See Edwards, 279 So.2d at 873. The resolution of the conflict in this case is controlled by this Court's recent opinion in Blumberg v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., No. SC95740 (Fla. July 12, 2001). In Blumberg, this Court held:

Based on the bankruptcy schedules, the statements reported by the Chapter 7 trustee, some equivocal deposition testimony Grau gave on March 28, 2001, and Grau's testimony at the June 14, 2002 bankruptcy court hearing, the circuit court granted the insurers' motions for summary final judgment on the ground of judicial estoppel. The supreme court reshaped the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Blumberg v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 790 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 2001). There, Blumberg sued an insurance company claiming that coverage existed on the theory of promissory estoppel arising from representations made by the insurer's agent, Bruner. Blumberg recovered a jury verdict of $25,000, which was not sufficient to beat the insurer's offer of judgment.

Relying on Kelly v. Lodwick, 82 So.3d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), APLU asserted that appellant's cause of action accrued when appellant retained counsel and first started paying legal fees in June 2006. Appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, asserting that the statute of limitations had not run. Relying on Blumberg v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 790 So.2d 1061 (Fla.2001), appellant argued, inter alia, that the statute of limitations to bring a negligence action against APLU did not begin to run until June 2008, when the underlying claims for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act were settled. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of APLU, finding that the statute of limitations had run under Kelly.

Angrand v. Fox, 552 So.2d 1113, 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Abatement is proper upon a showing by the movant that a related or underlying judicial proceeding will determine whether damages were incurred which are causally related to the alleged negligence/malpractice. Perez-Abreu, Zamora De La Fe, P.A. v. Taracido, 790 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 2001); Bierman v. Miller, 639 So.2d 627, 628 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). In Blumberg v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 790 So.2d 1061, 1065 (Fla. 2001) (footnote omitted), the supreme court said: Consistent with Peat, Marwick, [ Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323 (Fla. 1990)], we hold that, in the circumstances presented here, a negligence/malpractice cause of action accrues when the client incurs damages at the conclusion of the related or underlying judicial proceedings or, . . . when the client's right to sue in the related or underlying proceeding expires. If a negligence/malpractice action is filed prior to the time that a client's right to sue in the related or underlying judicial proceeding has expired, or if a negligence/malpractice action is filed during the time that a related or underlying judicial proceeding is ongoing, then the defense can move for an abatement or stay of the claim on the ground that the negligence/malpractice action has not yet accrued.

"Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that is used to prevent litigants from taking totally inconsistent positions in separate judicial, including quasi-judicial, proceedings." Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So.2d 1061, 1066 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Smith v. Avatar Props., Inc., 714 So.2d 1103, 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ); accord Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. R.W. Jones Constr., Inc., 227 So.3d 785, 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). The doctrine "protects the integrity of the judicial process and ‘prevents parties from "making a mockery of justice by inconsistent pleadings," and "playing fast and loose with the courts.

The first problem with this holding is that equitable tolling and judicial estoppel are separate and distinct doctrines. Compare Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 1061, 1066 (Fla. 2001) (judicial estoppel provides that "[a] claim made or position taken in a former action or judicial proceeding will, in general, estop the party to make an inconsistent claim or to take a conflicting position in a subsequent action or judicial proceeding to the prejudice of the adverse party." (citation omitted)), with Machules v. Dep't of Admin., 523 So. 2d 1132, 1133-34 (Fla. 1988) ("Generally, the tolling doctrine has been applied when the plaintiff has been misled or lulled into inaction, has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, or has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.") (citation omitted)).

At the outset, it is clear that the claim against Rossmiller has not yet accrued under Florida law. In Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So.2d 1061, 1063 (Fla. 2001), the plaintiff sued his insurance agent for allegedly failing to procure insurance to cover the loss of the plaintiff's sports cards. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations that started to run when the plaintiff previously filed an unsuccessful claim against the insurance company.

“Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that is used to prevent litigants from taking totally inconsistent positions in separate judicial, including quasi-judicial, proceedings.” Salazar-Abreu v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc., 277 So.3d 629, 631-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (quoting Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So.2d 1061, 1066 (Fla. 2001)). “The doctrine protects the integrity of the judicial process and prevents parties from making a mockery ofjustice” by submitting contrary pleadings and by “playing fast and loose with the courts.”

First, we have refused to adopt a “rule that would mandate simultaneous suits [if doing so] would ... prematurely disrupt an otherwise harmonious business relationship,” especially where the plaintiff “has an established relationship” with the defendant. Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So.2d 1061, 1065 (Fla.2001) ; see also Larson & Larson, P.A. v. TSE Indus., Inc., 22 So.3d 36, 45 (Fla.2009) (discussing the need to avoid “undue disruption” of “an ongoing attorney-client relationship”). Appellees point out that there was no ongoing relationship to disrupt because Kipnis and Kibler's last transaction with appellees was in 2001.

Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Florence v. Crescent Resources, LLC, 484 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007) ("We hold that, if there is any possibility that the state law might impose liability on a resident defendant under the circumstances alleged in the complaint, the federal court cannot find that joinder of the resident defendant was fraudulent, and remand is necessary.") Here, Banner Life does not assert that the Sperlings pled fraudulent jurisdictional facts. It claims, rather, that no possibility exists that the Complaint states a cause of action against Schachter. The Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Blumberg v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 790 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 2001) addresses the validity of the Sperlings claim against Schachter for professional negligence. In Blumberg, an insured sued his insurance company alleging coverage and later sued the insurance agent for negligently failing to procure valid insurance.