Opinion
December 26, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Erie County, Doyle, J.
Present — Doerr, J.P., Boomer, Green, Pine and Balio, JJ.
Order reversed on the law without costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed. Memorandum: Supreme Court should have granted defendant's motion to set aside the jury verdict in accordance with CPLR 4404 (a). Assuming that defendant's failure to erect the sign post in concrete constituted negligence, there was no showing that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that the failure to mount the post in concrete caused the sign to be down. Thus, there was no showing that the improper installation of the sign contributed to plaintiff's injuries. Because the jury's determination was not based upon any "valid line of reasoning" or "permissible inferences" which could be drawn from the evidence, the verdict must be set aside (Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499).
All concur, except Doerr, J.P., and Green, J., who dissent and vote to affirm, in the following Memorandum.
We dissent. The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to set aside the verdict on a motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a). From the evidence presented, the jury could have rationally concluded that defendant was negligent regardless of how the sign was knocked down. The jury could also have found that the lack of concrete contributed to the sign's being down.
Proximate cause is an elusive concept and ultimately depends on the precise factual pattern of the individual case (Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 314-315, rearg denied 52 N.Y.2d 784). It is axiomatic that there can be more than one proximate cause of a given harm. Because of the unique nature of the causation inquiry in each case, it is generally for the finder of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause (Sinsel v Lyons, 168 A.D.2d 902). Accordingly, we would vote to affirm.