Opinion
01-CV-6078L.
September 16, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Pedro Bonet, appearing pro se, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"), alleges various violations of his constitutional rights in connection with an alleged assault upon him by correction officers at Southport Correctional Facility on February 3, 1998. In addition to those officers, plaintiff has also sued two DOCS medical employees, nurse Karen Dyal and nurse practitioner Paul Daugherty ("the medical defendants"), for alleged denial of medical care for the injuries sustained by plaintiff in the alleged assault.
On January 10, 2003, the Court issued a Decision and Order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment without prejudice. As to the medical defendants, the Court granted plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion for further discovery, and directed that plaintiff be provided with a "complete copy of his medical record from February 3, 1998 onward, to the extent that it relates to treatment that he received or complaints that he made to medical staff concerning his injuries suffered during the alleged assault on February 3." Decision and Order (Docket #34) at 7. I also stated that I was "deny[ing the medical] defendants' motion for summary judgment without prejudice to renewal after further discovery." Id.
By letter from their attorney filed on July 23, 2004, the medical defendants have renewed their motion for summary judgment. Counsel states that plaintiff has been provided with his medical records as directed by the Court. In addition, Magistrate Judge Jonathan W. Feldman, to whom this case was referred for supervision of discovery, issued a Scheduling Order (Docket #50) on November 4, 2003, stating, in part, that discovery in this case was closed as of that date.
Also on July 23, 2004, the Court issued an Order (Docket #55) directing plaintiff to respond to defendants' renewed summary judgment motion within forty-five days, i.e., September 6, 2004. The Court also warned that "[i]f plaintiff fails to respond in a timely fashion, judgment could be entered in favor of the defendants." Plaintiff has not responded to either defendants' motion or to the Court's July 23 Order.
DISCUSSION
I. Eighth Amendment Claims: General Standards
To show that prison medical treatment was so inadequate as to amount to "cruel or unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, plaintiff must prove that defendants' actions or omissions amounted to "deliberate indifference to a serious medical need." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The Second Circuit has stated that a medical need is "serious" for constitutional purposes if it presents "`a condition of urgency' that may result in `degeneration' or `extreme pain.'" Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1154 (1995)).
As to the "deliberate indifference" component, the Supreme Court explained in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991), that this standard requires a showing that (1) there has been a sufficiently serious deprivation of the prisoner's constitutional rights, and (2) the deprivation was brought about by defendants in wanton disregard of those rights. To establish deliberate indifference, therefore, plaintiff must prove that the defendants had a culpable state of mind and intended wantonly to inflict pain. See id., 501 U.S. at 299; Ross v. Kelly, 784 F.Supp. 35, 44 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 970 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1040 (1992).
In addition, mere negligence is not actionable. "A [prisoner's] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Rather, the plaintiff must allege conduct that is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind," id. at 102, or "incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," id. at 105-06.
Likewise, an inmate's "mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim. So long as the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation." Chance, 143 F.3d at 703; see also Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977) ("The courts will not intervene upon allegations of mere negligence, mistake or difference of opinion").
II. Merits of the Medical Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
As noted in my January 10, 2003 Decision and Order, plaintiff did not respond to the merits of defendants' original motion for summary judgment, but asserted only that he could not adequately respond to the motion until he had access to his medical record. Since plaintiff has now been given a copy of his medical record, there is no apparent reason why he cannot respond to the renewed motion for summary judgment.
Under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1(a), a party moving for summary judgment must include with the motion a statement of material facts which that party contends are not in dispute. Local Rule 56(c) also provides that "[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party." Plaintiff was advised of the consequences of failing to adequately respond to defendants' motion in their original notice of motion (Docket #20), including the fact that "[a]ny factual assertions in [defendants'] affidavits will be accepted by the Court as being true unless [plaintiff] submit[s] affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting [defendants'] assertions." As stated above, the Court's July 23 Order also warned plaintiff that the motion might be granted if he did not respond. In considering defendants' summary judgment motion, then, the Court may assume that their factual allegations are true. See LeSane v. Hall's Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 211 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2001) (where plaintiff has been put on notice of consequences of not responding to summary judgment motion, can should "examine plaintiff's case, treating all of defendant's Rule 56.1 assertions as true, and consider whether, given those facts, summary judgment would lie"); see also Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 BEARGRAM Co., 373 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing Local Civ. R. 56.2 of the Southern and Eastern districts of New York); Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 681 (2d Cir. 2001) (commenting on "the perilous path of failing to submit a response to a summary judgment motion").
Accordingly, the Court accepts the truth of the following assertions in defendants' Rule 56.1 statement (Docket #22):
7. Following the [alleged assault on] the plaintiff, Nurse Dyal went to the plaintiff's housing area in order to examine him and provide him whatever medical attention may have been necessary.
8. When Nurse Dyal arrived at the plaintiff's cell, she attempted to assess his medical condition. However, despite her requests that he do so, the plaintiff refused to come to the cell door so that she could observe him. Instead, he stated that he wanted to go to the hospital.
9. Based upon the plaintiff's refusal to be examined, Nurse Dyal directed that the security staff transport him to the facility infirmary, which was done via stretcher. The plaintiff arrived at the infirmary at approximately 12:10 p.m.
10. At the infirmary, the plaintiff was examined by Nurse Dyal and Nurse Practitioner Daugherty.
11. A complete examination of the plaintiff revealed that he had a ½" laceration on his left elbow. He was also found to have a large hematoma of his right orbit and a closed 3" abrasion on the back of his neck.
12. The plaintiff was told that he needed stitches in his left eyebrow, however, he refused the stitches, insisting that this procedure be done at a hospital.
13. Nurse Practitioner Daugherty advised the plaintiff that the laceration was minor and that the sutures could be done at the infirmary. Despite this assurance, the plaintiff refused to have him place stitches on the laceration. The laceration was closed with a dry sterile dressing.
14. No other injuries were observed by Nurse Dyal or Nurse Practitioner Daugherty or complained of by the plaintiff.
15. At no time did the plaintiff complain of a loss of vision to Nurse Dyal or Nurse Practitioner Daugherty.
In addition to these statements, Dyal and Daugherty have each submitted an affidavit describing the treatment that they gave, or attempted to give, plaintiff on February 3, 1998. Those affidavits (Docket #24 and #25) likewise indicate that they gave plaintiff appropriate medical care for his injuries, and that any lack of treatment was due to plaintiff's own refusal of treatment.
Based on these facts — which plaintiff has failed to contradict — I find that the medical defendants are entitled to summary judgment. There is simply no evidence before me that Dyal or Daugherty deliberately ignored any of plaintiff's medical needs, serious or otherwise. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the medical defendants intended to cause plaintiff to suffer needless pain. To the contrary, defendants' undisputed statements indicate that plaintiff refused to allow defendants to treat him.
Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the medical defendants refused his request that he be sent to an outside hospital for treatment, but that amounts to no more than a simple disagreement between plaintiff and defendants over the proper course of treatment. As stated, that alone does not give rise to a constitutional violation. Chance, 143 F.3d at 703.
CONCLUSION
The renewed motion for summary judgment (Docket #54) by defendants Karen Dyal and Paul Daugherty is granted, and plaintiff's claims against those two defendants are dismissed.IT IS SO ORDERED.