Bowlds v. Sexton

Full title: WILLIAM TODD BOWLDS PLAINTIFF v. ROBERT SEXTON et al. DEFENDANTS

Court: United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, at Owensboro

Date published: Apr 23, 2010

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:10CV-P44-M (W.D. Ky. Apr. 23, 2010)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:10CV-P44-M.

April 23, 2010

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOSEPH McKINLEY JR., District Judge

Plaintiff, William Todd Bowlds, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 1).¹ This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). For the reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed.

1 The Court has consolidated three actions filed by Plaintiff into the instant action.

MOTIONS

Plaintiff has filed two motions which the Court interprets to be motions to amend or correct his complaint (DNs 9 and 10). These motions are GRANTED. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Plaintiff also has filed a motion for review of documents and for immediate release (DN 14). He asks the Court to review attached documents regarding medications he was taking at the time he made his plea and asks the Court to release him after reviewing those documents. The Court construes Plaintiff's request to review documents as a motion to amend the complaint and the motion (DN 14) in that respect is GRANTED. Plaintiff's request for immediate release (DN 14) is DENIED for the same reasons as this action will be dismissed as explained more fully below. Plaintiff has filed an additional motion to submit documents (DN 17), which the Court GRANTS.

I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS

Plaintiff sues in their individual capacities public defenders Robert Sexton and Leigh A. Jackson and Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney Timothy R. Coleman. He also sues the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy and the Kentucky Commonwealth's Attorney's Office. According to his complaints and amendments thereto, Plaintiff was arrested in November 2008 and charged in a criminal case in Hancock County, Kentucky. He alleges that Defendant Jackson was appointed counsel for him from the Department of Public Advocacy. He alleges that on December 4, 2009, Defendant Jackson violated his civil rights by not presenting to the state-court judge evidence that he had signed out of the mental institution where he was living and she did not "help keep his shock probation from being violated."

Plaintiff further states that when judgment was entered against him on February 6, 2009, he was represented by Defendant Sexton, who coerced him into answering "no" to the question whether he was under the influence of any narcotics. He states that Defendant Coleman was the prosecuting attorney in that case and that Defendant Coleman violated his constitutional rights because he knew that Plaintiff was on medication at the time he entered his plea.

As relief, Plaintiff wants monetary damages, to be released from incarceration, and to have his conviction vacated.

II. ANALYSIS

When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. While a reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Prosecutorial defendants

Public defender defendants

i.e., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409427-28see also Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135 1138 More v. Clerk, DeKalb County Superior Court474 F.2d 12751276Haggard v. Tennessee,421 F.2d 13841386 Polk County v. Dodson,454 U.S. 312325Otworth v. Vanderploeg,61 F. App'x 163165

To the extent that Plaintiff wishes to challenge the validity of his state-court conviction in this Court he may do so in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after he has fully exhausted his state court remedies.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will, by separate Order, dismiss Plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.