Opinion
No. 05-14-01610-CR
01-27-2016
STEPHEN DAYNE BRADFORD, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-14-54745-I
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Fillmore, Myers, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Fillmore
After finding Stephen Dayne Bradford guilty of robbery and enhancement paragraphs true, the trial court sentenced him to sixty years' confinement. In a single issue on appeal, Bradford contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Bradford to represent himself at trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10, of the Texas Constitution. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Discussion
Bradford argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Bradford to represent himself without warning him of the dangers and disadvantages of waiving his right to legal representation. The State responds that the trial court acted within its discretion by not admonishing Bradford of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation because standby counsel was available to assist Bradford throughout the entirety of his trial.
Federal and state law guarantee a criminal defendant the right to the assistance of counsel, as well as the right to waive counsel and represent himself. U.S. CONST. amends. VI & XIV; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 10; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.05 (West 2005) (accused "shall have the right of being heard by himself, or counsel, or both"); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-820 (1975); Hatten v. State, 71 S.W.3d 332, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court recognized an independent right of self-representation, in addition to the previously recognized right to waive the assistance of counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819-21 ("[t]he Sixth Amendment, when naturally read, thus implies a right of self-representation").
A defendant can choose to proceed pro se by exercising his right of self-representation. See TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("[an accused] shall have the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or both . . ."); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818-20; Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Geeslin v. State, 600 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). When the right of self-representation was recognized in Faretta, the Supreme Court stated:
Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order completely and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)); see also Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626; Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Martin v. State, 630 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Accordingly, once the defendant asserts his right of self-representation, the trial court is obligated to advise the accused of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Ex parte Winton, 837 S.W.2d 134, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Williams v. State, 774 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd).
Self-representation may be facilitated by "standby counsel" whereby, "in response to a defendant's request for self-representation, the trial court instead allows the defendant's attorney to remain as counsel and be available to advise the defendant and participate in the case, or not, as requested by the defendant." Robertson v. State, 934 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 ("State may—even over objection by the accused—appoint a 'standby counsel' to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary"). When the trial court appoints standby counsel, the admonishments regarding dangers and disadvantages accompanying the waiver of the right to counsel and the decision to self-represent are not required. Walker v. State, 962 S.W.2d 124, 126-27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd) (although appellant conducted his own defense, he had access to standby counsel appointed by trial court; absence from the record of Faretta admonishments was not error); Robertson, 934 S.W.2d at 865-66.
See also Gordon v. State, No. 05-12-01520-CR, 2013 WL 6096547, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 19, 2013, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Stell v. State, No. 05-12-00578-CR, 2013 WL 3947179, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 29, 2013, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Newkirk v. State, No. 05-12-00202-CR, 2013 WL 222278, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 22, 2013, no pet.) (not designated for publication); Sumrell v. State, Nos. 05-09-00238-CR & 05-09-00239-CR, 2010 WL 3123302, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 26, 2011, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication); Blanton v. State, Nos. 05-05-01060-CR & 05-05-01061-CR, 2006 WL 2036615, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 21, 2006, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication); Young v. State, No. 05-98-00036-CR, 2000 WL 2676, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 4, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
Here, the trial court appointed Donald Guidry as counsel for Bradford. The record contains pretrial correspondence from Bradford to Guidry indicating he wanted to represent himself at trial. Bradford also wrote to the trial judge and stated he "refused" to allow Guidry to represent him at trial, and he would represent himself at trial. Bradford also filed a motion to "withdraw" or "release" Guidry as his counsel. Bradford then wrote to the District Clerk of Dallas County requesting his pro se motions be "pushed through" to be heard and ruled upon. At a pretrial hearing on August 13, 2014, Guidry informed the trial court that Bradford had expressed a desire to represent himself. The case was reset for another pretrial hearing. At that subsequent October 3, 2014 pretrial hearing, Guidry again advised the trial court that Bradford wanted to proceed to trial and to represent himself at that trial.
The case was called to trial on December 18, 2014. Guidry advised the trial judge Bradford wished to address the court regarding self-representation at trial. The trial judge inquired whether Bradford had ever tried a case before. Bradford stated he had been present at a prior trial and observed his court-appointed attorney's representation of him. Bradford informed the trial judge that he had completed high school and approximately a year and a half of college. The trial judge cautioned Bradford regarding the seriousness of the charge against him and the authorized range of punishment of twenty-five years' to life imprisonment, but Bradford persisted in his resolve to represent himself. At that time, Bradford signed a "Waiver of Right to Representation by Counsel" which was approved by the trial judge. By that waiver, Bradford acknowledged he had been advised of his right to representation by counsel in the trial of the pending charge against him and "[u]nderstanding [his] right to have counsel appointed for [him] free of charge if [he is] not able to employ counsel," but wished to waive that right and proceed without an attorney. The trial judge advised Bradford that Guidry would serve as standby counsel during trial if Bradford changed his mind and desired Guidry's assistance. The trial judge cautioned Bradford, "I think you're making a mistake, but if during the course of the trial, you have some questions or you want Guidry to come back in and try to help you, that's fine. He'll be here, and he can help you, okay?" The record demonstrates that during trial, Bradford was able to communicate clearly, conduct himself appropriately and respectfully, proceed in an orderly fashion, cross-examine the State's witnesses, make objections, and deliver closing argument. At completion of the trial, the trial judge assured the record reflected that Guidry had been present for the entirety of the trial.
Although the record reflects the trial judge stated he believed Bradford was making a mistake by representing himself, nothing in the record shows the judge admonished Bradford concerning the actual dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se. However, although Bradford was allowed to present his defense, the trial judge maintained appointed counsel as standby counsel at Bradford's disposal during trial. Where, as here, a defendant has standby counsel at his disposal, a trial court is not required to admonish a defendant on the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Robertson, 934 S.W.2d at 866. We therefore reject Bradford's contention that his constitutional rights were violated. We resolve Bradford's sole issue against him.
See Gordon, 2013 WL 6096547, at *2; Stell, 2013 WL 3947179, at *3; Newkirk, 2013 WL 222278, at *3; Sumrell, 2010 WL 3123302, at *2. --------
/Robert M. Fillmore/
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 141610F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F-14-54745-I.
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Justices Myers and Whitehill participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 27th day of January, 2016.