Opinion
No. CV-05-0386-PHX-DGC.
June 27, 2006
ORDER
Defendants The Honorable Delbert W. Ray, Sr. and Jolene Cooney ("Tribal Defendants") ask the Court to modify the existing preliminary injunction to permit them to seek dismissal of the underlying lawsuit in Tribal Court. Doc. #107. During a telephone conference with the parties on June 7, 2006, the Court requested briefing. The Court has now reviewed memoranda filed by the parties. Docs. ##107, 112, 113.
A. Background.
The Sullivan Defendants filed suit against Plaintiff BNSF Railway Company ("BNSF") in Hualapai Tribal Court, 2004-CV-150 (the "Sullivan Lawsuit"), asserting claims stemming from a December 21, 2003 accident at U.S. DOT Crossing #025225B involving BNSF. BNSF subsequently filed a complaint in this Court seeking to permanently enjoin the Sullivans and the Tribal Court from pursuing the Sullivan Lawsuit, arguing that the Tribal Court does not have jurisdiction over the claims (Doc. #1). BNSF requested a temporary restraining order, which was granted on February 8, 2005, and a preliminary injunction, which was granted on March 10, 2005. Doc. #38. The preliminary injunction directs the Tribal Court and Sullivan Defendants to halt all prosecution of the Sullivan Lawsuit. Id.
For reasons stated in detail on the record at a March 3, 2005, hearing, the Court concluded that the Tribal Court most likely does not have jurisdiction in the Sullivan Lawsuit under Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), because neither of Montana's exceptions applies. Id. at 565-66. The Court found that the first Montana exception most likely does not apply because the parties have not entered into the kind of consensual relationship required by that exception. See Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene, 394 F.3d 1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005) ("consensual relation cases . . . `involve either direct regulation by a tribe of non-Indian activity on the reservation or lawsuits between a private party and the tribe or tribal members arising from an on-reservation transaction or agreement'") (quoting County of Lewis v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 1998)). The Court found that the second exception most likely does not apply because the underlying tort in this case, although clearly tragic, does implicate the "political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe" as contemplated by the narrowly-construed second exception. See Todecheene, 394 F.3d at 1181 ("Despite its seemingly broad sweep . . . the self-government exception is rather narrow") (citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) ("Read in isolation, the Montana rule's second exception can be misperceived. . . . [A] tribe's inherent power does not reach beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations")); see also Burlington Northern R.R. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the deaths of two tribal members from a train collision did not threaten the political integrity of the tribe or implicate the second Montana exception).
The Tribal Defendants opposed this ruling. They argued that the Tribal Court has full jurisdiction to adjudicate the Sullivan Lawsuit. Following entry of the preliminary injunction, the Tribal Defendants sought broad discovery to support their claim that Tribal Court jurisdiction extends to the lawsuit. The Court denied their broad discovery requests, noting that relevant Ninth Circuit law permits only limited discovery in such cases. Doc. #69.
The Tribal Defendants now seek to have the Sullivan Lawsuit dismissed from Tribal Court on jurisdictional grounds. Their memorandum fails to explain the precise jurisdictional basis for such a dismissal, but documents submitted with their memorandum suggest that the Tribal Defendants seek to have the Sullivan Lawsuit dismissed so that this Court will not reach a final decision on the permanent injunction request by BNSF. Doc. #108, Ex. A.
B. Discussion.
The Court concludes that the preliminary injunction should not be modified. This decision is based on three considerations.
First, the Court has already preliminarily concluded that the Tribal Court may not exercise jurisdiction over the Sullivan Lawsuit under the Montana doctrine. The appropriate course for a federal court to follow in such a case is to enjoin all further proceedings in the Tribal Court. The Court has done so in the preliminary injunction, and will consider whether that injunction should be made permanent after further briefing.
Second, modifying the preliminary injunction would risk improper entanglement by this Court in Tribal Court proceedings. The Sullivan Defendants, fearing that a dismissal of their action in Tribal Court would prejudice their right to proceed in other jurisdictions, ask the Court to exercise close control over the Tribal Court proceedings. Doc. #112. They ask the Court to review and approve any Tribal Court order, to require that the Tribal Court permit an appeal, and to make clear that the Tribal Court may only enter a dismissal "without prejudice." Id. BNSF similarly asks the Court to modify the preliminary injunction only to permit the filing of a specific kind of motion in Tribal Court, and to require that the Tribal Court proceed on an expedited basis. Doc. #113.
Such close control of Tribal Court proceedings by this Court would be entirely inappropriate. The Tribe is a sovereign entity, and its courts are separate and distinct judicial bodies. Other than the jurisdictional requirements found in federal cases such as Montana, this Court has no supervisory authority over the Tribal Court. Were the preliminary injunction to be modified to permit the Tribal Defendants to file the motion they seek, it is entirely possible that the Sullivan Defendants or BNSF would return to this Court if they felt that proceedings in the Tribal Court were inconsistent with the modification or otherwise disadvantageous. They might ask this Court to control what is happening in Tribal Court or to rescind the modification of the preliminary injunction in the midst of the Tribal Court's consideration of the Tribal Defendants' motion. Such entanglement in the Tribal Court are inconsistent with the deference due such courts and with the narrow issue presented by this case. The Court will not make a modification that invites such entanglement.
Third, it appears that the Tribal Defendants seek to have the preliminary injunction modified for the purpose of dismissing the Sullivan Lawsuit so that this Court will not reach the merits of the permanent injunction. Having previously asserted that the Tribal Court has full jurisdiction over the Sullivan Lawsuit, the Tribal Defendants now argue that the Tribal Court should dismiss the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction. Such a change in position does not provide a sound basis on which to modify the preliminary injunction entered under the Montana doctrine. IT IS ORDERED that the Tribal Defendants' request for a modification of the preliminary injunction (Doc. #107) is denied. Briefing on BNSF's summary judgment motion shall proceed under the existing schedule.
The Court notes apparent concern by the Tribe that the undersigned judge is unfavorably disposed to the Tribe and determined to limit its power. Doc. #108, Ex. A. The Court notes that the preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order have nothing to do with this Court's view of the Tribe. Those rulings were based solely upon an application of federal law as established by the Supreme Court of the United States and the Ninth Circuit in cases such as Montana, 450 U.S. 544, and Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059. That law, under the Court's preliminary analysis, prohibits a Tribe from exercising jurisdiction over a non-tribal member in a case such as the Sullivan Lawsuit. Likewise, the Court has limited the Tribal Defendants' access to discovery in this case not because of any unfavorable view of the Tribe, but because Ninth Circuit law provides that such discovery may be limited. See Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Corp. v. Fort Peck, 323 F.3d 767, 775 (9th Cir. 2003) (consideration of an injunction motion under Montana "does not require that the district court permit wholesale discovery. Rather, the district court may tailor limited discovery before . . . entertaining a motion for summary judgment."). Finally, the Court notes that the issue to be decided in this case is narrow — whether the Tribal Court may exercise jurisdiction over the Sullivan Lawsuit under the Montana doctrine. The Court has no intention of making broad pronouncements about Tribal authority or the Tribe's ability to control BNSF in settings other than the Sullivan Lawsuit.