The State countered that use or possession of a firearm was inherent in Count II. Regarding the appropriate detention period, the trial court and counsel extensively discussed State v. I.J., 258 So.3d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), and B.O. v. State, 25 So.3d 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). After considering the language of section 790.22 and the caselaw, the trial court concluded that the language in Count II was insufficient to put A.G. on notice that the State would be seeking the fifteen-day minimum enhancement under section 790.22(9)(a).

When the disposition hearing commenced, the State relied on and cited to a case from the Third District, State v. R.C.S. , 837 So.2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), arguing that the case held that the juvenile defendant did not have to personally use or possess a firearm for the enhancement statute to apply. In opposition, I.J. relied on our decision in B.O. v. State , 25 So.3d 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), contending B.O. requires actual possession to impose the detention penalty. The trial court agreed with I.J., and declined to impose the fifteen days in secure detention requested by the State.

B.E. v. State , 115 So. 3d 1038, 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Howard v. State , 883 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ); B.O. v. State , 25 So. 3d 586, 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

V.F., a juvenile, appeals the trial court's imposition of a mandatory fifteen days in a secure detention facility pursuant to section 790.22(9), Florida Statutes (2011). In B.O. v. State, 25 So.3d 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), we held that it was error to impose the section 790.22(9) sentencing enhancement based on a guilty plea to grand theft of a firearm where the juvenile petition neither cited the statute nor alleged that, in committing the theft, the child used or possessed a firearm. As in B.O., the trial court here imposed a fifteen-day mandatory period of detention based on appellant's plea of no contest to grand theft of a firearm.