Opinion
Civil Action 2: 23-cv-01800
02-02-2024
COLBY MATTHEW BOWLING, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN BRYAN KLINE, DEPUTY WARDEN STEVEN PELESKY, SERGEANT RHONDA CARTER, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BRENNER, DEPUTY WARDEN ERIC SCHWARTZ, LIEUTENANT, WESTMORELAND COUNTY PRISON; WESTMORELAND COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, THE WESTMORELAND COUNTY OFFICE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY, THE WESTMORELAND COUNTY COMMISSIONER OFFICE, WESTMORELAND COUNTY CONTROLLER OFFICE, Defendants.
Mark R. Hornak, Chief United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CYNTHIA REED EDDY, United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Reopen (ECF No. 16) filed by Plaintiff be denied.
II. REPORT
a. Background
On October 19, 2023, Plaintiff Colby Matthew Bowling submitted a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”), along with a Complaint. (ECF No. 1). The Complaint was lodge pending resolution of the IFP Motion. (ECF No. 1-2). The IFP motion was denied without prejudice as deficient because Bowling had failed to provide the requisite financial information. (ECF No. 6). The case was administratively closed pending resolution of these matters.
On November 13, 2023, Bowling filed a new IFP motion and attached the requisite financial information. (ECF No. 7). The IFP motion was granted on December 6, 2023 (ECF No. 10), and the Complaint filed that day. (ECF No. 11).
Before the Court could take any action on the Complaint, on January 2, 2024, the Court received from Bowling a one-page undated document to the Court stating: “I would like to drop my 1983 lawsuit due to me settling the dispute out of court with the Westmoreland County Prison. We have both come to terms without the need for assistance from the courts. Sorry for any troubles or inconveniences. Thank you.” (ECF No. 13, postmark unavailable). By Order entered on January 3, 2024, the Court advised Bowling that his correspondence had been construed as a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i), and the Clerk of Court was directed to mark the case closed. (ECF No. 14). As stated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A), “the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” Thus, by operation of law, this action was dismissed upon docketing of Bowling's notice that he wanted to “drop” the lawsuit as the parties had settled the dispute.
Three weeks later, on January 24, 2024, the Court received another one-page undated document from Bowling stating: “I do not wish to voluntarily withdraw my 1983 lawsuit. Case Number 2:23-cv-01800-CRE.” ECF No. 16 (undated correspondence, postmarked January 19, 2024). The Clerk's office construed this correspondence as a Motion to Reopen Case. Because Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his action on January 2, 2024, the Court cannot reopen it.
Nevertheless, the Federal Rules further provide that, unless the notice states otherwise, “the dismissal is without prejudice.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(B). That is, the dismissal does not preclude Bowling from commencing a new action with the same claims and defendants, or indeed, from pursuing other claims not made in the dismissed action. See Welty v. Donkewicz, 2: 21-cv-1843m 2022 WL 4072522, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 22, 2022) (citing Baxter v. Atl. Care Main Pomona Hosp., No. Civ. 13-7876, 2015 WL 715012, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 19, 2015)), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4018319 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2022). The law in this circuit and elsewhere is clear that a Rule 41(a)(1)(A) dismissal deprives the district court of jurisdiction to take further action in the case, except as it relates to certain collateral matters such as sanctions, costs, and attorney's fees. In re Bath & Kitchen Fixtures Antitrust Litig., 535 F.3d 161, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A proper [Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)] notice deprives the district court of jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case.”); id. at 166 n.8 (footnote observing the exception for collateral issues); Gorton v. Gardner Denver, Inc., No. CV 1:17-1110, 2022 WL 7579808, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2022) (“Once a plaintiff files the notice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A), the district court is deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction [ ] to decide the merits of the case because there is no ‘case or controversy' pending before the court as required for federal jurisdiction by Article III of the United States Constitution.”) (footnote omitted); Riffin v. Forest City Ratner Co., No. CV 164433, 2020 WL 8182839, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2020) (court noting that “when Plaintiff filed his notice of voluntary dismissal on June 22, 2018, this action and all prior orders within it ceased to have any legal effect, terminating the Court's subject matter jurisdiction”). Accord Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, PC v. Babakaeva, 375 Fed.Appx. 349, 350 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding that after a party voluntarily dismissed the action under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), the action was terminated and the district court was divested of jurisdiction); A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 197 F.2d 498, 502 (2d Cir. 1952) (A Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) voluntary dismissal “leaves the situation so far as procedures therein are concerned the same as though the suit had never been brought, thus vitiating and annulling all prior proceedings and orders in the case and terminating jurisdiction over it for the reason that the case has become moot.”); Emory v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, No. 7:20-CV-629, 2021 WL 5361834, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2021) (“Courts in this circuit have found that district courts lack jurisdiction to grant a motion to reopen where a plaintiff has previously voluntarily dismissed the action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 7:20-629, 2021 WL 4859942 (D.S.C. Oct. 19, 2021).
Thus, given Bowling's previous unambiguous notice of voluntary dismissal of this action, the Court lacks jurisdiction to reopen the case. Bowling's option at this point is to file a new civil action as suggested above. Thus, it is respectfully recommended that Bowling's motion to reopen be denied.
Additionally, even if the Court were to treat the instant Motion to Reopen as though filed under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,it is recommended that the Motion does not justify reopening the case. Rule 60(b) provides that a party may file a motion for relief from final judgment for these reasons:
While some circuits do not view a voluntary dismissal as a final proceeding for Rule 60(b) purposes, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has applied Rule 60(b) to motions seeking to reopen voluntarily dismissed cases. See, e.g., Kagalwalla v. Downing, 811 Fed.Appx. 152 (3d Cir. 2020). Therefore, the undersigned will exercise prudence by also providing analysis under Rule 60(b).
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence, that with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). As previously noted, this case was closed after Plaintiff notified the Court that the parties had settled and he wanted to “drop” the lawsuit; his bare-bones statement now that he “does not wish to voluntarily withdraw the case” does not provide a basis for Rule 60(b) relief.
The term “mistake” as it is used in Rule 60(b)(1) is broadly construed to include both legal and factual mistakes. See Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 523-35 (2022). “[A]s a general proposition, the ‘mistake' provision in Rule 60(b)(1) provides for the reconsideration of the judgments only where: (1) a party has made an excusable litigation mistake or an attorney in the litigation has acted without authority from a party, or (2) where the judge has made a substantive mistake of law or fact in the final judgment or order.” In re Shannopin Mining Co., No. 96-2185, 2002 WL 31002883, *25 (W.D.Pa. July 15, 2002)(quoting Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1996)).
And “the Rule 60(b)(6) ground for relief from judgment provides for extraordinary relief and may only be invoked upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.” Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 840 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1988)). A party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must show that without relief “an extreme and unexpected hardship will result.” Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). Importantly here, “in cases where parties make a ‘deliberate, strategic choice' that is ‘not the result of mistake or excusable neglect' to voluntarily dismiss a matter under Rule 41, ‘it should not be undone via Rule 60(b).' ” Bulut v. JP Morgan Case Bank, NA, Civ. Act. No. 189303, 2022 WL 1213480, at *2-3 (quoting Thomas v. Ramapo Coll. of N.J., No. 10-3898, 2011 WL 3206448, at *3 (D.N.J. July 27, 2011).
Bowling offers no argument supporting his request to reopen his case; he does not argue that he mistakenly dismissed this action, or that the Court mistakenly closed the case, or that exceptional circumstances exist. He made the unilateral decision to voluntarily dismiss his action and cannot “now reopen this matter as a back-up plan[.]” Bulut, 2022 WL 1213480, at *2-3. Thus, in the alternative, it is recommended that the motion does not warrant Rule 60(b) relief.
Subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Rule 60(b) do not apply.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Bowling's motion to reopen (ECF No. 16) be denied. Should Plaintiff desire to initiate a new lawsuit, he should request the appropriate forms from the Clerk's office.
If Plaintiff seeks to challenge this Report and Recommendation, he must seek review by the district judge by filing written objections by February 22, 2024. Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. City of Long Branch,866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).