The doctrine of renunciation applies where an individual has made "an express, clear and unequivocal renunciation of [his] rights to [property]. . . . [It] must be made with the full knowledge of the effects, legal and practical, of the act or the statement made, and . . . must be intelligently done, [with full awareness] of all the surrounding circumstances." Boucher v. Johnson, 117 N.H. 343, 346 (1977). In this case, the respondent's only express statement about the IRA was that he was "willing to divide [the decedent's] IRA equally."
The same is true of a right of survivorship in a joint tenancy. Boucher v. Johnson, 117 N.H. 343, 346, 373 A.2d 349, 351 (1977). "The surviving tenant is in a position analogous to that of a devisee or legatee, and has the right to prevent the passage of title by renunciation."
She did not waive her full right of ownership in the accounts when she signed the antenuptial agreement. Cf. Boucher v. Johnson, 117 N.H. 343, 346, 373 A.2d 349, 351 (1977). The trial court erred in considering extrinsic evidence to reach the same result we reach today.
This equity action seeks to compel the defendant to turn over the proceeds of two joint bank accounts and other property to the estate of Daniel J. Cronin. The joint accounts were created by deceased during his lifetime and became the property of the defendant as survivor on his death. RSA 384:28; In re Wszolek Estate, 112 N.H. 310, 295 A.2d 444 (1972); see Boucher v. Johnson, 117 N.H. 343, 373 A.2d 349 (1977). The Master (Robert A. Carignan, Esq.) found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant induced the deceased to change his bankbook by fraud or undue influence, that the deceased changed his bankbook knowingly, and that a joint account with rights of survivorship was what he intended.
I would relax this rule where, due to plain error, a party has been deprived of a directed verdict to which he or she would otherwise be entitled. Boucher v. Johnson, 117 N.H. 343, 346-347, 373 A.2d 349, 351-52 (1977) (Bois, J., dissenting). These circumstances are not present here, and in my view we should not go beyond those matters presented for review by plaintiff's own counsel and counsel for the state.
This statute, therefore, allows the donee to take the balance remaining in the account by precluding any investigation of the donor's intent after the donor's death, if a survivorship provision is included. See Courchesne v. Johnson, N.H., 373 A.2d 349 (1977); Street v. Hilburn, supra; In re Wszolek Estate, 112 N.H. 310, 295 A.2d 444 (1972); Ward v. Marine National Bank, 38 N.J. 132, 183 A.2d 60 (1962). However, the mere fact that one is a survivor of a joint bank account, without more, does not unequivocally vest the proceeds in the survivor under Title 5, ยง 128 (2a).