, Ewing received the invoice containing the value of the meat shipment by tele-facsimile transmission the day before trial.
On redirect examination, Ewing testified that the invoice was the actual bill-of-lading for the meat and was a record kept in the normal course of business. The invoice was not offered into evidence. Ewing also stated that although he had no direct knowledge of the price of the beef stolen in this instance, in seven years with his employer he had never known the wholesale price of beef to be less than one dollar per pound.
Bradley contended at trial that Ewing's testimony was inadmissible because it was not based on his personal knowledge. He also argued that Ewing's testimony was inadmissible hearsay because it was merely a recitation of facts contained in the invoice. Moreover, he contended that the invoice was not admissible as a business record because it had not been properly authenticated. The Commonwealth argued that Ewing was competent to testify about the value of the meat because his duties required him to examine the invoice to determine the value of the property stolen and in doing so he relied upon the business record used by his employer. Bradley responded that the record had not been authenticated and was not admissible as a business record. The trial court, while agreeing that the invoice was not admissible, overruled the motion on the ground that Ewing's position as security manager required him to be aware of the value of property stolen and that his testimony that he had never known the price of meat to be less than one dollar per pound was a matter the weight and credibility of which was for the jury to decide.
Code Sec. 18.2-95 defines grand larceny, as relevant to the facts presented here, as theft "not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of $200 or more." Similarly, Code Sec. 18.2-96 defines petit larceny as theft "not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of less than $200." Accordingly, the value of the goods is an essential element of the crime of grand larceny, and the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof that an article has some value is sufficient to warrant a conviction of petit larceny, but where the value of the thing stolen determines the grade of the offense, the value must be alleged and the Commonwealth must prove the value to be the statutory amount.
Wright v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 132, 139, 82 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1954).
We recognize that testimony as to value is opinion evidence requiring a demonstration of the witness's knowledge of the subject prior to admission. However, it is widely recognized that a lay witness may express an opinion as to value without possessing expert knowledge of the subject matter. See Stainback v. Stainback, 11 Va. App. 13, 23, 396 S.E.2d 686, 692 (1990). The rule extends to valuation of both real and personal property, in both criminal and civil cases. See 2 Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia Sec. 17-9 (4th ed. 1993). The witness need only have had an opportunity to become familiar with the property and to form an opinion as to its true value. See Kerr v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 169 Va. 149, 155-56, 192 S.E. 741, 743 (1937).
The standard of qualification of a witness by whom opinion testimony regarding property values is offered is usually not fixed very high. It is not required of the witness that he be an expert or skilled in the strict sense of such terms. It is universally recognized that opinion testimony of nonexperts who have sufficient knowledge of the value of the property in question or have had ample opportunity for forming a correct opinion as to it is admissible.
Haynes v. Glenn, 197 Va. 746, 750, 91 S.E.2d 433, 436 (1956) (citations omitted).
Bradley's contention that Ewing lacked "personal knowledge" of the value of the meat is without merit. Ewing was an employee of the owner of the stolen property. One of his duties as security manager was to ascertain the value of property stolen from the company and testify as to the ownership and value of the property in court. Ewing did not express an uninformed opinion about the value of the meat. Rather, he gave an opinion based on information obtained by him in the normal course of his duties. The weight and credibility to be given to Ewing's testimony was a matter for the jury to determine. Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to overrule Bradley's objection and motion to strike Ewing's evidence.
Additionally, Flinchum's testimony that a small fraction of the property stolen was sold shortly after its theft for eight hundred and fifty dollars was an inherently reliable indication of the value of the property stolen, from which the jury could have determined that its total value was at least two hundred dollars. We cannot say that the Commonwealth failed to produce evidence of theft of goods valued in excess of two hundred dollars in support of the charge of grand larceny or that the jury erred in accepting that evidence as credible proof of the value of the goods stolen. Accordingly, Bradley's conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.