Opinion
Cause No. IP 01-358-C H/G
June 20, 2001
AMENDED ENTRY ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RULING ON PARTIAL FINDINGS UNDER RULE 52(c)
The question before the court in this unusual case is whether to issue a preliminary injunction ordering defendant American Contract Bridge League (ACBL) to allow plaintiff John E. Blubaugh to continue playing in the ACBL's sanctioned bridge tournaments.
Plaintiff Blubaugh has made his living in recent years as a professional bridge player. He has been a member of the ACBL, which sponsors and sanctions bridge tournaments. After a question was raised about the manner in which Blubaugh shuffled and dealt cards in tournaments, the ACBL's Ethical Oversight Committee held a hearing with witnesses, exhibits, cross-examination and counsel. The committee issued a written decision finding that Blubaugh had violated bridge rules and suspending him from sanctioned bridge play for four months. Blubaugh exercised his right to appeal to the ACBL's Appeals and Charges Committee, which upheld the findings but enhanced the punishment to an eighteen month suspension.
Blubaugh filed this action on March 15, 2001, and moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent the suspension from taking effect. After a hearing on March 16, 2001, the court orally denied such relief. Blubaugh then filed two amended complaints and a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to have the suspension lifted. Blubaugh's second amended complaint and motion for preliminary injunction raise a different set of new legal theories to support Blubaugh's claim for relief, including the Sherman Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, breach of contract, defamation, tortious interference with contracts, "tortious deprivation of livelihood," and "gross negligence in handling of confidential evidence." The court has subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. Blubaugh is a citizen of Indiana; the ACBL is a citizen of Tennessee for diversity purposes; and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The ACBL suspended Blubaugh for 18 months from activities in which he earned approximately $80,000 over the last full year that he played. The court also has federal question jurisdiction based at least on the claim arising under the federal Sherman Act
Because jurisdiction is established on these grounds, the court need not determine whether Blubaugh's claim asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act on its own would be sufficiently colorable to support federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See generally Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction on May 11, 2001. After Blubaugh presented all of his evidence in support of the motion, the ACBL moved for denial of a preliminary injunction based on findings under Rule 52(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As explained below, the court grants defendant ACBL's motion and denies plaintiff Blubaugh's motion for a preliminary injunction. At the core of this case, Blubaugh contends the suspension imposed from violations of the ACBL's rules and procedures and from personal malice on the part of some ACBL leaders with whom he has had some bitter conflicts over the years. Indiana courts exercise only very limited judicial oversight of voluntary membership organizations like the ACBL. Blubaugh has not shown that his case fits the limited exceptions for fraud, other illegality, or abuse of civil or property rights having their origin elsewhere. See Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Reyes, 694 N.E.2d 249, 256 (Ind. 1997). Blubaugh has not shown "other illegality" because he has not shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Sherman Act. The ACBL decided Blubaugh's case after an extensive hearing and appeal throughout which he was represented by counsel. Blubaugh has not shown any violation of the ACBL's elaborate rules and procedures. This entry sets forth the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rules 52 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Relevant Facts
Blubaugh has made his living for several years as a professional bridge player. Bridge is a team game, and some devoted amateurs are willing and able to pay excellent bridge players like Blubaugh to play as their partners in bridge tournaments that do not offer monetary prizes. (Blubaugh has also established a modest business in which he brokers such arrangements between such "clients" and other professional players in return for a fee.)
Blubaugh is a member of the ACBL and has been active in its national leadership, including past membership on its national board of governors and its National Appeals Committee. He has been an outspoken critic of others in leadership positions with the ACBL and the World Bridge Federation. For example, he has criticized what he views as excessive travel expenses for ACBL directors and their spouses.
During the summer of 2000, the ACBL received information that Blubaugh was suspected of deliberately placing an ace or other "honor card" at the bottom of a deck, shuffling the deck in such a way as to keep the ace at the bottom of the deck throughout the shuffles, and then putting the ace in the hand given to his partner. The ACBL conducted some video surveillance of Blubaugh as he shuffled and dealt at tournaments during the summer of 2000. See Ex. 4 (videotape).
Blubaugh was formally charged on August 12, 2000, with manipulating honor cards to the bottom of the deck and knowing into which hands he dealt them at the Indianapolis Regional tournament on July 29-30, 2000, and the Anaheim NABC tournament on August 10-11, 2000. The charge specified violations of Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.11 of the ACBL's Code of Disciplinary Regulations and the ACBL's Laws 6 and 16. Blubaugh was notified of a hearing scheduled for August 16, 2000, before the ACBL's Ethical Oversight Committee. The notice informed him of his rights under ACBL rules to have "counsel" (who was not required to be an attorney), to present evidence, to confront witnesses, and to challenge any committee member for cause. He was also informed that any appellate bodies that might review a decision by the Ethical Oversight Committee had the power, among others, to increase any discipline imposed.
At Blubaugh's request, the hearing before the Ethical Oversight Committee was postponed to November 17, 2000, at a tournament in Birmingham, Alabama. Blubaugh's counsel obtained the four-month delay by explaining that he needed time to gather evidence relating to Blubaugh's injuries and their effects.
Blubaugh suffered an injury to his right hand approximately 20 years ago. His right ring finger was amputated just above the last knuckle, and that finger is stiff and virtually useless. He also suffered nerve damage to his middle finger that reduces its function. Over the last several years, also, Blubaugh's vision in his right eye has deteriorated, especially his peripheral vision. Blubaugh contends that his hand injuries cause his shuffling of cards to be clumsy and awkward and not very effective in mixing the cards of the deck, but that his restricted vision keeps him from actually seeing the face of any card when he shuffles. Blubaugh vehemently denies that he knew the positions of any cards in the shuffled decks or that he knowingly gave his partner any particular cards.
During the months and weeks leading up to the hearing, Blubaugh's counsel attempted to obtain the equivalent of pretrial discovery from the ACBL, including the identities of witnesses and the substance of any expert witness testimony. The ACBL rules make such prehearing disclosures optional rather than a matter of obligation, and the ACBL provided only a copy of the surveillance videotape before the hearing, without explanation or expert commentary.
A committee composed of members of the Ethical Oversight Committee convened to hear evidence on November 17, 2000. Witnesses in the hearing were not under oath, nor was a complete record of the hearing made. Blubaugh did not try to have any members removed for cause. The Recorder of the ACBL presented evidence against Blubaugh, including the videotape as narrated and explained by Norman Beck, who was presented as an expert in cards and their manipulation. Blubaugh's counsel cross-examined the witnesses against him. Blubaugh's counsel did not ask those witnesses any questions about Blubaugh's hand injury or its effects. After the ACBL presented its evidence, the committee took a prolonged recess to play bridge, then reconvened late that same night and heard evidence from Blubaugh and witnesses he called. Both sides indicated they were through presenting evidence. At 4:30 the morning of November 18th, the committee announced its ruling against Blubaugh and the sanction of a four month suspension.
Blubaugh appealed that decision to the ACBL's Appeals and Charges Committee, and the suspension was stayed pending that appeal. The appeal resulted in a decision to increase the suspension to 18 months, to take effect in March 2001. Blubaugh filed this action on March 15, 2001. After this court denied a temporary restraining order, the suspension took effect as scheduled.
At the preliminary injunction hearing, Blubaugh attempted to show that the charges against him were the result of malice on the part of ACBL leaders he had criticized in the past and that certain members of the Ethical Oversight Committee were biased against him as a result of various past conflicts and feuds with their friends, associates, and/or spouses. In addition, all but one of the members of the Ethical Oversight Committee who heard Blubaugh's case are also professional bridge players who compete with Blubaugh for paying clients.
If one member of a bridge team knows that his partner holds a specific card, that knowledge can provide their team with a modest but unfair advantage in the competition. Blubaugh concedes as much. There is no evidence at this point, however, that Blubaugh and his partners actually received or exploited any such advantage as a result of the shuffles and deals in dispute here.
The parties have stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 4, a copy of surveillance videotape showing Blubaugh shuffling and dealing several hands of bridge. The videotape was not played or explained at the hearing before this court. When it was presented to the ACBL's Ethical Oversight Committee, witness Norman Beck provided a narration and explanation, as well as a written report. At the request of plaintiff, the court has watched the videotape. Without commentary, explanation, and questioning by those expert in the game of bridge, however, the videotape was not enlightening. The task of this court is not to try de novo the case against Blubaugh before the ACBL's Ethical Oversight Committee.
Both the videotape and Blubaugh's testimony to this court show that, before Blubaugh shuffles a deck, he habitually holds the entire deck of cards face-up in a fan-like arrangement that allows him to see all the cards, including the cards that will be at the very bottom of the deck before it is shuffled. Blubaugh testified that he views the cards this way to ensure that all the cards are facing the same way. If a card is dealt face-up, the dealer must reshuffle the deck and start over. Blubaugh has not explained why he could not make that same determination by holding the cards face-down, without seeing which cards would be at the bottom of the deck.
Discussion
To obtain the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction, a party must show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of a claim, and the threat of imminent and irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. If the moving party makes that showing, the court must then consider the balance of harms, which requires consideration of the consequences of both erroneously granting preliminary relief and erroneously denying such relief, as well as the public interest, including the interests of those not parties to the lawsuit. E.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Mead Johnson Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11-12 (7th Cir. 1992).
Defendant ACBL based its motion under Rule 52(c) only on Blubaugh's likelihood of success on the merits. After hearing Blubaugh's evidence, the court agrees with ACBL that Blubaugh has not shown a sufficient likelihood of succeeding on the merits of any claim to support issuance of a preliminary injunction.
I. Voluntary Membership Associations
The principal obstacle plaintiff faces is the decision by the Supreme Court of Indiana in Indiana High School Athletic Association v. Reyes, 694 N.E.2d 249 (Ind. 1997). In Reyes the court held that the IHSAA could enforce against member schools its "Restitution Rule," under which a school may be forced to forfeit victories, return trophies and awards, and return certain funding if the school allows an ineligible student to compete, even where the school acts in accordance with a court order or injunction that is later vacated or reversed. 694 N.E.2d at 254 n. 3.
The Reyes court took the opportunity to clarify Indiana law on judicial review of the internal affairs and rules of voluntary membership associations like the ACBL. The court repeated the general rule that Indiana courts generally will not interfere in the governance of such a private organization, such as its interpretation and administration of rules governing membership and discipline. Id. at 256, citing State ex rel. Givens v. Superior Court of Marion County, 117 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. 1954) (declining to exercise authority over union election dispute). The court recognized certain limited exceptions to the general rule. These include a decision by the voluntary membership association that infringes upon a personal liberty or property right having origins outside the association itself. 694 N.E.2d at 256, citing Givens, 117 N.E.2d at 555, and other cases. A second exception applies when the association's decision constitutes fraud or other illegality. 694 N.E.2d at 256, citing Randolph v. Leeman, 146 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ind.App. 1957).
The Reyes court then addressed several opinions by the Indiana Court of Appeals suggesting that another exception could apply if the voluntary membership association applies its rules in an arbitrary, discriminatory, or malicious manner, or if it fails to apply rules requiring due process. 694 N.E.2d at 256, citing United States Auto Club v. Woodward, 460 N.E.2d 1255, 1261 (Ind.App. 1984), and Terrell v. Palomino Horse Breeders of America, 414 N.E.2d 332, 335 (Ind.App. 1980). The response of the Supreme Court of Indiana to these suggestions could not have been clearer:
We reject additional exceptions to the rule. Absent fraud, other illegality, or abuse of civil or property rights having their origin elsewhere, Indiana courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of voluntary membership associations. This means, inter alia, that Indiana courts will neither enforce an association's internal rules, State ex rel. Givens, 233 Ind. at 239, 117 N.E.2d at 555, nor second guess an association's interpretation or application of its rules, see [Crane v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 975 F.2d 1315, 1329 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J., dissenting)].694 N.E.2d at 256.
As an initial matter, plaintiff Blubaugh suggests that this passage from Reyes is obiter dicta that this court is not required to follow. To the contrary, the Reyes court both stated and applied this reasoning in upholding the Restitution Rule of the IHSAA: "Because Lafayette Jeff's challenge to the Restitution Rule does not allege fraud, other illegality, or abuse of civil or property rights having their origin elsewhere, we will not interfere in this school's dispute with a voluntary association of which it is a member." 694 N.E.2d at 257. Further, this court's role when applying state law is to use its best judgment to apply the rules of law that the Supreme Court of Indiana would apply. E.g., Trytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 1994). A declaration as clear and recent as that in Reyes would be a powerful indicator of the state court's views even if the declaration had not been essential to the decision in the case.
Plaintiff Blubaugh also contends that the Reyes rule should not apply to his case because his livelihood is at stake, as compared to a high school athlete's athletic career and his school's athletic endeavors at stake in Reyes. The argument has some superficial appeal but is not persuasive.
The Supreme Court of Indiana has not drawn any such distinction in its decisions on interference with the internal affairs of voluntary membership associations. In fact, Indiana courts have applied the general rule in cases involving activities similarly important to the litigants. See State ex rel. Givens, 117 N.E.2d 553 (election of union officers); United States Auto Club v. Woodward, 460 N.E.2d 1255 (professional auto racing).
In addition, Blubaugh is arguing that Indiana courts should recognize protections for his livelihood that the vast majority of employees in Indiana do not enjoy. Indiana continues to adhere to the doctrine of employment at will. See, e.g., Orr v. Westminster Village North, Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712, 717 (Ind. 1997); Wior v. Anchor Industries, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Ind. 1996). The doctrine of employment at will allows an employer to fire an employee without good cause, and even without investigation of a charge of wrongdoing, let alone an evidentiary hearing with representation by counsel and the sorts of procedural protections set forth in the ACBL's rules and provided to Blubaugh in this case.
For these reasons, the fact that Blubaugh has made his living by having other people pay him to play as their partners in ACBL events does not expand the scope of judicial scrutiny of the ACBL's decision to suspend him. The standards articulated by the Supreme Court of Indiana in Reyes apply to this case.
Plaintiff Blubaugh does not contend that the ACBL's decision to suspend him constituted a fraud. He contends, however, that the decision was illegal under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act and the federal Sherman Act barring restraints of trade. Blubaugh has not shown he is likely to succeed on either theory.
II. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Blubaugh contends the ACBL's decision to suspend him violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which provides that a person who "owns, leases (or leases to) or operates a place of public accommodation" may not discriminate against an individual on the basis of a disability in the "full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of any place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Blubaugh is not likely to succeed on the merits of this theory.
The term "public accommodation" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) in terms only of physical places. See Erwin v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (S.D.Ind. 1998) (disability insurance plan not a "public accommodation" under Title III of ADA). When the ACBL leases a hotel ballroom for a tournament, Title III of the ADA presumably requires it to ensure that the tournament is physically accessible to people with disabilities. Blubaugh has not shown any reason to extend Title III's provisions on public accommodations to the rules of competition in the ACBL. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is considering whether Title III of the ADA requires golf sanctioning bodies to modify their rules of competition to allow golfers with certain disabilities to ride in golf carts rather than walk. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 998, 999 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1306 (2000) (golf courses held to be places of public accommodation in professional competitions); Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that, even if golf courses are places public accommodation during professional competition, rule change allowing use of golf carts would fundamentally alter competition), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 20, 2000 (No. 00-434). Even if the Supreme Court rules that Title III might apply to such rules of competition, Blubaugh is not likely to prevail on the theory that the ACBL violated the ADA in this case.
Title III of the ADA protects persons with disabilities, defined in terms of having physical or mental impairments that substantially limit a person in one or more "major life activities" (or having a record of or being regarded as having such impairments). 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Regulations under the ADA define major life activities as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Blubaugh's ADA theory seems to be based on the belief that shuffling cards is a major life activity. The court is aware of no support for that extraordinary view. Cf. Knapp v. Northwestern University, 101 F.3d 473, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1996) (playing college basketball not a major life activity under Rehabilitation Act).
In addition, Blubaugh does not suffer any substantial impairment in the activity of playing bridge, even if that could be deemed a "major life activity." Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 App. (interpretive guidance for Title I of ADA) (noting as example that a professional baseball pitcher who develops a bad elbow and can no longer throw a baseball may not be considered substantially limited in the major life activity of working). The evidence shows that Blubaugh has been able to compete successfully at the highest levels of bridge for many years despite the injury to his right hand. He is not required to shuffle in order to play. When he does shuffle, if his shuffling has limited effect in mixing the cards at the bottom of the deck, the obvious solution is merely to offer the shuffled cards to an opponent for a cut of the deck, which would put the cards on the bottom into unknown positions in the middle of the deck.
In addition, even if Blubaugh's injury and its effect on his shuffling amounted to a disability under the ADA, he has not shown that the ACBL took action against him because of that disability. The Ethical Oversight Committee heard evidence from both sides, including evidence about Blubaugh's injury. The committee found that Blubaugh was knowingly placing an honor card (usually an ace) in his partner's hand. That conduct was not the result of a disability.
Plaintiff also argues that the ACBL's procedures for resolving the case should have taken his injury into account in some ways not clearly specified. The argument is not persuasive. Blubaugh seems to suggest that he was unfairly disadvantaged because his lawyer had to tell the ACBL about his injury in order to obtain the delay in the hearing from July to November 2000. There is nothing unreasonable or unfair about being required to give a reason for such a delay. Blubaugh also cannot claim the Ethical Oversight Committee discriminated against him based on a disability before he disclosed it. Blubaugh further complains that the ACBL witnesses were not asked whether his injury might account for the observed irregularities in his shuffling. Blubaugh and his counsel had every right and opportunity to ask such questions during the hearing. The evidence before this court indicates they did not do so. The fact that the ACBL also chose not to ask such questions does not show a violation of the ADA.
Blubaugh's current suggestion that ACBL witnesses should have been "recalled" in the middle of 2 the night after his witnesses testified is too far removed from the ADA to require further comment. At the hearing Blubaugh also suggested that the ADA required the ACBL to respond to a complaint about irregular shuffling or dealing by approaching the player in question and asking whether there was a problem stemming from any physical or mental impairment. This suggestion is also goes far beyond anything the ADA might require.
III. The Sherman Act
Blubaugh's other theory for "other illegality" is that the ACBL's suspension violated the Sherman Act. This theory is built upon the premise that all but one of the members of the Ethical Oversight Committee who considered his case are other bridge professionals who compete with Blubaugh for paying clients. Blubaugh sees the case as a group boycott case subject to per se illegality under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, relying on Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265-66 (N.D.Ga. 1973) (applying per se rule to suspension of one competitor by other competitors who failed to provide a hearing and acted with unfettered discretion).
Since Blalock was decided, however, the Supreme Court and the circuits have analyzed such cases involving restrictions in sports and other competitive leagues under the rule of reason. When the trade allegedly being restrained concerns a competitive sport, the Court has recognized, the per se rule creates problems because the competition would be impossible without collective agreements among competitors about the rules of the competition and enforcement of those rules. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (applying rule of reason to horizontal agreement limiting television broadcasts of college football games; critical fact was that case involved "an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all"); United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 788-89 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (horse racing association's ban on members competing at non-sanctioned tracks was not per se illegal and was tested under rule of reason); Bridge Corp. of America v. American Contract Bridge League, 428 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1970) (applying rule of reason to Sherman Act claim against ACBL based on refusal to sanction a tournament using new scoring computer); Brant v. United States Polo Ass'n, 631 F. Supp. 71, 75 (S.D.Fla. 1986) (denying injunction to block suspension of polo player for abusing umpire; restraint must be tested under rule of reason, and per se analysis from Blalock was no longer applicable).
Blubaugh has not shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his antitrust claim. The ACBL's interest in prohibiting cheating is obvious and substantial. Blubaugh and his witnesses before this court agreed that a player's knowledge that his partner held a specific honor card could provide an unfair advantage in competition. The facts show that the ACBL provided Blubaugh with ample opportunity to be heard. Blubaugh did not make any effort to remove for cause any of the committee members who heard his case.
Blubaugh has also focused on the ACBL's decision not to provide prehearing discovery, which he contends effectively denied him his right to counsel under the ACBL's rules and so effectively denied him any meaningful hearing at all, such that the court should apply the per se rule in Blalock. The evidence shows no violation of the ACBL's rules. Prehearing discovery is not required under its rules, even if those rules were enforceable in court. Blubaugh's attempt to equate a denial of (optional) prehearing discovery with a denial of the promised right to "counsel" (who need not be a lawyer) is not persuasive. Blubaugh's theory seems to be that the law requires the ACBL's disciplinary procedures to be a blend of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which provide extensive discovery) with constitutional and procedural protections afforded to criminal defendants, in which pretrial discovery is much more limited. In short, even if Blalock were still good law, Blubaugh has not shown the foundation for applying its per se standard.
The rule of reason under the Sherman Act focuses on the impact the restraint of trade has on competition, NCAA v. University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. at 104, which is gauged primarily in terms of the effect on price and supply, id. at 107. Blubaugh has not begun to show the kind of effect in the market for the services of professional bridge players that would be needed to support a Sherman Act claim under the rule of reason. Nor has he articulated a legal theory that would not have the consequence of turning every suspension or expulsion from a professional sport (for gambling on the sport, for drug use, for cheating, or for any other reason) into a federal antitrust case in which a jury or judge would decide de novo whether the league had applied its rules correctly and fairly. See Brant, 631 F. Supp. at 76-78 (denying preliminary injunction to block suspension of polo player for abusing umpires despite allegation of anticompetitive intent); Cooney v. American Horse Shows Ass'n, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 424, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (granting summary judgment upholding suspension of horse trainer for violating association drug rule designed to foster fair competition; procompetitive benefits of the rule were predominant).
Blubaugh also has not cited any post-Blalock case in which a competitor actually prevailed on an antitrust theory for exclusion from a sport or similar activity after procedures as extensive as those provided in this case. See also Livezey v. American Contract Bridge League, 1985 WL 2648, 1985-2 Trade Cases ¶ 66,875 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 12, 1985) (granting summary judgment under rule of reason on antitrust claim challenging ACBL's suspension of player after hearing), aff'd mem., 800 F.2d 1135 (3rd Cir. 1986); Cokin v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 1981 WL 2223, 1983-1 Trade Cases ¶ 65,367 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 1981) (refusing to apply per se standard to ACBL's suspension of bridge players for cheating, but denying summary judgment under rule of reason).
Blubaugh had a full hearing, he had counsel, and he had the opportunity to challenge committee members for cause. Even if the court indulged the assumption that a few members whom Blubaugh chose not to challenge were nevertheless biased against him, the committee ruled against him unanimously. In sum, the court is not convinced that Blubaugh has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his antitrust claim.
Conclusion
After fully hearing plaintiff's evidence on his motion for preliminary injunction, the court finds pursuant to Rule 52(c) that he cannot show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of his claims to support preliminary injunctive relief. The court makes no finding as to whether Mr. Blubaugh in fact knowingly placed aces or other honor cards in his partner's hands. The court recognizes the importance of that question for Mr. Blubaugh, but that is at bottom an issue for the ACBL to decide. Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is therefore denied.
So ordered.