Opinion
34180-21S
08-18-2022
TAMMY LOUISE BLASZAK, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
ORDER CONCERNING FRIVOLOUS ARGUMENTS
David Gustafson, Judge
The purpose of this order is to provide information concerning the potential penalty for making frivolous arguments in a Tax Court case.
Background
This case is schedule for trial at the Tax Court's Detroit session beginning September 6, 2022. Our standing pretrial order ("SPTO", Doc. 18) stated that each of the parties should file a pretrial memorandum ("PTM") by August 16, 2022, and the Commissioner filed a PTM. We have not yet received a PTM from petitioner Tammy Louise Blaszak. The Commissioner's PTM alleges that, for the year at issue in this case (2018), Ms. Blaszak filed a so-called "zero return"; and the PTM states that "Respondent will file a motion for sanctions pursuant to I.R.C. § 6673 if petitioner advances frivolous arguments at trial."
Discussion
Section 6673, which the Commissioner's PTM cites, provides that where proceedings are "instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay" or where "the taxpayer's position ... is frivolous or groundless, ... the Tax Court, in its decision, may require the taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty not in excess of $25,000."
The Commissioner's PTM prompted the judge signing this order to review the record in this case. An attachment to the petition (Doc. 1) does assert frivolous arguments. Without prejudging the matter, we observe the possibility that, if Ms. Blaszak were to persist in making such arguments, she might become liable for the penalty under section 6673.
Of course, America is a free country, and Ms. Blaszak is free to believe in her own mind and heart whatever she believes about any subject, including taxes. But she is not free to maintain litigation as an opportunity to press foredoomed, frivolous arguments. The outcome of those arguments would inevitably be failure, and the only possible purposes for pressing them would be to delay the assessment of her proper tax liability and to impose expense and burden on the IRS and the Tax Court. We would not expect to issue any opinion rebutting frivolous arguments, for the reasons stated in Wnuck v. Commissioner, 136 T/.C. 498, 501-513 (2011).
For a non-exclusive list of factors that the Tax Court may consider in deciding whether to impose a penalty and in what amount, Ms. Blaszak should read Leyshon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-104, *25-*29. As to the first two of those listed factors--prior proceedings brought by the taxpayer and prior warnings given to the taxpayer--we do not find in the Tax Court's records any previous case brought by Ms. Blaszak. However, simple online research did reveal Tammy Louise Blaszak v. United States, No. 1:21-CV-1093 (W.D. Mich.), and we hereby give notice to Ms. Blaszak that we would expect to take judicial notice of the record in that case, including the magistrate's report (ECF No. 29), and the Judgment (ECF No. 32) and judge's "Order Approving and Adopting Report and Recommendation". We note that the magistrate determined that Ms. Blaszak's "correspondence setting forth her position in support of her claim for a refund does not constitute a proper informal claim, as her arguments were no less frivolous than her amended returns" and warned that "if Blaszak persists in maintaining frivolous arguments, . . . an award of monetary sanctions would be wholly appropriate."
We encourage Ms. Blaszak to abandon frivolous positions and instead to advance any legitimate arguments she may have, such as her entitlement to any deductions or credits for which the IRS's notice of deficiency did not give her the benefit. If she has no non-frivolous arguments to make, then she should cooperate with her opponent in signing and filing a proposed stipulated decision sustaining the deficiency as determined by the IRS. It is
ORDERED that the parties shall take note of the information and instructions given above.