Opinion
CV-24-08082-PCT-JAT (JZB)
10-01-2024
Douglas M. Boldt, Plaintiff, v. Debra R. Phelan, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff Douglas M. Boldt, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Eyman, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and subsequently paid the filing and administrative fees. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Direct Answer to Complaint (Doc. 6) and two Motions for Status (Docs. 9, 10.) The Court will grant the Motions for Status insofar as this Order updates Plaintiff on the status of this case, deny the Motion to Direct Answer, and dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend.
I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff's specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant's conduct. Id. at 681.
But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).
If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim, but because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend.
II. Background
To provide context for Plaintiff's allegations, the Court sets forth the following background:
On May 30, 2001, Plaintiff was indicted on one count of child abuse and one count of felony murder as a result of the death of his infant daughter. Boldt v. Schriro, CV-06-01996-PCT-ECH (Doc. 44.) On June 28, 2001, the State filed notice of its intention to seek the death penalty. (Id.) On February 6, 2002, Plaintiff entered into a plea agreement. (Id.) In exchange for Plaintiff's guilty plea to felony murder, the State agreed not to seek the death penalty to dismiss the charge of child abuse. (Id.) Plaintiff admitted at the change of plea hearing that he “snapped” when he could not get his daughter to stop crying and, although he knew she might be injured, he intentionally threw her into her crib “with great force” twice in a matter of minutes, causing her head to strike the wooden crib each time; he then waited more than an hour to seek medical attention for her, and she died. State v. Boldt, 2017 WL 4129294, at *1 (Ariz.Ct.App. Sept. 19, 2017). Plaintiff later asked to withdraw from the plea, asserting that his daughter's death was accidental, her injuries were inconsistent with the structure of the crib, and his statements to the contrary at the change of plea hearing were lies suggested by his attorney. Id. The trial court denied the request to withdraw from the plea. Id. On April 1, 2002, the trial court sentenced Plaintiff to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life. (Doc. 44 in CV-06-01996.)
In his of-right petition for post-conviction relief, Plaintiff asserted that his daughter's injuries were not consistent with the physical construction of the crib. See State v. Boldt, On August 14, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. (Doc. 1 in CV-06-01996.) On March 12, 2008, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation that the Court dismissed the Amended Petition. (Doc. 44 in CV-06-01996.) On June 15, 2009, the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and denied and dismissed the Amended Petition with prejudice. (Doc. 61 in CV-06-01996.) The Court subsequently denied Plaintiff's Request for Certificate of Appealability. (Doc. 65 in CV-06-01996.) Plaintiff appealed, and on January 28, 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Plaintiff's Request for a Certificate of Appealability. (Doc. 68 in CV-06-01996.)
Plaintiff again unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in the trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals. In his seventh successive petition for post-conviction relief, Plaintiff claimed he had newly discovered evidence that the State did not examine the crib, never admitted the crib into evidence, and does not now possess the crib, and he claimed that the crib (if examined) would have shown that the victim's injuries were not consistent with the physical properties of the crib, establishing his actual innocence. State v. Boldt, 2017 WL 4129294, at *1 (Ariz.Ct.App. Sept. 19, 2017). The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief, concluding that the structure of the crib and any inconsistencies between the crib and the victim's injuries were known and explored during the initial plea and presentencing proceedings, and the State's purported failure to retain or examine the crib did not constitute newly discovered evidence. Id.
Plaintiff filed three more petitions for post-conviction relief in the trial court, all of which the court dismissed. Most recently, on June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The status of the petition is unclear.
See https://apps.azcourts.gov/publicaccess/caselookup.aspx (search by case number CR-20010395 in Yavapai County Superior Court) (last accessed Sept. 23, 2024).
III. Complaint
In his Complaint, Plaintiff sues Arizona Attorney General Kris Mayes, Yavapai County Superior Court Judge Debra R. Phelan, and Yavapai County Attorney Dennis McGrane. Plaintiff asserts that in 2002, he was pressured by his defense attorney into pleading guilty to first-degree felony murder following the death of Plaintiff's three-month old daughter. He claims his daughter's death was an accident and that he lied during the plea colloquy by stating that he had thrown his daughter against a crib. Plaintiff alleges that the State never examined the crib to determine whether it matched the injuries to his daughter's head, and to this day, the crib has not been examined. Plaintiff asserts that he has “repeatedly told the courts that he lied about throwing his daughter in her crib and that his felony murder conviction is based on a false confession.” Plaintiff contends Defendants have refused to grant him an evidentiary hearing, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. He seeks “a full and fair post conviction evidentiary hearing with help from a court appointed lawyer or assistant.”
IV. Failure to State a Claim
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “a state-court decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011). This doctrine bars a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction “not only over an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal, but also over the ‘de facto equivalent' of such an appeal.” Morrison v. Peterson, 809 F.3d 1059, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012)).
This doctrine takes its name from two Supreme Court decisions, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
To determine whether an action functions as a de facto appeal, the Court “‘pay[s] close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.'” Cooper, 704 F.3d at 777-78 (quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003)). A “forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman ” arises “when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003). But Rooker-Feldman “does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing an ‘independent claim' that, though similar or even identical to issues aired in state court, was not the subject of a previous judgment by the state court.” Cooper, 704 F.3d at 778 (quoting Skinner, 562 U.S. at 532). Thus, “a statute or rule governing the [state court's] decision may be challenged in a federal action.” Skinner, 562 U.S. at 532, 131 S.Ct. 1289.
“Where a federal plaintiff complain[s] of harm caused by a state court judgment that directly withholds a benefit from him based on an allegedly erroneous ruling by that court, the jurisdictional inquiry hinges on whether the constitutional claims presented to the district court are inextricably intertwined with the state court's [ruling].” Hooper v. Brnovich, 56 F.4th 619, 624 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Claims are inextricably intertwined if ‘the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.'” Id. (quoting Cooper, 704 F.3d at 779).
Here, Plaintiff asks this Court to order the trial court to grant him an evidentiary hearing to present evidence regarding claims that the state courts have repeatedly rejected. Plaintiff's claim “‘is a pure horizontal appeal of the state court's decision.'” Id. (quoting Cooper, 704 F.3d at 779.” The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint, and it will be dismissed. Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint, Defendants are not required to answer it, and Plaintiff's Motion to Direct Answer to Complaint will be denied.
V. Leave to Amend
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a first amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. The Clerk of Court will mail Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a first amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails to use the court-approved form, the Court may strike the amended complaint and dismiss this action without further notice to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “First Amended Complaint.” The first amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety on the court-approved form and may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint by reference. Plaintiff may include only one claim per count.
A first amended complaint supersedes the original Complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. RichardFeiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court will treat the original Complaint as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised in the original Complaint and that was voluntarily dismissed or was dismissed without prejudice is waived if it is not alleged in a first amended complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
VI. Warnings
A. Address Changes
Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action.
B. Possible Dismissal
If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61 (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the Court).
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Plaintiff's Motions for Status Update (Docs. 9, 10) are granted insofar as this Order updates Plaintiff on the status of this case. In all other respects, the Motions are denied. (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Direct Answer to Complaint (Doc. 6) is denied. (3) The Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this Order. (4) If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action without prejudice and deny any pending unrelated motions as moot. .... .... .... .... .... .... 8 (5) The Clerk of Court must mail Plaintiff a court-approved form for filing a civil rights complaint by a prisoner.