Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Napa County Super. Ct. No. 26-36731
Lambden, J.
Courtland Booze owned a trailer and rented a lot in the Spanish Flats Resort (the resort) near Lake Berryessa, California. The resort was owned by R.E.L. Ltd. (REL), was managed by West Coast Mobile Home Parks, Inc. (West Coast), and had Vincent and Sharon Renyer (the Renyers) as on-site managers (collectively, mobile park owners and managers). Thomas Raymond Costello (Tom) and Bari Costello (collectively, the Costellos) conducted lien sales for the mobile park owners and managers.
When Booze did not make his lot rental payments by the due date, the mobile park owners and managers foreclosed on his trailer under the garageman’s lien law (Civ. Code, § 3067 et seq.). Booze filed a complaint against the mobile park owners and managers, the Costellos, and others. The court determined that the mobile park owners and managers and the Costellos were liable for an unlawful eviction and conversion of Booze’s trailer and that they had violated various statutes. A jury found in favor of Booze on his claims for conversion of his personal property, negligence per se, and negligence, and found against him on his breach of contract claim. After the jury verdict, the court ruled that the mobile park owners and managers and the Costellos had violated the Mobilehome Residency Law (MRL) (§ 798 et seq.) or the Recreational Vehicle Park Occupancy Law (RVPOL) (§ 799.20 et seq.). Under the attorney fees provision of either the MRL or RVPOL, the court awarded attorney fees in the amount of $60,000 to Booze.
All further unspecified code sections refer to the Civil Code.
On appeal, the mobile park owners and managers contend that they were entitled to have the jury determine whether they were liable under the MRL or RVPOL and the court erred in awarding attorney fees under the MRL or RVPOL. The Costellos separately appeal and argue that they were independent contractors and therefore not liable under the MRL or RVPOL. They also maintain that Booze’s claims did not arise out of the MRL or RVPOL and, consequently, the court erred in awarding attorney fees under either of them.
We consolidated both appeals. Booze never filed a responsive brief in this court to either appeal. We, however, conclude that neither appeal has merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Booze owned a trailer located on a rented lot in the resort. In 2004, Booze executed annual rental agreements with the resort. The resort was owned by REL and managed by West Coast. The Renyers were the on-site managers of the resort for West Coast for the time pertinent to the issues related to this appeal. The Costellos own Marine Lien Sale Service, and they conducted lien sales authorized and supervised by the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV).
In 2004, Booze and the mobile park owners and managers became involved in a dispute over the amount of rent he owed the resort. The mobile park owners and managers foreclosed on a debt of $1,325 they claimed Booze owed and conducted a lien sale of the trailer under the garageman’s lien law (§ 3067 et seq.).
On February 20, 2007, Booze filed a complaint against the mobile park owners and managers, the Costellos, and others for breach of contract, conversion, wrongful eviction, unfair competition, civil conspiracy, negligence, violation of statute, and enforcement of bond. He alleged that his trailer was a mobilehome subject to the MRL (§ 798 et seq.). He maintained that he did not receive the required notice and information from the DMV before it granted permission to conduct the lien sale in January 2005. Booze’s pleading stated that Tom, on February 22, 2005, conducted a lien sale of his trailer and transferred title and possession of it to the resort. Booze further pleaded that the mobile park owners and managers prevented him from accessing the trailer and removed, sold, or disposed of the personal possessions inside the trailer. Booze alleged that after February 22, 2005, he paid the mobile park owners and managers all sums alleged to be owed by him, but they still refused to return title to him and refused him entry to the resort. Booze claimed that he was entitled to, among other things, penalties and attorney fees for violating section 3070 of the garageman’s lien law. Additionally, he claimed that he was entitled to attorney fees pursuant to sections 798.85 and 798.86 for violating the MRL.
The case proceeded to trial. Booze filed a motion in limine on April 17, 2008, requesting that the trial court exclude any evidence from the mobile park owners and managers that their reliance on the garageman’s lien law to evict Booze was legitimate or lawful. The court granted the motion, and explained in pertinent part as follows: “[T]he dispute is whether the vehicle is a mobilehome or [a recreational vehicle], and that’s the way the parties see it, and whether the park was a mobilehome park or [a recreational vehicle] park. [¶] I really don’t think it matters, because even if it was just a recreational vehicle, in a recreational vehicle park, I believe, a garageman’s lien sale is not appropriate, because that is for vehicles being fixed or stored, not vehicles being used as a domicile in a park for periods of time. So the motion is granted.”
On May 14, 2008, after the jury heard the evidence, but before the matter was submitted to the jury for decision, Booze orally moved for a directed verdict on his second and third causes of action for wrongful eviction and conversion. Booze argued that, since the court had already determined that the garageman’s lien sale was unlawful, “there would be no lawful basis for the defendants to have asserted any right to possession over [his] property.” The court found that the lien sale process was unlawful and therefore there was a wrongful eviction and conversion of the trailer. The court specified that it was not making any finding regarding conversion of the personal property inside the trailer.
Booze also argued that the court should determine whether attorney fees should be awarded under section 3070. The court stated that the jury should decide whether there was a knowing violation of this statute. If the jury decided that the violation was knowing, then the court would decide whether to award attorney fees.
Booze maintained that the court should also decide whether the MRL applies. The court stated that it did not believe that it needed to decide this issue. The court noted that the parties agreed that section 798.3 would ordinarily apply, but that counsel for the mobile park owners and managers were asserting that this state statute did not apply because the mobile park is on federal land and federal law applies.
The following day, on May 15, 2008, prior to the court’s giving the jury its instructions, Booze’s attorney argued that her “impression [was] that one of [the] causes of action for statutory penalties is not an issue that should go to the jury because it calls for the court to exercise its discretion under statutes” to award penalties and attorney fees. The court agreed that it had to decide the issue of attorney fees but, as to the issue of penalties, it believed there were questions of fact that should be determined by the jury. Counsel for Booze responded that she believed it was a “legal determination.”
Subsequently, the court instructed the jury, and the instructions did not include any admonishment regarding a violation of the MRL. With regard to negligence per se, one of the instructions the court provided was the following: “A violation of the lien law has been established and is not an issue for you to decide. [¶] You must decide whether the violation was a substantial factor in harming Courtland Booze. If you decide that the violation was a substantial factor, then you must find that either one or more of the defendants was negligent.”
After the jury deliberated, the jurors found in favor of the mobile park owners and managers on Booze’s claim for breach of contract. It found against the mobile park owners and managers on Booze’s claim for conversion of his personal property. With respect to Booze’s claims of negligence and negligence per se, the jury found in favor of Booze and against the mobile park owners and managers and the Costellos. The jurors also found that Booze was negligent. The jurors awarded Booze damages in the amount of $45,000. On May 20, 2008, the trial court entered judgment on the special verdict.
On June 2, 2008, Booze filed a memorandum and requested the court to determine liability on causes of action not submitted to the jury, including Booze’s fourth cause of action for unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) and his sixth cause of action for violating the MRL or the RVPOL. Booze also filed a motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant to the lien law, MRL or RVPOL, and the private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5). The mobile park owners and managers and the Costellos opposed both motions.
After a hearing, the trial court entered its order on June 25, 2008, on Booze’s request to determine liability on his fourth and sixth causes of action. With regard to Booze’s sixth cause of action for violation of statute, the court noted that this action was not submitted to the jury for verdict, but the mobile park owners and managers had not cited any authority supporting their argument that Booze had waived his right to have the cause of action decided by the court. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the court found that statutes were violated, but the violation was not willful. The court therefore refused to impose penalties. The court found that Booze proved a violation of the unfair competition law as alleged in his fourth cause of action, but the jury had already awarded him restitution and an injunction was not needed.
The court concluded: “The jury awarded [Booze] $45,000.00 in damages for wrongful eviction and other causes of action. The jury also provided an allocation of fault between the parties on the negligence claims. However, since all of the damages awarded are attributable to the intentional tort of wrongful eviction (in addition to the negligence causes of action), the court finds no basis to offset the award by the 12% allocated to [Booze] only on the negligence claim. [¶] It is appropriate, however, to reduce the award by the $4,500.00 pretrial settlement [Booze] received from the Costellos’ surety. This leaves a total outstanding award of $40,500.00 owed by the defendants. The $4,500.00 settlement shall be credited toward the Costellos’ share of liability.”
On July 21, 2008, the trial court entered an order on Booze’s motion for attorney fees. The trial court refused to award attorney fees under the garageman’s lien law or the private attorney general law (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5). However, it granted fees under either the MRL or RVPOL. The court noted that it had found in its post-verdict decision that Booze established a violation of either the MRL or RVPOL. It concluded that it did not need to decide which statute was violated because “both of these statutory schemes entitle the prevailing party” to attorney fees and costs. The court found that the mobile park owners and managers and the Costellos were jointly and severally liable for attorney fees in the amount of $60,000.
The Costellos and the mobile park owners and managers separately filed notices of appeal. We consolidated the two appeals.
The record submitted on appeal contained only small portions of the reporter’s transcript. On September 29, 2009, this court entered an order requiring the mobile park owners and managers and the Costellos to augment the record to include the entire reporter’s transcript and for the mobile park owners and managers to file a supplemental brief. On this same date, we entered an order striking, on our own motion, the opening brief of the Costellos for failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). We gave the Costellos leave to file a new brief.
Thereafter, the parties filed the augmented record and their briefs became due on December 28, 2009. Extensions to file briefs were granted and the briefs were not filed by the due date. We permitted the mobile park owners and managers to file their supplemental brief by March 8, 2010. The Costellos filed their opening brief on March 15, 2010.
Booze did not file any brief in this court.
DISCUSSION
I. The Appeal of the Mobile Park Owners and Managers
A. The Court’s Determination of Violations of the MRL or RVPOL
The mobile park owners and managers contend that the lower court erred in deciding their liability under the MRL or RVPOL because, according to them, this issue should have been submitted to the jury. They complain that the court’s ruling violated their right to a jury trial.
In setting forth the standard of review, the mobile park owners and managers maintain that their appeal involves the adequacy of a special verdict form to support a judgment. Thus, they assert that the standard of review is de novo. (See, e.g., Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 325.)
The question presented by this appeal is not the correctness or the adequacy of the special verdict. The record is clear that the jury did not decide whether the mobile park owners and managers violated the MRL or RVPOL. This appeal concerns the question of liability under the MRL or RVPOL being decided by the court rather than the jury. The de novo standard of review does not apply.
If the challenge is brought after judgment, as here, the appellant must show actual prejudice, and “prejudice will not be presumed from the fact that the trial was to the court rather than to the jury. [Citations.] Rather, it is presumed that the party had the benefit of a fair and impartial trial.” (Gann v. Williams Brothers Realty, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1698, 1704; McIntosh v. Bowman (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 357, 363.) “After a trial to the court it may be difficult for the petitioner to establish that he was prejudiced by the denial of a jury trial.” (Byram v. Superior Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 648, 654.)
Here, the mobile park owners and managers do not address their burden of showing actual prejudice, and thus the trial court’s ruling must stand. Furthermore, the record establishes that they suffered no prejudice. The trial court ruled that even though it found they had violated the statutes, it would not impose penalties, because it found that the violations were not willful. The court did not impose any additional damages as a result of finding that the mobile park owners and managers had violated the MRL or RVPOL. Thus, other than the award of attorney fees pursuant to the MRL or RVPOL, which we consider below, the court’s ruling on liability had no adverse effect on the mobile park owners and managers.
B. The Award of Attorney Fees
The mobile park owners and managers argue that the lower court erred in awarding attorney fees to Booze pursuant to the MRL (§ 798 et seq.) or RVPOL (§ 799.20 et seq.) because Booze was not the prevailing party on his claims for violation of the MRL or RVPOL. They maintain that the jury’s verdict did not address Booze’s claims under these statutes and therefore the court could not award attorney fees pursuant to these statutes. The mobile park owners and managers fail to cite any of the pertinent authority, and the relevant authority undermines their argument.
“ ‘ “An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review; however, the ‘determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs have been met is a question of law.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (SC Manufactured Homes, Inc. v. Canyon View Estates, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 663, 673 (SC Manufactured Homes).) Entitlement to attorney fees under section 798.85 (or § 799.78) is a legal question subject to de novo review. (MHC Financing Limited Partnership Two v. City of Santee (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1397 (MHC Financing).)
As the trial court found, and the mobile park owners and managers do no dispute, it is immaterial whether the MRL or the RVPOL applies. The language in the attorney fees statutes in the MRL and the RVPOL is identical. The attorney fees provisions in the MRL and the RVPOL provide: “In any action arising out of the provisions of this chapter the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. A party shall be deemed a prevailing party for the purposes of this section if the judgment is rendered in his or her favor or where the litigation is dismissed in his or her favor prior to or during the trial, unless the parties otherwise agree in the settlement or compromise.” (§§ 798.85, 799.78.)
The MRL (§ 798 et seq.) regulates relations between the owners and the residents of mobilehome parks. (Cacho v. Boudreau (2007) 40 Cal.4th 341, 345.) “The protections afforded by the [MRL] reflect legislative recognition of the unique nature of mobilehome tenancies. (See... § 798.55, subd. (a).) Ordinarily, mobilehome park tenants own their homes but rent the spaces they occupy. [Citation.] Once a mobilehome is in place in a park, it is difficult to relocate. [Citations.] Its owner thus ‘is more likely to be a long-term resident.’ [Citation.] In many cases, mobilehome park tenants have limited and undesirable options if they find ‘living in the park no longer desirable, practical, or possible....’ [Citation.]” (People ex rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 109.)
The statutes within the MRL cover topics such as the form of, and mandatory and prohibited terms for, rental agreements between the resident and the mobilehome park (§§ 798.15-798.19.5); the instances in which the park may be required to permit the sublease of a mobilehome by a park tenant (§ 798.23.5); the procedures that must be followed by the park in amending its rules and regulations (§ 798.25); the circumstances under which park management may enter mobilehomes (§§ 798.26, 799.2.5); when park management may remove unauthorized vehicles (§ 798.28.5); required procedures for a park’s implementation of rent increases (§ 798.30); permissible charges, including security deposits, by the park to tenants (§§ 798.31-798.44); regulation of homeowners’ meetings (§§ 798.50-798.52); regulation of termination of tenancies by parks and homeowners (§§ 798.55-798.61); and the regulation of ownership transfers of mobilehomes and mobilehome parks (§§ 798.70-798.83). In so regulating these activities, the MRL provides “homeowners a measure of stability and predictability in their mobilehome park residency....” (Griffith v. County of Santa Cruz (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1321, 1323 (Griffith).) The MRL generally excludes recreational vehicles from the definition of mobilehome. (§ 798.3, subd. (a).) However, it includes recreational vehicles within the definition of mobilehome (with certain exceptions) if the “recreational vehicle occupies a mobilehome site in the park for nine or more continuous months....” (§ 798.3, subd. (b)(2).)
The RVPOL regulates recreational vehicle tenancies in recreational vehicle parks. (Griffith, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322.) The RVPOL generally governs the contents of rental agreements and regulates the removal of recreational vehicles after default. The RVPOL requires that the termination of a “resident” tenancy be for specified reasons similar to the reasons required before a mobilehome tenancy may be terminated under the MRL. (Compare §§ 799.70 & 798.56.)
Contrary to the argument of the mobile park owners and managers, the inquiry is not whether Booze alleged specific violations of the MRL or the RVPOL and prevailed on these causes of action. The issue is whether his lawsuit arose under these statutes and, if so, he prevailed in the lawsuit. “A case may ‘arise’ under the MRL even if a complaint does not allege a specific cause of action under the MRL, as long as the dispute is one within the scope of the MRL.” (SC Manufactured Homes, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 676; see also Del Cerro Mobile Estates v. Proffer (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 943, 945-948 [in a dispute between a mobilehome park and its tenant, the prevailing tenant was held entitled to attorney fees because she “had a legal basis to claim recovery of such fees grounded in the [MRL]”]; Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 377, 386-387 [mobilehome owners who prevailed in an unlawful detainer action by their landlord were held entitled to attorney fees because their defense to the suit was the landlord’s noncompliance with the MRL].) “[T]he phrase ‘any action arising out of the provisions of [the MRL]’ in... section 798.85 encompasses only those actions directly involving the application of MRL provisions in specific factual contexts addressed by the MRL....” (MHC Financing, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1398.)
Here, Booze unquestionably prevailed in his lawsuit as the court found in his favor on his claims of unlawful eviction, conversion of the trailer, and violations of various statutes. Additionally, the jury found in favor of Booze on his claims for conversion of his personal property, negligence and negligence per se. The only claim not decided in Booze’s favor was his breach of contract claim. Thus, the critical inquiry is whether Booze’s lawsuit constituted an “action arising out of” the MRL; it is insufficient for the case to merely relate to the MRL. (MHC Financing, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1397-1398.)
The mobile park owners and managers never discuss whether the lawsuit arose from the MRL, but our review of the record establishes that the lower court did not err in deciding that attorney fees under the MRL or RVPOL were warranted. All of the allegations contained in Booze’s complaint arose from his relationship as a resident in the mobilehome park to the owners and managers of the mobile park. His claims all involved his unlawful eviction from the trailer and the unlawful seizure of his personal property in the trailer, which were done in violation of the MRL or RVPOL. Indeed, Booze alleged there would have been no liability on any of his claims had there been compliance with the MRL or RVPOL.
The record establishes that Booze’s lawsuit arose from his claim that the mobile park owners and managers were liable to him on various causes of action for evicting him and seizing his property in a manner that did not comply with the MRL or RVPOL. Accordingly, the lower court properly awarded him attorney fees under these statutes.
II. The Costellos Appeal
A. Applying the Attorney Fees Provision to the Costellos
The Costellos maintain that the MRL and the RVPOL apply to owners and operators of mobile home parks and their tenants. They maintain that the attorney fees provisions under the MRL and RVPOL do not apply to them because they did not have a landlord/tenant relationship to Booze. The sole support they offer in support of this argument is the Supreme Court’s statement that the MRL “regulates relations between the owners and the residents of mobilehome parks.” (Cacho v. Boudreau, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 345.)
Even if we were to presume the attorney fees provision only applies to landlords and tenants, the Costellos would still be liable if they were agents of the mobile park owners and managers. The court instructed the jury to decide whether, “at the time of the events out of which the lawsuit occurred,” the Costellos were agents of the mobile park owners and managers or whether they were independent contractors. Given the jury’s finding that the Costellos were liable for negligence and negligence per se and the court’s finding that the Costellos had violated the MRL or RVPOL, we presume they found that the Costellos were agents of the mobile park owners and tenants. “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.)
The Costellos have not cited to any evidence in the record establishing that they were not agents of the mobile park owners and managers. Rather than cite to any evidence, they simply assert that they were independent contractors. Our independent review of the record establishes that evidence supports a finding that they were operating as agents of the mobile park owners and managers. Tom testified that he helped the resort collect money when the resort was owed money; he had been helping the resort collect money prior to the lien sale involving Booze. He stated that, if the money were not paid during this process, he would conduct a lien sale. This testimony was sufficient to support a finding of agency.
Furthermore, even if the record did not establish that the Costellos were agents of the mobile park owners and managers, we would still affirm the lower court’s finding that the Costellos had to pay attorney fees under the MRL or RVPOL. We do not agree with the Costellos that this attorney fees provision applies only to landlords and tenants.
The attorney fees provisions in the MRL and RVPOL state that a “prevailing party shall be entitled” to attorney fees “[i]n any action arising out of the provisions of this chapter....” (§§ 798.85, 799.78.) The plain language in the statute does not limit its application to landlords and tenants.
As already set forth, the attorney fees provisions in the MRL and the RVPOL provide: “In any action arising out of the provisions of this chapter the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. A party shall be deemed a prevailing party for the purposes of this section if the judgment is rendered in his or her favor or where the litigation is dismissed in his or her favor prior to or during the trial, unless the parties otherwise agree in the settlement or compromise.” (§§ 798.85, 799.78.)
“Words used in a statute or constitutional provision should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute)....” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) We must construe the meaning of the attorney fees provision within the context of the entire MRL and RVPOL as a “[l]iteral construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute.” (Lungren, at p. 735.)
Here, not only does the plain meaning of the attorney fees provision apply to all lawsuits arising out of the MRL or RVPOL, or to any individual or entity involved in an action arising between a mobilehome landlord and a tenant, but also such an interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the statute. “The protections afforded by the [MRL] reflect legislative recognition of the unique nature of mobilehome tenancies. [§ 798.55, subd. (a).] Ordinarily, mobilehome park tenants own their homes but rent the spaces they occupy. [Citation.] Once a mobilehome is in place in a park, it is difficult to relocate. [Citations.] Its owner thus ‘is more likely to be a long-term resident.’ [Citation.] In many cases, mobilehome park tenants have limited and undesirable options if they find ‘living in the park no longer desirable, practical, or possible....’ [Citation.]” (People ex rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 109.) Thus, applying the attorney fees statute to any individual or entity that has significantly affected the compliance of the landlord or tenant with the MRL or RVPOL furthers the protective purpose of these statutes, which are designed to give tenants some “measure of stability and predictability in their mobilehome park residency....” (Griffith, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1323.)
We note that dicta in SC Manufactured Homes, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th 663, suggest that the attorney fees provision of the MRL applies only to landlords and tenants. After concluding that the lawsuit before it did not arise out of the MRL, the court in SC Manufactured Homes focused on an argument by one of the defendants that the attorney fees provision did not limit its definition of “the prevailing party” (§ 798.85) to tenants or park owners. The defendants pointed out that no specific language was used in the attorney fees provision while section 798.86 permitted “a homeowner” or former “homeowner” who is successful in enforcing his or her rights to collect punitive damages and additional damages for willful violations. The defendants argued that the use of “homeowner” in section 798.86 indicated that the Legislature would have limited the definition of prevailing party had it wished to do so. (SC Manufactured Homes, supra, at p. 680.) The court in SC Manufactured Homes distinguished section 798.85 from section 798.86 and explained that the reciprocal attorney fees and costs provision permitting both sides to a dispute arising under the MRL to obtain attorney fees and costs is different from the “unilateral attorney fees and costs provision” of section 798.86. (SC Manufactured Homes, supra, at p. 680.) We do not disagree with this distinction between sections 798.85 and 798.86 or with the court’s rejection of the defendants’ claim to attorney fees based on a determination that the lawsuit did not arise out of the MRL, but primarily concerned kickbacks and the plaintiff’s own personal gain. (SC Manufactured Homes, at p. 679.) To the extent that the court in SC Manufactured Homes suggests in dicta that the attorney fees provision can never apply to people who are not landlords or tenants, we disagree.
Our interpretation of the attorney fees provision of the MRL and RVPOL is consistent with People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626. In McKale, the district attorney had sued the owner of a mobile park and its managers for alleged violations of the MRL and other statutes. (Id. at p. 631.) The district attorney also sued Wells Fargo Bank and alleged that it was in possession and control of the park during a portion of the time when the alleged discriminatory acts occurred. (Ibid.) When sending the matter back to the trial court, our Supreme Court stated that if Wells Fargo Bank established that it was the prevailing party in a lawsuit involving the MRL, it could receive attorney fees pursuant to the MRL. (McKale, at pp. 638-639.) Thus, the Supreme Court stated that the attorney fees provision under the MRL could apply to Wells Fargo Bank even though the bank was neither a landlord nor a tenant. Similarly, here, the Costellos do not have to be a landlord or a tenant to be subject to the attorney fees provision in the MRL.
B. Substantial Evidence in Support of the Verdict
The Costellos argue that they were independent contractors and therefore could not be jointly liable with the mobile park owners and managers in the dispute involving the lien sale. They claim that they sent a notice of the lien sale to Booze “pursuant to their usual procedure[,]” which had been approved by the DMV. They then assert that no lien sale took place and that the Costellos never met Booze and never had any contact with him. They maintain that their only conduct consisted of sending out a notice of sale and that “[t]he trial court erroneously held that this conduct constituted a wrongful eviction and conversion by them of plaintiff’s travel trailer and accessory structures.” In support of this latter contention, they cite to the special verdict.
The Costellos argument is somewhat incomprehensible and their citations to the record in support of this argument are woefully inadequate. The court found that the Costellos, as well as the mobile park owners and managers, had unlawfully evicted Booze and converted his trailer and that they had violated the MRL or RVPOL and the unfair competition law. The Costellos, however, never cite to the portion of the record setting forth these rulings or to any of the evidence supporting these findings. The jury found in the special verdict that the Costellos were liable for negligence per se and negligence.
The record contained ample evidence to support the findings of both the court and the jury. Booze presented evidence that the Costellos modified DMV forms, which deprived Booze of the right notifications, especially with respect to his 10-day right to redeem his property after the lien sale. Further, there was evidence that the Costellos falsely stated under penalty of perjury in DMV applications that the resort was a “self-service storage facility.”
“Where multiple tortfeasors are responsible for an indivisible injury suffered by the plaintiff, each tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for those damages and thus may be held individually liable to the injured plaintiff for the entirety of such damages. [Citations.] Thus, the joint and several liability doctrine ensures that the injured party receives adequate compensation for its injuries, even if one or more of the responsible parties do not have the financial resources to pay for their share of the liability. [Citation.] Under such circumstances, ‘fairness dictates that the “wronged party should not be deprived of his right to redress,” but that “[t]he wrongdoers should be left to work out between themselves any apportionment.” ’ [Citation.]” (Expressions at Rancho Niguel Assn. v. Ahmanson Developments, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1139.) Code of Civil Procedure section 875, subdivision (d) precludes contribution between intentional tortfeasors.
The court noted that the jury awarded Booze $45,000 in damages for wrongful eviction and other causes of action and, since all of the damages awarded were attributable to the intentional tort of wrongful eviction and negligence, the court found the parties jointly and severally liable for the damages. The record amply supported the finding that the Costellos violated statutes and were involved in and liable for the wrongful eviction and conversion claims. Thus, the court properly found them jointly and severally liable for the damages.
C. Booze’s Action and the MRL
The Costellos contend that the lower court erred in awarding attorney fees pursuant to the MRL or RVPOL because Booze’s claims did not arise under the MRL. The Costellos argue that, because they are independent contractors, they were not involved in the landlord and tenant dispute between Booze and the mobile park owners and managers. They further claim that the MRL is mentioned only once in Booze’s complaint and the complaint does not set forth any cause of action involving the MRL directly against the Costellos.
Again, the Costellos fail to cite to any evidence supporting their assertion that they were independent contractors and, as already stressed, the record supports a finding that they were agents of the mobile park owners and managers. As already discussed, the present lawsuit concerned an unlawful eviction of a resident of a mobilehome park and the unlawful seizure of property in violation of the MRL or RVPOL and therefore the trial court properly awarded attorney fees pursuant to the attorney fees provision of the MRL or RVPOL.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The mobile park owners and managers and the Costellos are to pay their own costs of appeal.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Richman, J.