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Brackenridge v. Ametek, Inc.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District
Feb 10, 1987
503 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

Opinion

No. 85-2775.

February 10, 1987.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County; John A. Tanksley, Judge.

Beth Tyler Vogelsang and George C. Vogelsang, Miami, for appellant.

Stroock, Stroock Lavan and David C. Pollack and Ricardo Torres, Jr., James O. Nelson, Steven R. Berger and William G. Liston, Miami, for appellees.

Before HUBBART, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.


Affirmed on the authority of Shaw v. General Motors Corp., 503 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). As in Shaw, we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the following questions as being of great public importance:

I. Should the legislative amendment of Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the statute of repose in product liability actions, be construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accrued before the effective date of the amendment?

II. If not, should the decision of Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1985), appeal dismissed, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1626, 90 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986), which overruled Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1980), apply so as to bar a cause of action that accrued after the Battilla decision but before the Pullum decision?

Affirmed.


Summaries of

Brackenridge v. Ametek, Inc.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District
Feb 10, 1987
503 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
Case details for

Brackenridge v. Ametek, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:WILLIAM A. BRACKENRIDGE, APPELLANT, v. AMETEK, INC. AND BARING INDUSTRIES…

Court:District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District

Date published: Feb 10, 1987

Citations

503 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

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