Opinion
2012-11-8
James BOBKO, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants–Appellants.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Marta Ross of counsel), for appellants. Raskin & Kremins, LLP, New York (David M. Hoffman of counsel), for respondent.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Marta Ross of counsel), for appellants. Raskin & Kremins, LLP, New York (David M. Hoffman of counsel), for respondent.
MAZZARELLI, J.P., FRIEDMAN, CATTERSON, RENWICK, FREEDMAN, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Geoffrey D. Wright, J.), entered March 22, 2011, which granted plaintiff's motion to amend his notice of claim and deemed it timely served nunc pro tunc, and denied defendants' cross motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, plaintiff's motion denied, and defendants' cross motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the complaint. Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered May 31, 2011, which, upon reargument, adhered to the original determination,unanimously dismissed, without costs, as academic.
Plaintiff's notice of claim, filed on June 11, 2009, contained an accident date of March 18, 2009. He then moved to change the date of the accident from March 18, 2009 to March 9, 2009. Plaintiff essentially sought an order deeming the notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc. Given the accident date of March 9, 2008, plaintiff's service of the notice of claim, however, was untimely by three days ( seeGeneral Municipal Law § 50–e [1] [a] ). This late service, without leave of court, was a nullity ( see Croce v. City of New York, 69 A.D.3d 488, 893 N.Y.S.2d 48 [1st Dept. 2010];McGarty v. City of New York, 44 A.D.3d 447, 448, 843 N.Y.S.2d 287 [1st Dept. 2007] ). Further, the court lacked the authority to deem the notice timely served nunc pro tunc, as the one-year and 90–day statute of limitations period had expired ( see Pierson v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 950, 954–956, 453 N.Y.S.2d 615, 439 N.E.2d 331 [1982];General Municipal Law §§ 50–e[5], 50–i[1][c] ).