Opinion
No. 05-05-01087-CV.
March 13, 2007.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Dallas County, Texas. Trial Court Cause No. CC-99-09283-C.
Before Justices WRIGHT, LANG-MIERS, and MAZZANT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Bobby D. Associates Ohio General Partnership appeals the denial of a request for the turnover of G. David Ringer's stocks, shares, and ownership interest in G. David Ringer, P.C. For the reasons stated below, we conclude we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.
Bobby D. Associates obtained a final judgment against Ringer in 2003. Thereafter, Bobby D. Associates filed a single application seeking a a turnover order and the appointment of a receiver pursuant to section 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order denying Bobby D. Associates's request for a turnover order. The order also states that the trial court "declined to rule on [Bobby D. Associates's] request for the appointment of a receiver until further hearing." The record does not contain a subsequent order ruling on Bobby D. Associates's request for the appointment of a receiver nor any indication that Bobby D. Associates has withdrawn that request. At oral argument, Bobby D. Associates informed the Court that the trial court has not yet ruled on the request for the appointment of a receiver and it remains pending before the trial court.
Appellate courts have jurisdiction over final judgments and such interlocutory orders as the legislature deems appealable. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Section 31.002(b) authorizes both turnover relief and the appointment of a receiver, and Bobby D. Associates requested both forms of relief in its application. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002 (Vernon Supp. 2006). Because the complained-of order does not dispose of all the relief requested by Bobby D. Associates, we conclude it is not final. Cf. Wilkins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 58 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (concluding turnover order also appointing receiver final order, rather than interlocutory, because it disposed of all parties and issues leaving nothing for further decision except as necessary to carry decree into effect).
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
CAROLYN WRIGHT JUSTICE