Opinion
Case No. 1:13-cv-909
12-23-2013
BRAD ALONZO BRADFORD, Plaintiff, v. BUTLER COUNTY SHERIFF RICHARD K. JONES, et al., Defendants.
Dlott, J.
Bowman, M.J.
ORDER AND REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a prisoner in state custody at the Chillicothe Correctional Institution in Chillicothe, Ohio, brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging his treatment when he was incarcerated at the Butler County Jail in Hamilton, Ohio. By separate Order issued this date, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a "litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or "wholly incredible." Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are "fantastic or delusional" in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be "liberally construed" and "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 ("dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim" under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well- pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Id. at 557. The complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff brings this § 1983 action against Butler County Sheriff, Richard K. Jones; "Warden" Nick Fisher; and unidentified paramedics and a doctor at the Butler County Jail. (Doc. 1, Complaint, p. 1). Plaintiff alleges that he is 54 years old and is disabled with various medical conditions, which include a crushed left leg from an incident that occurred in 2007 and hypertension that caused him to have a heart attack in 1999 and a stroke in 2000. (Id., pp. 1-2). Plaintiff also states that he had to have his gall bladder removed in May 2013 and was hospitalized for an infection in August 2013. (Id., p. 2).
On July 25, 2013, plaintiff was placed in the Butler County Jail. (Id., p. 1). Plaintiff alleges that he informed the "intake deputies" of his medical conditions and requested a "botto[m] bunk bottom range restriction." (Id., pp. 1-2). Medical staff were notified, and a "medic" responding to plaintiff's request "became very angry," stating to plaintiff:
Oh, you can climb a fucking ladder, but come in here and fucking bitch about your medical problems. Well if you die in here, it's going to be listed as natural causes and you're not getting any fucking pain medications.(Id., p. 2).
Plaintiff alleges that he was assigned to the "top bunk" in his jail cell and began to experience "serious chest pain." (Id.). Plaintiff states that his "blood pressure was way to[o] high" and that he was "taken to medical isolation for two and a half days without any medications." (Id.). Plaintiff was returned to his "top bunk top range" jail cell. (Id., p. 3). When he was moved to another cell on August 14, 2013, he again requested a "bottom range bottom bunk," but was told that "there is no bottom bunk bottom range restriction listed by medical so go to the assigned cell or face disciplinary action." (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that on September 7, 2013, he again "suffered sharp chest pain while attempting to get down from the top bunk and fell fracturing his left knee" and tearing a tendon. (Id.). He was treated at an "outside hospital," given crutches and a knee immobilizer, and returned to the jail "with instructions . . . to medical to schedule appointments for [ortho]pedics and cardiology." (Id.). Plaintiff states that he was "taken to medical isolation for two and a half days," but was not given "any medications for hypertension or pain." (Id.). He also alleges that while he was incarcerated at the Butler County Jail, he was "never seen for an examination physically or visually by the jail doctor" and no appointment was scheduled for him to see a cardiologist. (Id.).
As relief, plaintiff requests $350,000 in damages "for unnec[e]ssary infliction of physical and emotional harm due to the defendants['] deliberate negligence in providing the plaintiff ad[e]quate medical treatment and a safe environment." (Id., p. 5).
At this stage in the proceedings, without the benefit of briefing by the parties to this action, the undersigned concludes that plaintiff's claims against the unidentified medics and doctor are deserving of further development and may proceed at this juncture to the extent that plaintiff has alleged that those defendants' inaction and/or response to his requests for placement in a "bottom bunk bottom range" amounted to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). However, it is RECOMMENDED that the following portions of the complaint should be dismissed at the screening stage because it is clear from the face of the pleading that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted:
(1) The "Warden" of the Butler County Jail, Nick Fisher, and Butler County Sheriff Richard K. Jones should be dismissed as defendants. Plaintiff has failed to state a viable federal claim under § 1983 against those individuals in the absence of any allegations that they were involved in, encouraged, or were even aware of plaintiff's alleged mistreatment at the Butler County Jail. To the extent that plaintiff alleges they are liable in their supervisory capacity for the misconduct of the jail's medical staff, plaintiff has not stated an actionable claim for relief under § 1983. It is well-settled that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability onto supervisory personnel. See, e.g., Wingo v. Tennessee Dep't of Corr., 499 F. App'x 453, 455 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)). "In order to find supervisory personnel liable, a plaintiff must allege that the supervisors were somehow personally involved in the unconstitutional activity of a subordinate, . . . or at least acquiesced in the alleged unconstitutional activity of a subordinate." Id. (citing Dunn v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 128 (6th Cir. 1982), and Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)); see also Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 292 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 803 (6th Cir. 2009)) (to succeed on claim against supervisory state prison officials, the plaintiff must show the officials "at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers"). In the instant case, plaintiff has made no such allegation against Fisher or Jones. Therefore, plaintiff has "failed to state a plausible claim" against them. Cf. Wingo, 499 F. App'x at 455; see also Koch v. Cnty. of Franklin, No. 2:08cv1127, 2010 WL 23686352, at *10-11 (S.D. Ohio June 10, 2010) (Frost, J.) ("a supervisory official's failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
(2) Plaintiff has failed to state a viable claim under § 1983 against the remaining defendant paramedics and doctor to the extent he alleges that they should be held liable for their "negligence" in treating his medical conditions. (See Doc. 1, Complaint, p. 5). Negligence in diagnosing or treating a prisoner's medical condition does not implicate any Eighth Amendment concerns. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976)). The defendants may be held liable only if shown that their alleged misconduct amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See id.; see also Jones v. Muskegon Cnty., 625 F.3d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 2010) (and cases cited therein). Therefore, plaintiff's allegations based on the theory of negligence do not state a cognizable federal claim.
Accordingly, in sum, it is RECOMMENDED that Butler County Jail "Warden" Nick Fisher and Butler County Sheriff Richard K. Jones be dismissed as defendants because the complaint fails to state an actionable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against them. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that plaintiffs' allegations sounding in "negligence" against the remaining defendants (unnamed paramedics and doctor at the Butler County Jail) be dismissed.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
The complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted to the extent that (1) plaintiff has named Butler County Sheriff Richard K. Jones and Butler County Jail "Warden" Nick Fisher as defendants; and (2) plaintiff alleges claims sounding in "negligence" against the remaining defendants. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. The United States Marshal shall serve a copy of the complaint, summons, the separate Order issued this date granting prisoner in forma pauperis status, and this Order and Report and Recommendation upon the following defendants as directed by plaintiff, with costs of service to be advanced by the United States: the Butler County Jail paramedics and doctor who, at this juncture, have not been identified by plaintiff.
However, before service of process can occur with respect to those defendants, plaintiff must file a motion to issue service setting forth the identifies of the paramedics and doctor he is suing and must provide updated summons and United States Marshal forms for service purposes. Therefore, plaintiff is ORDERED to file a motion to issue service, including updated summons and United States Marshal forms, if/when he discovers the identities of the paramedics and doctor through discovery. Plaintiff is advised that no service will be issued on those defendants until he complies with this Order. Plaintiff is further advised that if he fails to comply with this Order, his complaint against the Butler County paramedics and doctors may eventually be dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
2. Plaintiff shall serve upon the defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon the defendants' attomey(s), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to defendants or their counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which has not been filed with the clerk or which fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
3. Plaintiff shall inform the Court promptly of any changes in his address which may occur during the pendency of this lawsuit.
________________________
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge
BRAD ALONZO BRADFORD, Plaintiff,
vs BUTLER COUNTY SHERIFF RICHARD K. JONES, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 1:13-cv-909
Dlott, J.
Bowman, M.J.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to this Report & Recommendation ("R&R") within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent's objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).