(Def.'s Resp. Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 4; Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 8; see Compl.). This is inapposite, however, as the Sixth Circuit recently made clear that courts are not limited by the parties' pleading when considering the validity of an oil and gas lease. Bluegrass Materials Co. v. Freeman, 54 F.4th 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Delta Gas Corp. v. Thompson, 951 F.2d 348, 1991 WL 256568, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1991)) (“Courts may analyze a lease for termination under all three grounds depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, and we are not limited to only considering the grounds analyzed by the district court or those pled by the parties.”)
If this finding was in error, the proper course is not to analyze the remaining Belo plan factors, but instead to reverse the district court and issue a general remand for further proceedings. See Bluegrass Materials Co., LLC v. Freeman, 54 F.4th 364, 373 (6th Cir. 2022) (general remand appropriate when reversing grant of summary judgment that produced a "domino effect" on "multiple, interrelated issues"); Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 2005) ("As a general rule, appellate courts do not consider any issue not passed upon below.") (quoting Dubuc v. Mich. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 342 F.3d 610, 620 (6th Cir. 2003)).
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. BluegrassMaterials Co. v. Freeman, 54 F.4th 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
If the words of the Policy are unambiguous, the Court must enforce the contract strictly according to its terms, which are afforded their ordinary meaning. Bluegrass Materials Co., LLC v. Freeman, 54 F.4th 364, 371 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Frear v. P.T.A. Indus., Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Ky. 2003));