Opinion
C.A. No. 03A01-9803-CV-0113.
October 30, 1998.
BLOUNT CIRCUIT, HON. DALE YOUNG, JUDGE.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
CHARLES M. CLIFFORD, Maryville, for Appellants.
JERRY M. MARTIN, Knoxville, for Appellee.
OPINION
This is a very simple case involving a single issue. The plaintiffs filed an action in the General Sessions Court for Blount County arising from the same cause of action. That action was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. Plaintiffs thereafter filed this action in the Circuit Court. The defendant answered and filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12.02(6), Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, i.e., failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Defendant's argument was that the plaintiffs' claim was res judicata because of the dismissal in general sessions court for failure to prosecute. The motion was sustained and plaintiffs' case was dismissed. This appeal resulted.
It is patently clear that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply unless a case was dismissed on its merits.
Res judicata is a claim preclusion doctrine that promotes finality in litigation. Moulton v. Ford Motor Co., 533 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tenn. 1976). It bars a second suit between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action with respect to all the issues which were or could have been litigated in the former suit. Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 459 (Tenn. 1995). Parties asserting a res judicata defense must demonstrate that (1) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered the prior judgment, (2) the prior judgment was final and on the merits, (3) that the same parties or their privies were involved in both proceedings, and (4) both proceedings involved the same cause of action. White v. White, 876 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tenn. 1994); Collins v. Greene County Bank, 916 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995).
Milligan v. George, 1997 Tenn. App LEXIS 485.
This case is controlled by Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Buntrock Industries, Inc., 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 772, and the cases cited therein. We quote from Sea-Land:
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant on the ground of res judicata [based on a dismissal in General Sessions Court for failure to prosecute]. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in so doing. In order for res judicata to operate as a bar to plaintiff's suit in the instant case, the dismissal of the prior general sessions suit must have been a dismissal on the merits of the case. Long v. Kirby-Smith, 40 Tenn. App. 446, 292 S.W.2d 216, 219 (1956). Therefore, the dispositive issue in this case is whether the dismissal of the general sessions suit operated as an adjudication on the merits of the case. Under Tenn.R.Civ.P. 41.02, the dismissal for failure to prosecute operates as an adjudication upon the merits unless otherwise ordered by the court. However, the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply, with certain exceptions not applicable here, to general sessions court. Tenn.R.Civ.P. 1. Accordingly, in the absence of a statute or rule to the contrary, common law controls the decision as to whether the general sessions dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.
In W. R. Grace Company v. Taylor, 55 Tenn. App. 227, 398 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn.App. 1965), this court was faced with a similar problem. In Grace, the defendant entered a plea of res judicata on the ground that a bill on the same cause of action had previously been filed by complainant in November of 1961, but had been dismissed by decree of September 3, 1962, for failure to prosecute. Id. at 82. On the date the first case was set for trial, complainant did not appear, although defendant was ready for trial. Id. at 83. The court then dismissed plaintiff's case for want of prosecution. Id. The plaintiff then refiled the same suit a short time later. In the second suit, the chancellor overruled defendant's plea of res judicata, and held that the order of dismissal, even though it did not recite that it was without prejudice, was not res judicata. In affirming the chancellor, this court said:
Where it appears on the face of a decree of dismissal that it was not upon the merits, as in this case where it appears from the face of the decree the dismissal was based on want of prosecution, that a suit on the same grounds may be reinstated at any time within one year, and that such a decree is not res judicata.
Id. at 83. See also Patrick v. Dickson, 526 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. 1975); Woods v. Palmer, 496 S.W.2d 474 Tenn. 1973).
1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 772.
The appellee argues in his brief that the doctrine of res judicata applies because the suit in general sessions court was for property damages only and that the present suit is for personal injuries and loss of consortium. Thus, the defendant concludes that the plaintiffs have split their causes of action and that the splitting of their causes of action is fatal to this action. First, we note that there is nothing in the technical record in this case to demonstrate that a previous action was filed in the general sessions court. Appellants admit in their brief, however, that they had filed an action in the general sessions court seeking damages to their automobile. Second, there is nothing in the record that reflects the judgment in the general sessions court. Considering the parties' briefs together, however, we do not believe that there is any genuine dispute regarding the action that took place in the general sessions court.
It is true, as appellee argues, that a party may not split his causes of action, but must try all relevant issues in one suit. Jordan v. Johns, 79 S.W.2d 798 (1935). If a cause of action is split and a part thereof is concluded on the merits, any remaining causes of action are barred. "The prohibition against splitting an indivisible cause of action is a logical extension of the princi ples underlying the doctrine of res judicata. Potts v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 682 (Tenn. 1990). Like the doctrine of res judicata, it shields a defendant from a multiplicity of suits, Stapp v. Andrews, 172 Tenn. 610, 613, 113 S.W.2d 749, 750 (1938), and it applies to both contractual and tort causes of action. Holland v. Forcum-James Cooperage Lumber Co., 154 Tenn. 174, 176, 285 S.W. 569, 569 (1926)." Utley v. Cullum, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194.
Any argument concerning the splitting of causes of action is irrelevant, however, unless there has been a judgment on the merits or the applicable statute of limitations has expired. Neither has occurred in this case.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for such other and further action as may be necessary and in conformity with this opinion. Costs are assessed to the appellee.
________________________________ Don T. McMurray, J.
CONCUR:
_______________________________ Herschel P. Franks, Judge
_______________________________ Charles D. Susano, Jr., Judge
This appeal came on to be heard upon the record from the Circuit Court of Blount County, briefs and argument of counsel. Upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that there was reversible error in the trial court.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for such other and further action as may be necessary and in conformity with this opinion. Costs are assessed to the appellee.
PER CURIAM