Opinion
IP 00-C-983-B/S
March 13, 2002
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO LIMIT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S FINAL WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST
This matter comes before us on the motions of Defendant R.R. Donnelley Sons Company Short-Term Disability Plan ("the Plan") asking us: (1) to deem admitted for trial purposes the administrative record which it submitted on summary judgment; (2) to limit the admissible evidence at trial to that administrative record; and (3) and to strike Plaintiff Katherine Blickenstaff's final witness and exhibit list. We GRANT defendant's motion to deem the administrative record admitted without the need for a foundational witness, but we DENY defendant's motion to limit the evidence to that record, and we DENY defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's Witness and Exhibit lists.
The factual background of this case is recited in Blickenstaff v. R.R. Donnelley Sons Co. Short Term Disability Plan, 2002 WL 169320 (S.D.Ind. January 28, 2002) and will not be repeated here.
Before addressing the specific requests, we note that the issue before the court at trial will be whether the Plan's decision to deny Ms. Blickenstaff benefits was arbitrary and capricious. Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the decision was arbitrary and capricious, and plaintiff is entitled to present evidence relevant to that question.
1. Motion to Deem Administrative Record Admissible at Trial.
Defendant submitted a copy of the administrative record on summary judgment. It was accompanied by the sworn affidavit of Joanne K. Rud which recited facts sufficient to established its admissibility. Plaintiff did not object to the admissibility of the documents Bates numbered AR0001 to AR0256 nor to their introduction as the administrative record. Evidence may be considered on summary judgment only if it is admissible. Corder v. Lucent Technologies Inc., 162 F.3d 924, 927-928 (7th Cir. 1998). Bates Numbered pages AR0001 to AR0256 were admissible on summary judgment and they will be admissible at trial without the need for the Plan to call a foundational witness.
2. Motion To Limit Evidence to the Administrative Record
The Plan next asks us to limit the universe of potentially admissible evidence to the administrative record defined above. It begins with the well-established proposition that, since the standard at trial is whether the decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious, then we should consider only the evidence that was before the administrator when it made its decision. Hess v. Hartford Life Accident Insurance Co., 274 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2001); Trombetta v. Cragin Fed. Bank for Sav. Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 102 F.3d 1435, 1437 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1996). Materials that were not available to the decision maker at the time of the decision obviously could have played no role in the decision.
Accordingly, says the Plan, anything other than the documents submitted in the "administrative record" as it defines that record is "extrinsic" and should not be admitted.
In view of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hess, it is questionable whether evidence may never be admitted at trial that was not first part of the administrative record. The question of whether a decision denying benefits was "arbitrary and capricious" is different from the question of whether the plaintiff had been entitled to the benefits. It follows that the evidence used to support each issue may be different. What if, for example, the plaintiff offered evidence at trial that documents or affidavits had been available to the decision maker prior to making the benefits decision but the decision maker had wilfully disregarded them? What if the plaintiff sought to introduce documentary evidence showing that the decision maker based his decision on personal pecuniary gain? Does the Plan seriously contend that such evidence would be inadmissible at trial because it had not been introduced at the administrative level?
Even leaving aside such possibilities, however, the submission of new materials does not exhaust the universe of potential evidence that goes beyond the evidence presented to the decision maker. Here, Ms. Blickenstaff not only challenges the administrator's benefits determination, but contends that certain of the materials before the administrator — namely, the two conflicting job descriptions contained in the administrative record — led to an unreasonable result. It is difficult to imagine how Ms. Blickenstaff could seek to explain how the variant job descriptions affected the outcome of the benefits decision if she is limited to the contradictory documents themselves.
We simply cannot make a blanket determination that no evidence other than the documents contained in Bates numbered pages AR0001 to AR0256 may be admissible at trial. We will make decisions as to the admissibility of evidence at the appropriate times at trial.
3. Motion to Strike Ms. Blickenstaff's Witness and Exhibit List.
Defendant asks us to strike Ms. Blickenstaff's witness and exhibit list because all witnesses and exhibits not contained in the "administrative record" defined earlier is "extrinsic" and therefore irrelevant and because plaintiff filed it late. Once again, since the question before us is whether the Plan's decision was arbitrary and capricious and not whether Ms. Blickenstaff was entitled to benefits, we can conceive of evidence which may be pertinent to the former question that was not part of the "administrative record." Such evidence and testimony may be "extrinsic" in the sense that it was not considered by the decision maker, but it may well be intrinsic to the issue before us at trial.
Although the Plan informs us that Ms. Blickenstaff's witness and exhibit list was filed late, it does not say (much less show) that it was surprised to see any of the witnesses or exhibits listed on it or that consideration of this evidence will prejudice it in any way. We will exercise our sound discretion by hearing the testimony and considering the evidence presented by the parties according to the Rules of Evidence and by giving each the weight to which it is entitled. Wilson v. AM General Corp., 167 F.3d 1114, 1121-1122 (7th Cir. 1999) (admission and exclusion of evidence at trial is subject to abuse of discretion standard); Jackson v. Bunge Corp., 40 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 1994). We thus DENY defendant's motion to strike Ms. Blickenstaff's witness and exhibit list.
It is so ORDERED this day of March 2002.