Opinion
C/A 7:24-cv-03139-BHH-KFM
07-19-2024
Latasha Boyd, Plaintiff, v. County of Spartanburg, Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
This is a civil action filed by a pro se non-prisoner plaintiff. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that this case be dismissed.
LITIGATION & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 29, 2024, in a prior case filed by the plaintiff, the Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks, United States District Judge, issued an order sanctioning the plaintiff $405.00 based on her proclivity for filing duplicative and frivolous actions. See Boyd v. City of Spartanburg, et al., C/A No. 7:24-cv-00711-BHH, 2024 WL 2763919 (D.S.C. May 29, 2024). Specifically, Judge Hendricks noted:
if Plaintiff attempts to file another action in this Court before paying the filing fee and the sanction from this case, the Court hereby authorizes the Clerk of Court to assign a civil action number to such other action (for docket control purposes) so the Magistrate Judge may (1) instruct Plaintiff to pay the filing fee and sanction from this case (and dismiss the other action if Plaintiff fails to do so) or (2) certify that such other action is not frivolous.Id. In the instant matter, the plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket in May 2024 (doc. 1). By order dated May 31,2024, the plaintiff was informed that in order for this case to proceed she was required to pay the outstanding sanctions (or submit proof that the sanctions had been satisfied) (doc. 6 at 1-2). Specifically, the May 31,2024, order noted that the allegations in the current action were of the same frivolous nature as the plaintiff's prior actions; thus, pursuant to Judge Hendricks' order, the case would be subject to dismissal unless the plaintiff paid the sanctions (Id.). The order also warned the plaintiff to provide other documents to bring her case into proper from and that if she failed to comply within the timetable set forth in the order, the case would be forwarded to the assigned United States District Judge with a recommendation that it be dismissed (Id. at 2). The order also reminded the plaintiff to notify the clerk in writing of any change of address and warned that failure to keep her address updated with the court may lead to dismissal of the case (Id. at 3). The plaintiff did not respond to the court's order, so on June 26, 2024, a second order was issued informing the plaintiff that her case was not in proper form (doc. 10). The plaintiff was reminded a second time if she failed to comply within the timetable set forth in the order, the case would be forwarded to the assigned United States District Judge with a recommendation that it be dismissed (Id. at 1). The order also reminded the plaintiff to notify the clerk in writing of any change of address and warned that failure to keep her address updated with the court may lead to dismissal of the case (Id. at 3). Despite the opportunities outlined above, the plaintiff has not brought her case into proper form for judicial screening.
ALLEGATIONS
This is a civil action filed by the plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se (doc. 1). The plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to § 1983 for violations of her rights (Id.). The plaintiff's claims appear to involve her dissatisfaction with a charge for unlawfully placing at risk or abandoning a child pending in the Spartanburg County General Sessions Court. See Spartanburg County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Spartanburg/ PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2024A4220100012) (last visited July 19, 2024).
The plaintiff contends that the defendant, in pursuing the criminal charge against her, is conspiring to violate her rights (Id. at 1-2). The plaintiff also alleges that Judge Usha has denied her motions for emergency relief without hearing her side of the story (Id. at 2, 3-4). Subsequent emergency requests for orders of protection from another judge were also wrongfully denied (Id. at 3). The plaintiff also alleges that her rights have been violated because the school principal would not bar her child's father from picking him up without a protective order and because the guidance counselor reported her to Child Protective Services (“CPS”) when her son's arm was damaged (Id.). After a case was opened with CPS, she alleges a proper investigation was not done before CPS tried to remove her son from her custody (Id. at 3-4).
The plaintiff contends that judges reviewing her filings have violated the ethical standards (Id. at 4-6). The plaintiff's first cause of action is intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) by her children's father (Id. at 6-7). The plaintiff also asserts claims for kidnapping, domestic violence, assault, harassment, post-separation domestic violence, defamation/defaming on social media, parental alienation, parental stalking, knowingly giving false reports to CPS, strict liability, misconduct, psychological abuse, domestic abuse, false information, cyber stalking, false imprisonment, trespass to chattel, entrapment, retaliation, and allowed her child's father to give her post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) (Id. at 7-11, 12-15, 17-20). The plaintiff also contends that the defendant is racially discriminating against her, gaslighting her to drive her insane, and “taking advantage of single-family households such as Jeffery Epstein” (Id. at 14, 15-16). The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant is conspiring to keep her at a financial disadvantage by not requiring that her child's father pay child support and “forcing” the plaintiff on social welfare programs and disability (Id. at 16-17).
The plaintiff also asserts that this action is a removal of her criminal proceedings in the Spartanburg County General Sessions Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446 (Id. at 20-22). The plaintiff also asserts claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Id. at 22-24). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages and a protective order against her child's father (Id. at 11, 24).
APPLICABLE LAW & ANALYSIS
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Rule 41
It is well established that a court has the authority to dismiss a case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with orders of the court. Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir.1989). “The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (emphasis added). In addition to its inherent authority, this court may also sua sponte dismiss a case for lack of prosecution under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Id. at 630. In considering whether to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 41(b), the court is required to consider four factors:
(1) the degree of personal responsibility on the part of the plaintiff;
(2) the amount of prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay;
(3) the history of the plaintiff in proceeding in a dilatory manner; and,
(4) the existence of less drastic sanctions other than dismissal.Davis v. Williams, 588 F.2d 69, 70 (4th Cir.1978).
Here, the factors weigh in favor of dismissal. With respect to factors (1) and (3), as noted, despite two opportunities, the plaintiff has failed to bring her case into proper form or comply with Judge Hendricks' May 29, 2024, order. In doing so, the plaintiff has failed to comply with the court's orders in this case dated May 31,2024, and June 26, 2024 (docs. 6; 10). Each order warned the plaintiff of the consequences of failing to comply with the orders' instructions, including the dismissal of the case pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (docs. 6 at 2; 10 at 1). Despite these warnings, the plaintiff has not complied with or responded to the court's orders. Accordingly, as the plaintiff has failed to comply with multiple court orders and has been previously warned that such failures could result in dismissal, the undersigned recommends that the instant action be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) for failure to comply with orders of the court.
Frivolousness
The plaintiff's complaint is also subject to summary dismissal for frivolousness. It is well-settled that the court has the authority to dismiss claims that are obviously “fantastic” or “delusional.” Adams, 40 F.3d at 74; Raiford v. FBI, C/A No. 1:10-cv-2751-MBS-JRM, 2010 WL 6737887, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 2020729 (D.S.C. May 23, 2011) (explaining a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”). In reviewing a complaint for frivolousness or malice, the court looks to see whether the complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Harley v. United States, 349 F.Supp.2d 980, 981 (M.D. N.C. 2004) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)). The Court must accept all well-pled allegations and review the Complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
Here, even when reviewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint is comprised of factual allegations that are not credible, and which fail to state a claim for relief. See Neal v. Duke Energy, No. 6:11-cv-1420-HFF-KFM, 2011 WL 5083181, at *4 (D.S.C. June 30, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 5082193 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2011) (dismissing action upon finding plaintiff's factual allegations were frivolous, fanciful, and delusional where plaintiff claimed defendants clandestinely placed a GPS device in her car while it was in the shop for repairs and that she was being stalked by the defendants, noting the allegations were “made without any viable factual supporting allegations and appears to be the product of paranoid fantasy”); Feurtado v. McNair, C/A No. 3:05-cv-1933-SB, 2006 WL 1663792, at *2 (D.S.C. Jun. 15, 2006) (noting that frivolousness encompasses inarguable legal conclusions and fanciful factual allegations), aff'd, 227 Fed.Appx. 303 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. dismissed, 553 U.S. 1029 (2008). For example, the plaintiff's assertion that this action “removes” her pending criminal charges to this court is clearly legally and factually frivolous (see doc. 1). The remainder of the plaintiff's allegations are similarly frivolous and nonsensical in nature, including that: the defendant has allowed her child's father to give her PTSD; the defendant has racially discriminated against her and has been gaslighting her; the defendant is “taking advantage of single-family households such as Jeffery Epstein;” and that the defendant has forced her onto social welfare programs (see id.). These allegations are clearly frivolous and lack a basis in the law. As such, even if the plaintiff had paid the sanctions and brought her case into proper form, the plaintiff's complaint would also be subject to summary dismissal as frivolous.
Prefiling Restrictions
Federal courts may issue prefiling restrictions when vexatious conduct hinders the court from fulfilling its constitutional duty. Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004) (published). This “drastic remedy must be used sparingly” to ensure “constitutional guarantees of due process of law and access to the courts.” Id. The factors for consideration in determining whether to enter a prefiling injunction include (1) the party's history of litigation, particularly whether she has filed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation or simply intended to harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the courts and other parties resulting from the party's filings; and (4) the adequacy of alternative sanctions. Id. at 818 (internal citations omitted). If a court finds a prefiling injunction is warranted based on the four Cromer factors, the injunction must be “narrowly tailored to fit the specific circumstances at issue.” Id. Additionally, a litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of a prefiling injunction. Id. at 819-20.
Here, the factors weigh in favor of entering tailored prefiling restrictions against the plaintiff, as set forth in more detail below. With respect to the first Cromer factor, the plaintiff's history of litigation (especially whether she has filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits), the plaintiff has filed multiple frivolous, vexatious, and duplicative lawsuits. Indeed, as set forth in detail in Exhibit A, and detailed in the plaintiff's prior case, the plaintiff has initiated more than fifteen civil actions in this court that have been dismissed as frivolous and duplicative, and the plaintiff has been previously sanctioned by this court for her abusive filing practices. See supra pp. 1-2 (citing Boyd, 2024 WL 2763919); see also Exhibit A. As such, the first Cromer factor weighs in favor of instituting prefiling restrictions.
The second Cromer factor, whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation or simply intended to harass, likewise weighs in favor of instituting prefiling restrictions. As noted above, the instant matter is subject to dismissal for multiple reasons, including frivolousness. Further, the majority of the cases filed by the plaintiff, as set forth in Exhibit A, indicate that she has continued to file cases to harass instead of based upon a good faith basis - as she has been repeatedly warned that the claims she pursues are frivolous and duplicative. See Exhibit A. The plaintiff has also been warned previously regarding the entry of sanctions if she continued filing frivolous and duplicative actions. See Boyd, 2024 WL 2763919; Boyd v. U.S.A., etal., C/A No. 7:22-cv-01633-BHH, 2023 WL 1794569 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2023) (dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim and instructing that future actions not be accepted asserting the same allegations); Boyd v. U.S. Cent. Intell. Agency, C/A No. 7:21-cv-01133-BHH, 2021 WL 2477170 (D.S.C. June 17, 2021) (dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim and warning regarding the entry of prefiling restrictions). As such, the second Cromer factor weighs in favor of entering prefiling restrictions.
The third factor likewise weighs against the plaintiff. As previously noted, the plaintiff's duplicative, frivolous, and vexatious filings have resulted in a burden on the court in each of her sixteen cases (including the instant matter). As such, based on the tiresome continued filings by the plaintiff, the third factor also weighs in favor of instituting a prefiling injunction. With respect to the fourth Cromer factor, it appears that alternative sanctions will not be adequate to address the vexatious filing practices of the plaintiff, as she filed two additional frivolous, duplicative actions even after the imposition of money sanctions. See Boyd, 2024 WL 2763919; Boyd v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., C/A No. 7:24-cv-03287-BHH-KFM (D.S.C.) (pending); Boyd v. State of S.C., etal., C/A No. 7:24-cv-03200-BHH-KFM (D.S.C.) (pending). As such, the fourth Cromer factor weighs in favor of entering prefiling restrictions.
Accordingly, in light of the Cromer factors, the undersigned recommends that the following prefiling restrictions be imposed on the plaintiff:
1. For any future non-habeas actions commenced by the plaintiff, the Clerk of Court is authorized to assign civil action numbers (for docket control purposes) and to authorize the assigned United States Magistrate Judge to direct the plaintiff to pay the statutory filing fee. Should the plaintiff fail to pay the full statutory filing fee in any such applicable civil actions, the case will be forwarded to the assigned United States District Judge for an order of dismissal without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
2. These filing restrictions do not apply to any criminal case in which the plaintiff is named as a defendant.
3. The plaintiff may file a motion to modify or rescind the order imposing these restrictions no earlier than two years from the date of its entry.
This report and recommendation provides notice to the plaintiff of the recommendation that prefiling restrictions be entered and provides her an opportunity to be heard regarding the imposition of a prefiling injunction.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of the plaintiff's failure to bring her case into proper form, including her failure to pay the sanctions ordered by Judge Hendricks on May 29, 2024, the undersigned recommends the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Should the United States District Judge assigned to this case adopt this recommendation, IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that an order restricting the plaintiff's ability to file additional actions in this district be entered as set forth above.
Based upon the foregoing, in accordance with the notice rule articulated in
Cromer, this Report and Recommendation is NOTICE to the plaintiff that the undersigned has recommended that prefiling restrictions be entered against her. The plaintiff is directed that specific written objections to this recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation.
The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the last page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
EXHIBIT A
Boyd v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., C/A No. 7:24-cv-03287-BHH-KFM (D.S.C.) (pending)
Boyd v. State of S.C., et al., C/A No. 7:24-cv-03200-BHH-KFM (D.S.C.) (pending)
Boyd v. Spartanburg Mun. Corp., et al., C/A No. 7:23-cv-05097-BHH, 2023 WL 7924725 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 2023) (dismissing case as frivolous and duplicative of prior actions filed in this court)
Boyd v. U.S. Corp., et al., C/A No. 7:23-cv-04236-BHH, 2023 WL 6161946 (D.S.C. Sept. 21,2023) (dismissing case as frivolous)
Boyd v. Spartanburg Cnty., et al., C/A No. 7:23-cv-02182-BHH, 2023 WL 4686460 (D.S.C. July 20, 2023) (dismissing case as frivolous, duplicative, and for failure to state a claim)
Boyd v. Spartanburg Cnty., et al., C/A No. 7:23-cv-02478-BHH, 2023 WL 4601019 (D.S.C. July 18, 2023) (dismissing case as frivolous, duplicative, and for failure to state a claim)
Boydv. Wilkey, Sr., C/A No. 6:23-cv-01880-BHH, 2023 WL 3752291 (D.S.C. June 1,2023) (dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim)
Boyd v. U.S.A., et al., C/A No. 7:22-cv-01633-BHH, 2023 WL 1794569 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2023) (dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim and instructing that future actions not be accepted asserting the same allegations)
Boyd v. U.S. Cent. Intell. Agency, C/A No. 7:21-cv-01133-BHH, 2021 WL 2477170 (D.S.C. June 17, 2021) (dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim and warning regarding the entry of prefiling restrictions)
Boydv. S.C. Dep'tof Soc. Servs., C/A No. 7:20-cv-00829-BHH, 2020 WL 1891913 (D.S.C. Apr. 16, 2020) (dismissing case for failure to state a claim)
Boyd v. U.S., C/A No. 7:20-cv-00178-BHH, 2020 WL 816077 (D.S.C. Feb. 19, 2020) (dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim)
Boyd v. Diangikes, C/A No. 7:19-cv-01077-BHH, 2019 WL 2057911 (D.S.C. May 9, 2019) (dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), aff'd 773 Fed.Appx. 689 (4th Cir. 2019) (mem.)
Boyd v. S.C., et al., C/A No. 7:19-cv-00867-BHH, 2019 WL 2057961 (D.S.C. May 9, 2019) (dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim), aff'd 773 Fed.Appx. 678 (4th Cir. 2019) (mem.)
Boyd v. United States, C/A No. 7:19-cv-00376-BHH, 2019 WL 1875592 (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 2019) (dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim), aff'd 773 Fed.Appx. 702 (4th Cir. 2019) (mem.)
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).