La.Const. 1964, Art. 5, Sec. 10(B); Higgins v. Johnson, 349 So.2d 918 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1977); Bond v. Jack, 387 So.2d 613 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1980). We would then be bound to render the judgment which we conclude is just, legal and proper upon the record on appeal.
Cordy v. Sherwin Williams Co., 975 F. Supp. 639 (N.J. 1997); Meyer, 475 N.W.2d at 191; Dare v. Sobule, 674 P.2d 960, 962-63 (Colo. 1984); Hukill v. DiGregorio, 136 Ill. App.3d 1066, 1067-68, 92 Ill.Dec. 64, 484 N.E.2d 795 (1985); Bond v. Jack, 387 So.2d 613, 616 (La.App. 1980); Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 240-44, 262 A.2d 549 (1970); Burgstahler v. Fox, 290 Minn. 495, 496, 186 N.W.2d 182 (1971). Some courts have rested their rejection of the helmet defense on the ground that neither Congress nor their state legislatures had passed a law requiring the use of helmets.
Id.SeeRogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 262 A.2d 549 (1970); Burgstahler v. Fox, 290 Minn. 495, 186 N.W.2d 182 (1971); Bondv. Jack, 387 So.2d 613 (La. App. 1980), aff'd sub. nom.Bondv. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 407 So.2d 401 (La. 1981); Dare v. Sobule, 674 P.2d 960 (Colo.
. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 780-81, 727 P.2d 1187, 1208-09 (1986) (seat belt) (nonuse inadmissible on contributory negligence and mitigation of damages under comparative fault); Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill.2d 129, 130-35, 90 Ill.Dec. 950, 951-52, 483 N.E.2d 268, 269-70 (1985) (seat belt) (nonuse inadmissible on question of liability or damages); Hukill v. Di Gregorio, 136 Ill. App.3d 1066, 1067-68, 92 Ill.Dec. 64, 65, 484 N.E.2d 795, 796 (1985) (helmet) (nonuse inadmissible on liability or damages under comparative fault; relying on Clarkson v. Wright); State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444, 448 (Ind. 1981) (seat belt) (nonuse inadmissible on mitigation of damages) (court refused to judicially mandate use of seat belts absent clear mandate from legislature); Watkins v. Hartsock, 245 Kan. 756, 757-61, 783 P.2d 1293, 1295-96 (1989) (seat belt) (under comparative negligence doctrine, "[t]here is no duty to use a seat belt under the common law standard of due care or in order to mitigate damages"); Bond v. Jack, 387 So.2d 613, 616 (La.App. 1980) (helmet) (motorcyclist not contributorily negligent in failing to wear safety helmet) aff'd, 407 So.2d 401 (La. 1981); Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 240-44, 262 A.2d 549, 553-54 (1970) (helmet) (nonuse inadmissible on liability and damages); Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 225-26, 230 A.2d 629, 635 (1967) (seat belt) (nonuse inadmissible on liability but no holding as to damages); Burgstahler v. Fox, 290 Minn. 495, 496, 186 N.W.2d 182, 183 (1971) (helmet) (nonuse inadmissible), but see Northway v. Madsen, 390 N.W.2d 435, 436 (Minn.App. 1986) (helmet) (instruction on mitigation of damages because there was no objection to it); D.W. Boutwell Butane Co. v. Smith, 244 So.2d 11, 12 (Miss. 1971) (seat belt) (under comparative negligence court refused to "lay down a rule that the failure to use [seat belts] is negligence"); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293, 301 (Mo.App. 1970) (seat belt) (nonuse inadmissible to show lack of due care) ("such a matter is properly for the legislature"); Kop
The court of appeal reversed the jury's verdict for the defendants because the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the standard of care required of a left turning motorist and because the verdict was clearly wrong based on all of the evidence in the record. Bond v. Jack, 387 So.2d 613 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1980). After reviewing the evidence we conclude that the intermediate court correctly decided these issues and affirm its judgment for the reasons stated in the court of appeal opinion.
153 Neb. at 819, 46 N.W.2d at 358. E.g., Tyler v. Drennen, 255 Ala. 377, 51 So.2d 516 (1951); Bond v. Jack, 387 So.2d 613 (La.Ct.App. 1980); Facianne v. Greene, 379 So.2d 847 (La.App. 1980); Jacobs v. Kimbrough, 376 So.2d 1273 (La.App. 1979); Esponette v. Wiseman, 130 Me. 297, 155 A. 650 (1953). See also Rowedder v. Rose, 188 Neb. 664, 199 N.W.2d 18 (1972); Keller v. Wellensiek, 186 Neb. 201, 181 N.W.2d 854 (1970); Kreger v. Ervin Clark Const. Co., 166 Neb. 252, 88 N.W.2d 778 (1958); Berbohn v. Pinkerton, 208 Okla. 242, 255 P.2d 260 (1953).
4 Cir. 1975) ("the fact that a motorist involved in an accident was speeding or intoxicated does not in and of itself require a finding of liability"); see also Loveday v. Travelers Ins. Co., 585 So.2d 597 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 590 So.2d 65 (La.1991) (excessive speed not a causative factor in accident); Aguillard v. Frank, 542 So.2d 834, 836 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989) ("While excessive speed or speed exceeding the lawful limit is a violation of the law, it is not necessarily a proximate or contributing cause of every accident."); Fontenot v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 130 So.2d 462 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1961) (same); Wood v. Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 107 So.2d 309 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1958) (finding excessive speed does not necessarily give rise to liability).Bond v. Jack, 387 So.2d 613, 615 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1980), aff'd, 407 So.2d 401 (La.1981) ("It is clear from the jurisprudence that a left turning motorist bears a higher standard of care than ordinary"; standard described as "a high degree of care," "higher duty of care," "exceptional duty of care," and "considerable in degree"). In Lang v. Cage, 554 So.2d 1312, 1316 (La.App.
Where some portion of the instructions are isolated from the context and are erroneous, the error is not necessarily prejudicial. Furthermore, the manifest error standard for appellate review may not be ignored unless the jury charges are so incorrect or so inadequate as to preclude the jury from reaching a verdict based on the law and facts. Anderson v. Fowler Trucking, Inc., supra; citing Bond v. Jack, 387 So.2d 613 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1980). In the instant case, the trial court excluded instruction number 27 because it was covered by the general instructions regarding credibility.
See, e.g., Dare v. Sobule, 674 P.2d 960 (Colo. 1984); Hukill v. DiGregorio, 136 Ill. App.3d 1066, 92 Ill. Dec. 64, 484 N.E.2d 795 (1985); Bond v. Jack, 387 So.2d 613 (La.App. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Bond v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 407 So.2d 401 (La. 1981); Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 262 A.2d 549 (1970); Burgstahler v. Fox, 290 Minn. 495, 186 N.W.2d 182 (1971). These cases are of little value to us because the rationale given in each either has been expressly rejected by our supreme court in Law II or has no application because of differences in the negligence law of those states.
Where some portions of the instructions are isolated from the context and are erroneous, the error is not necessarily prejudicial. Furthermore, the manifest error standard for appellate review may not be ignored unless the jury charges are so incorrect or so inadequate as to preclude the jury from reaching a verdict based on the law and facts. Bond v. Jack, 387 So.2d 613 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1980). Plaintiff contends that the instructions suggested to the jury that if Sawyer was at fault, then the jury could not find Fowler at fault.