Opinion
No. 13,890.
Filed May 16, 1930. Rehearing denied September 3, 1930. Transfer denied January 6, 1931.
AUTOMOBILES — Liability of Owner for Acts of Son while Driving the Car at Father's Direction. — Where the evidence disclosed that the defendant was the owner of an automobile and had directed his minor son to take the car and bring defendant's daughter home from work when she was working late in the evening, that, for months thereafter, the son had, with the knowledge and consent of the father, taken the automobile on such occasions and brought the daughter home from work, and that plaintiff was injured by being struck by the automobile while so operated by the minor son, a verdict for plaintiff against the father was proper, and the fact that the defendant was not at home on the day the accident took place and had given no specific direction to take the car on that particular occasion would not prevent a recovery.
From Clark Circuit Court; George C. Kopp, Judge.
Action by Walter S. Cisco against Charles Bolly. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appealed. Affirmed. By the court in banc.
James L. Murray, for appellant.
James W. Fortune and Stotsenburg, Weathers Minton, for appellee.
Appellee recovered a judgment against appellant because of injuries received by being struck by an automobile owned by appellant and operated by his minor son. The only question attempted to be presented by this appeal relates to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury. Appellant's minor daughter was employed in a telephone exchange in Jeffersonville, and appellant, sometime prior to the day when appellee was injured, directed and authorized his son to take appellant's automobile when the daughter was working late in the evening and bring her home from her work. On the day in question, the daughter worked until about 9 o'clock p.m. and the son, as was usual, took appellant's automobile, drove it to the place where his sister was working and, while taking her home, struck appellee and severely injured him.
The fact that appellant was not at home on the day when the accident took place and that he gave his son no specific direction to take the automobile and bring the daughter home that evening does not prevent a recovery. The uncontradicted evidence shows that appellant had prior thereto directed his son to take the automobile and bring the daughter home when she was late; that the son had, for months thereafter, with the knowledge and consent of appellant, taken the automobile on such occasions and brought the daughter home from her work. The evidence is ample to warrant a finding that appellant had authorized his son to take the automobile and bring the daughter home from her work on the evening when appellee was injured, and that, when so doing, the son was acting as the agent of appellant. The "family purpose doctrine" is not involved in this action.
There is no merit in this appeal. Judgment affirmed with five per cent penalty.