From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Brach v. Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Oct 12, 1999
265 A.D.2d 360 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)

Summary

In Brach v. Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc., 265 A.D.2d 360, 361 696 N.Y.S.2d 496, 498 (2d Dep't 1999), a religious congregation published an article reporting that property they purportedly owned was sold to plaintiff without their knowledge or consent, and that plaintiff refused to settle the dispute in rabbinical court, leading to a state court action the congregation claimed was won "`by lies and deceit.'"

Summary of this case from McNamee v. Clemens

Opinion

Submitted August 17, 1999

October 12, 1999

In an action to recover damages for libel, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Belen, J.).


ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action is denied, and the complaint is reinstated.

The instant case has its genesis in a long-running dispute between competing claims to certain real property in Brooklyn ( see, Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar v. 26 Adar N. B. Corp., 219 A.D.2d 186). The defendant Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. (hereinafter Yetev Lev), a religious corporation, purchased the property in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and built a synagogue and a home on the property for its leader. The property is now owned by nonparty 26 Adar N.B. Corp., which is owned by the plaintiff Nachman Brach. In May 1990, Yetev Lev commenced an action in the Supreme Court, Kings County, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to compel the determination of its claim to the property. Essentially, it alleged that a 1978 transfer of the property, and all subsequent transfers of the property, were invalid. The Supreme Court granted Yetev Lev summary judgment on its claim and declared that it was the owner of the property. However, this court reversed that order and dismissed Yetev Lev's complaint ( see, Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar v. 26 Adar N. B. Corp., supra).

Thereafter, the defendant Der Yid published an article signed by the defendant Executive Board of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. (hereinafter the Executive Board). This article essentially reported that the subject property was sold to Brach without the Executive Board's knowledge or consent, that the Executive Board had attempted to persuade Brach to settle their dispute in a rabbinical court, and that Brach refused, resulting in the aforementioned case in Supreme Court, Kings County. The article also stated that Brach had won that action "by lies and deceit", and "declare[d] publicly" that "Nachman Brach is a robber".

In or about April 1997 Brach commenced the instant action against Yetev Lev, the Executive Board, various individual defendants, and Der Yid, seeking to recover damages for defamation. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, finding that "a reasonable reader of the publication complained of would consider it to contain expressions of opinion rather than assertions of fact about [Brach]". We reverse and reinstate the complaint.

The issue of whether particular words are defamatory presents a legal issue to be resolved by the court ( see, Aronson v. Wiersma, 65 N.Y.2d 592, 593-594; Jessel Rothman, P. C. v. Steinberg, 207 A.D.2d 438, 439). The words must be construed in the context of the entire statement and interpreted based on the understanding of the average reader. If the words are not reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, they are not actionable ( Aronson v. Wiersma, supra; see, Armstrong v. Simon Schuster, 85 N.Y.2d 373, 380; Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 254, cert denied 500 U.S. 954; Weiner v. Doubleday Co., 74 N.Y.2d 586, 592, cert denied 495 U.S. 930).

In the instant case, the statements complained of imply that "the speaker knows certain facts, unknown to his audience, which supports his opinion and are detrimental to the person about whom he is speaking", and therefore constitute statements of "mixed opinion", which are actionable ( Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 290; see, Kovacs v. Briarcliffe School, 208 A.D.2d 686; Kelleher v. Corinthian Media, 208 A.D.2d 477; Brown v. Albany Citizens Council on Alcoholism, 199 A.D.2d 904).

S. MILLER, J. P., SULLIVAN, FRIEDMANN, and FEUERSTEIN, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Brach v. Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Oct 12, 1999
265 A.D.2d 360 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)

In Brach v. Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc., 265 A.D.2d 360, 361 696 N.Y.S.2d 496, 498 (2d Dep't 1999), a religious congregation published an article reporting that property they purportedly owned was sold to plaintiff without their knowledge or consent, and that plaintiff refused to settle the dispute in rabbinical court, leading to a state court action the congregation claimed was won "`by lies and deceit.'"

Summary of this case from McNamee v. Clemens
Case details for

Brach v. Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:NACHMAN BRACH, appellant, v. CONGREGATION YETEV LEV D'SATMAR, INC., et…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Oct 12, 1999

Citations

265 A.D.2d 360 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)
696 N.Y.S.2d 496

Citing Cases

McNamee v. Clemens

While general denials of accusations aren't actionable, denials coupled with accusations that the accuser…

Wengui Guo v. Guan Liang

As in this matter, plaintiff states that defendant's staments implied that defendant had information unknown…