Opinion
HHDCV156058346S
04-15-2016
Walenta Bobo v. Jack Family Trust Dated Sept. 15, 2000
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (#114)
Sheila A. Huddleston, Judge.
In this premises liability action, the defendant, Jack Family Trust Dated Sept. 15, 2000, moves to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because a trust is not a legal entity that can sue or be sued. In support of its motion, the defendant cites Superior Court decisions that have granted motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that a trust is not a legal entity that can be sued. See Booker v. Cappozziello, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-05-4010211-S (July 21, 2006) (Gilardi, J.) (granting trust's motion to dismiss on the ground that a trust is not a legal entity that can be sued); Hall v. Bergman, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X02-CV-01-017751, (October 28, 2011, Shaban, J.) (same). For the reasons discussed below, the court agrees that a trust is not a legal entity that can be sued. The court concludes, however, that a motion to strike, rather than a motion to dismiss, is the proper procedure by which the status of a defendant should be challenged.
A motion to dismiss tests the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, " essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007). When a court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light. Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516, 923 A.2d 638 (2007).
Standing is an issue that goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. " Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy . . . When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue . . . If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fairfield Merrittview Ltd. Partnership v. Norwalk, 320 Conn. 535, 547-48, 133 A.3d 140 (2016). Since standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it is properly raised by a motion to dismiss.
Standing, however, concerns the legal right to invoke the court's jurisdiction, and as such, it is a doctrine that applies ordinarily to plaintiffs. A seminal case involving the standing of a trust to bring a cause of action is Randolph Foundation v. Appeal from Probate Court of Westport, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X05-CV-98-0167903, (April 3, 2001, Tierney, J.). In that case, the court analyzed the status of trusts and concluded that a trust is not a legal entity. Rather, as stated in leading treatises, a trust is " a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it." Id., citing I Scott, Trusts § 2.3 (4th Ed. 1987). " As a general rule, the trustee is the proper person to sue or be sued on behalf of a trust." Randolph Foundation v. Appeal from Probate Court of Westport, Superior Court, supra, Docket No. X05-CV-98-0167903, citing 76 Am.Jur.2d, Trusts § 656.
The court agrees with the authorities discussed in Randolph, Booker, and Hall that a trust is not an entity that can sue or be sued in Connecticut. The question is whether the naming of a trust as a defendant deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concludes that it does not. The naming of the trust as a defendant is an issue of misjoinder, and the failure to name the trustee is an issue of nonjoinder. See Bloom v. Miklovich, 111 Conn.App. 323, 329, 958 A.2d 1283 (2008) (" [n]aming an improper person as a party in a legal action constitutes misjoinder"); Labulis v. Kopylec, 128 Conn.App. 571, 578-79, 17 A.3d 1157 (2011) (failure to name an indispensable party is nonjoinder).
" It is well established . . . that an action cannot be defeated due to the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties, and failure to notify or join indispensable parties does not deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction." D'Appollonio v. Griffo-Brandao, 138 Conn.App. 304, 313, 53 A.3d 1013 (2012). That is because misjoinder and nonjoinder can be cured, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-108 and Practice Book § 9-19, by dropping or adding parties to bring the proper parties before the court. The nonjoinder of party implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction only when a statute mandates the naming and serving of a party. See Yellow Cab Co. of New London & Groton, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 127 Conn.App. 170, 176-77, 13 A.3d 690, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 908, 19 A.3d 178 (2011). In the absence of a statutory mandate, however, the remedy for nonjoinder or misjoinder is by a motion to strike. Indeed, pursuant to Practice Book § 11-3, a motion to strike is the exclusive remedy for nonjoinder and misjoinder. A motion to strike based on nonjoinder, moreover, requires that the movant provide information as to the name and address of the missing party. See Practice Book § 10-39(d).
General Statutes § 52-108 provides: " An action shall not be defeated by the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties. New parties may be added and summoned in, and parties misjoined may be dropped, by order of the court, at any stage of the action, as the court deems the interests of justice require."
Practice Book § 9-19 provides: " Except as provided in Sections 10-44 and 11-3 no action shall be defeated by the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties. New parties may be added and summoned in, and parties misjoined may be dropped, by order of the judicial authority, at any stage of the cause, as it deems the interests of justice require."
Practice Book § 11-3 provides: " The exclusive remedy for misjoinder of parties is by motion to strike. As set forth in Section 10-39, the exclusive remedy for nonjoinder of parties is by motion to strike."
Practice Book § 10-39(d) provides: " A motion to strike on the ground of nonjoinder of a necessary party or noncompliance with Section 17-56(b) must give the name and residence of the missing party or interested person or such information as the moving party has as to the identity and residence of the missing party or interested person and must state the missing party's or interested person's interest in the cause of action."
This is a common-law negligence action and does not involve statutorily mandated parties. The misjoinder of the trust as defendant and the nonjoinder of the trustee as defendant are therefore defects that are curable pursuant to General Statutes § 52-108 and Practice Book § 9-19. Consequently, the court has subject matter jurisdiction in this case. The motion to dismiss is denied.