Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. 37-2010-00065879-CU-UD-EC, Allan J. Preckel, Judge.
IRION, J.
Gwendolyn L. Bond (Bond), as trustee of the Gwendolyn Bond Trust, appeals from a judgment in an unlawful detainer action that she filed against Tina M. Woolley and Danny Woolley (collectively, the Woolleys). Bond contends that the trial court erred by not awarding past-due rent or other damages to her in connection with its order giving her possession of the premises. We conclude that Bond's argument is without merit, and accordingly we affirm the judgment.
Tina Woolley is Bond's granddaughter.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Bond and the Woolleys were involved in litigation against each other over certain real property and businesses, including two houses, a motel and a feed store business. After participating in a mediation, the parties entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement, which was entered as a judgment by the superior court in January 2007 (the settlement agreement).
The litigation in which the settlement agreement was entered was Woolley v. Bond (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2007, No. GIE023735).
The case currently before us involves one of the parcels of real property covered by the settlement agreement, which is the property located at 23518 Bell Bluff Truck Trail, in Alpine (the Property). In the settlement agreement, the parties agreed as follows concerning the Property:
"4. The [Woolleys] and [Bond] will enter into a five (5) year lease with an option to purchase of [the Property] (which shall be recorded)..., upon the execution of this judgment. Rent will be paid monthly at $2,000 a month for the 5-year term. A form of the lease is attached hereto and made a part hereof. The purchase price to be inserted in the Option to Purchase [of the Property] shall be the current fair market value as determined by [a specific appraiser].
"5. [Bond] will vacate the house at [the Property] within 90 days or sooner from the date of execution of this Judgment. [The Woolleys] will quit claim to [Bond] their existing ownership interest, if any, in [the Property] within ninety (90) days of the execution of this Judgment by [the trial court]. This conveyance will be effected in a manner such as to mitigate and minimize any and all types of taxes that may arise as a result of said transfer."
The settlement agreement further "contemplated that the parties... will be executing additional documents including without limitation deeds, ... leases, options to purchase and related documents." Although the settlement agreement stated that a "form of the lease is attached hereto and made part hereof, " no such document was attached.
After entry of judgment on the settlement agreement, the parties apparently could not come to terms on a lease agreement and option to purchase, and thus no lease was ever executed and no option to purchase was recorded.
It is not clear from the record whether the parties followed through on the portion of the settlement agreement requiring Bond to vacate the Property and the Woolleys to quit claim their ownership interest, if any. During the hearing on the unlawful detainer action, counsel referred to having gotten "the rescission deed taken care of" after a motion granting appointment of an elisor. Although we are not certain, counsel may have been referring to the quit claim deed for the Property referred to in the settlement agreement.
On March 3, 2010, Bond filed the instant unlawful detainer action against the Woolleys, alleging that the Woolleys had failed to pay rent in the amount of $2,000 per month. Bond sought possession of the premises and past-due rent in the amount of $26,000, plus damages in the amount of $66.66 per day for each additional day that the Woolleys occupied the Property. Attached to the complaint were (1) a notice to pay rent or quit that Bond served on the Woolleys on February 25, 2010; and (2) a copy of the settlement agreement, which Bond contended constituted a written rental agreement between the parties.
The unlawful detainer complaint was based on Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision 2, which states that unlawful detainer occurs when a tenant "continues in possession... without the permission of his or her landlord... after default in the payment of rent, pursuant to the lease or agreement under which the property is held."
Bond sought only a year's worth of rent, plus rent that accrued after the notice to pay rent or quit, because a three-day notice to pay or quit must be served "within one year after the rent becomes due." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. 2.)
The Woolleys filed an answer, in which they alleged that (1) the parties had never entered into a written rental agreement, and (2) if the parties did finally enter into such an agreement, as required by the settlement agreement, they expected that their rent would be approximately $1,000 per month because they would be entitled to credits for their costs related to other properties, including a motel, that were covered by the settlement agreement.
The trial court held a bench trial on April 15, 2010, at which Bond was the sole witness. During her testimony, Bond acknowledged that the parties had not entered into a written lease agreement and option to purchase as required by the settlement agreement, but she claimed that the settlement agreement constituted the parties' rental agreement.
The trial court entered judgment, giving Bond possession of the Property and ordering the Woolleys to vacate it by May 1, 2010. The trial court declined, however, to award any past-due rent to Bond or any other damages. The parties did not request a statement of decision, but the trial court explained at trial that it was not awarding past-due rent or damages to Bond because the parties had not entered into a rental agreement.
The trial court did make an award of costs in favor of Bond in the amount of $473.50.
II
DISCUSSION
Bond appeals from the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in declining to make an award of past-due rent or other damages, in the form of the rent due after the service of the notice to pay rent or quit.
Bond cites the portion of the statute governing unlawful detainer actions, which states that "[t]he jury or the court... shall... assess the damages occasioned to the plaintiff by any... unlawful detainer, alleged in the complaint and proved on the trial, and find the amount of any rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer be after default in the payment of rent." (Code. Civ. Proc., § 1174, subd. (b).) According to Bond, the evidence establishes the existence of a rental agreement under which the Woolleys are required to pay her $2,000 per month for the Property. She contends that based on this evidence, the trial court improperly refused to make an award of past-due rent and damages for post-notice unpaid rent.
As we have explained, the trial court declined to award past-due rent and damages because it found that the parties were not operating under a lease agreement requiring the Woolleys to pay rent to Bond. We must therefore determine whether the trial court erred in making that determination.
The parties disagree over the applicable standard of review. Bond contends that our review of the trial court's decision requires us to interpret a written agreement - specifically, the settlement agreement - and that because extrinsic evidence was not presented on that issue, we should apply a de novo standard of review in interpreting that document. (California National Bank v. Woodbridge Plaza LLC (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 137, 142; Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865-866.) The Woolleys contend that in deciding that the parties had not entered into a rental agreement, the trial court was making a factual determination subject to the normally applicable substantial evidence standard of review that we apply to findings of fact. (Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Essex Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 86, 92.) We need not resolve this dispute, as under any standard of review, the record does not support a conclusion that the parties entered into a lease or other rental agreement.
The only evidence Bond presented to support her claim of a rental agreement was the settlement agreement. She claims that the settlement agreement "is, in effect, the parties' 'rental agreement.' " However, the terms of the settlement agreement make clear that it is not a rental agreement between the parties and that additional documents will have to be executed before any rental agreement comes into existence. Specifically, the settlement agreement unambiguously (1) references a separate form of a lease agreement that is supposed to be attached to the settlement agreement; (2) states that upon execution of the judgment the parties "will enter into" a five-year lease and option to purchase; (3) provides that a purchase price will be determined and the option to purchase "shall be recorded"; and (4) contemplates that the parties will be executing "additional documents, " including a lease. Bond acknowledged that these events did not occur.
Because the settlement agreement, without more, does not constitute a rental agreement between the parties, there is no factual support for Bond's argument that by entering into the settlement agreement the Woolleys became parties to an agreement to pay monthly rent to Bond. As Bond presented no other evidence of a rental agreement between the parties, the trial court properly concluded that there was no basis for awarding past-due rent or other damages to Bond.
Bond argues that "[i]t is logically inconsistent for a landlord to prevail in an unlawful detainer for nonpayment of rent, and then have the court fail to award any money damages for the nonpayment." We agree. But the peculiarity in the trial court's decision is not that it declined to award past-due rent or damages. As we have explained, that decision is well supported by the evidence. Instead, the puzzling part of the trial court's decision is the entry of an order restoring possession of the premises to Bond based on her unlawful detainer application for nonpayment of rent under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision 2, when the trial court found that Bond failed to establish any past-due rent. However, the Woolleys did not appeal from the portion of the judgment restoring possession of the Property to Bond, and we therefore express no opinion on whether the trial court erred in making such an order.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P.J., NARES, J.