Opinion
No. 01-07-00730-CV
Opinion issued October 9, 2008.
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 889947.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kenneth Bowie, acting pro se, has appealed the trial court's judgment. According to his docketing statement and appellant's brief, the judgment reflects that Bowie prevailed in a suit against ASAP Motors arising out of his purchase of a defective engine, and awards him actual damages of $1585, punitive damages in the amount of $5000, and interest.
The clerk's record, however, contains a take-nothing judgment against Bowie signed by the small claims court on March 20, 2007. After Bowie requested trial de novo in the county court at law, the county court signed an order setting trial for July 30, 2007. The county court's next action was to sign an order dismissing the case for want of prosecution on August 10, 2007.
Bowie declares in his brief that he appeared for trial on July 30, but nothing in the record indicates that Bowie appeared for trial in the county court. On August 22, 2007, Bowie sent a letter to the county court requesting that his case be reinstated and reopened, explaining that "no one from the court system informed me that I had to appear on August 10, 2007."
Given the trial court's order of dismissal, we can reasonably infer only that Bowie failed to appear in the county court on the scheduled trial date. Nowhere does the record show that Bowie acknowledged or explained his failure to appear for trial or to prosecute his case in the county court.
Moreover, Bowie did not either timely file his appellant's brief or move this court to extend the time for filing that brief. Bowie's brief was due within thirty days after the date the clerk's record was filed — in other words, on October 7, 2007. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(a). On February 15, 2008, this court notified Bowie that his brief was past due and informed him that, to avoid dismissal of his appeal for want of prosecution, he was required to file his brief and a motion to extend time reasonably explaining the delay by March 6, 2008. Bowie filed his brief on March 5, 2008, but did not file a motion or otherwise provide any reasonable explanation for his failure to timely file the brief. Bowie also failed to serve ASAP Motors with his brief, and did not include any certificate of service.
ASAP has moved to dismiss Bowie's appeal due to his failure to serve the appellant's brief or, alternatively, to extend time for it to file its appellee's brief. Our disposition renders the motion moot.
We find it unnecessary to consider whether to dispose of this appeal based on the several procedural grounds available because Bowie's appeal, on its face, wholly lacks merit. Bowie does not claim any error in the judgment, does not present any issues that would require reversal of the trial court's judgment, and does not cite to any legal authority to support his appeal. Not only does Bowie fail to cite to the record, he affirmatively misstates the outcome of his case and the salient events that transpired in the trial courts below.
As a pro se litigant, Bowie is held to the same standards that apply to licensed attorneys. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1978); Steffan v. Steffan, 29 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). An appellant's failure to brief, or to adequately brief, an issue effects a waiver of that issue on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h); Wheeler v. Methodist Hosp., 95 S.W.3d 628, 646 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
Conclusion
In light of the misrepresentations in Bowie's brief concerning the posture of this case, his failure to present any issue warranting reversal, and his unexplained delay in prosecuting the case, we affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing Bowie's suit for lack of prosecution. All pending motions are dismissed as moot.