Opinion
Case No. C-1-09-267.
August 11, 2010
ORDER
I. Procedural History
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Community Insurance Company's ("CIC") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) (doc. 37) and Plaintiff Eric Bolden's Memorandum Contra (doc. 40). The suit was originally filed in the Court of Common Pleas for Hamilton County, Ohio but was thereafter removed to the District Court. This Court affirmed its subject matter jurisdiction over the case under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") in February of this year (doc. 32). Defendant CIC now moves for judgment on Count Eight of Plaintiff's amended complaint, tortious interference with contract.
II. Request for Oral Argument
III. Background
Mr. Bolden alleges in Count Eight of his Amended Complaint that Defendants Anthem, CIC, and their representative John Doe tortiously interfered with his employment contract with Hyde Park Landscape by telling Shumrick to terminate Plaintiff and/or his medical insurance. This interference, according to Mr. Bolden, caused Hyde Park Landscape to adversely alter the terms and conditions of his employment, which led to a loss of compensation, loss of fringe benefits, loss of opportunity to secure a kidney transplant, loss of future earnings and loss of future earning capacity and caused him to incur medical expenses, among other damages.
IV. Standard of Review
V. ERISA Preemption
EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850851 JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget,510 F.3d 577581Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 Erickson v. Pardus,550 U.S. 89Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Health Place, LLC, 539 F.3d 545550Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids,526 F.3d 291295-96Twombly,550 U.S. at 555Erickson, Twombly,8Twombly,550 U.S. at 555 See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila,542 U.S. 200214See id. Thurman v. Pfizer, Inc., 484 F.3d 855861
VI. Opinion
Defendant CIC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count Eight of Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff concedes that the damages he is seeking for tortious interference are benefits due under the terms of the Plan, but he argues this does not mean Count Eight is primarily Plan-related. In support of this argument, Plaintiff points to four different cases in which courts held that the state law claims before them were not preempted by ERISA even though the plaintiffs sought to recover benefits under ERISA plans as damages. Plaintiff's argument is not well-taken as these cases are distinguishable from his situation.
In Yagemen v. Vista Maria, Sisters of Good Shepherd, 767 F.Supp. 144 (E.D. Mich. 1991), the court found that state law claims for age and sex discrimination were not preempted by ERISA even though there was "language in plaintiff's complaint that defendant, by its discriminatory acts, intended to deny him benefits." Id. at 145. The district court reasoned that "the real gravamen of plaintiff's complaint [was] that he was discharged as a result of age and sex discrimination" and the reference to a denial of plan benefits related only to damages allegedly suffered as a result of defendant's discriminatory conduct. Id.
In Nguyen v. Ashland Oil, 2007 WL 869717 (S.D. Ohio) (unpublished decision), the court determined that the plaintiff's state law claims that he was discharged due to his race, national origin, and association with other employees were not preempted by ERISA. The court found that when viewing the complaint as a whole, it did not appear that the plaintiff was alleging an action to enforce an ERISA plan. Instead, his reference to "all lost wages and benefits" was properly construed as a reference to "specific ascertainable damages" the plaintiff claimed to have suffered as a proximate result of the alleged discrimination. Id. at *4.
In Etheridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1988), the court found that although the plaintiff sought to recover lost benefits as part of his damages for tortious discharge in retaliation for union activities, the plaintiff's claims were not preempted because the lost benefits were a consequence of his discharge rather than a motivating factor for it. Id. at 1405 (quoting Rose v. Intelogic Trace, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1328, 1330 (W.D. Tex. 1987)).
Finally, in Sears v. Chrysler Corp., 884 F.Supp. 1125, 1129 n. 2 (E.D. Mich. 1995), the court expressly declined to address the § 1144 preemption of plaintiff's claims. The court did determine for removal purposes that the plaintiff was not an ERISA plan participant and she did not seek clarification of the terms of any employee benefits plan. The plaintiff did not seek benefits under the terms of an ERISA-governed plan but instead sought the value of benefits she would have received if she had continued to work for the defendant. Id. at 1131. Therefore, the court found her claims did not fall within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provision. Id. at 1132.
In contrast to each of these cases, the primary focus of Mr. Bolden's claim for tortious interference is rectifying a wrongful denial of benefits under an ERISA regulated plan. Plaintiff alleges that Hyde Park Landscape altered the terms and conditions of his employment by interfering with his health insurance. He alleges that CIC and/or Anthem advised Mr. Shumrick that he should terminate Plaintiff or his health insurance in order to avoid paying higher premiums and that Mr. Shumrick terminated his medical insurance provided under the Plan as a direct result of CIC's allegedly tortious action. Furthermore, the remedy sought for CIC's alleged tortious interference is primarily Plan-related. Mr. Bolden seeks reimbursement for benefits payable under the Plan and future benefits due under the Plan.
In sum, while a reference to plan benefits as damages may not be enough alone to establish preemption, a review of the entire complaint shows that the focus of Mr. Bolden's lawsuit is the wrongful termination of Plan benefits and his attempt to recover benefits allegedly due and owing under the Plan. His tortious inference with contract claim is specifically premised on termination of his medical coverage under the Plan and the resulting denial of benefits under the Plan. As such, his claim for tortious interference against Defendant CIC is preempted.
VII. Conclusion
Defendant CIC's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Count VIII (doc. 37) is GRANTED. Count VIII against Defendant CIC is DISMISSED. This case will proceed on the remaining claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.