Opinion
Case No. 2:99-cv-256 Consolidated with Case No. 2:99-cv-393
May 14, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On March 29, 2002 this Court granted summary judgment for Defendant Eli Lilly Company ("Lilly") and dismissed this case. On April 10 and April 12, 2002 the Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7.2(b). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs' motions (Docs. 130 131) are denied,
The standard for granting a motion to reconsider is strict. "[R]econsideration will generally be denied unless the moving part[ies] can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995).
A motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) may be granted on the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) to correct clear legal error; (4) to prevent manifest injustice. See C-TC 9th Ave. Partnership v. Norton Co. (In re C-TC 9th Ave. Partnership), 183 B.R. 1, 2 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). The Plaintiffs have not specified the grounds for their motion; from their brief however it is clear that they believe that the Court overlooked or misinterpreted controlling law, or committed clear legal error.
A motion to reconsider brought within ten days of the entry of judgment is functionally a Rule 59(e) motion, regardless of its label. McCowan v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 908 F.2d 1099, 1103 (2d Cir. 1990).
The Plaintiffs have called attention to two points in the Court's March 29 opinion that they believe merit reconsideration. First, they claim that in concluding that Dr. Maltsberger's opinions do not "fit" the facts of this case, the Court exceeded its "gatekeeper" role to usurp the jury's function. Mot. for Recons. at 2-3 (Doc. 131). In support of this contention, they quote from Dr. Maltsberger's declaration, submitted post-hearing:
akathisia is not the only adverse effect of Prozac that has been implicated in violence-suicide. Dr. Healy and others have written about the disinhibition which these drugs cause some patients. As I explained to Mr. See during my deposition, I believe that this is the manner in which Prozac, most likely, contributed to Vera Espinoza's death. . . . Serotonin has long been associated with inhibition, and Prozac, which alters the serotonin system in the body, specifically causes disinhibition or emotional deregulation. This is the very mechanism which I believe to be implicated in Ms. Espinoza's death.
Id. at 3 (quoting Decl. of Maltsberger at 7-8 (Doc. 120, Ex. C)). Dr. Maltsberger believed that in the past Espinoza suffered from disinhibition after an increase in her Prozac dosage. There was no evidence that Espinoza increased her Prozac dosage in the days or weeks before her death. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Espinoza was suffering from disinhibition at the time or shortly before her death; on the contrary, the undisputed evidence was that she appeared calm and deliberate.
Although Espinoza's post-mortem blood level of Prozac and its metabolite were ten times the approved therapeutic level, there was no contention or evidence indicating that she must, therefore, have increased her dosage just before her death.
The Court does not doubt Dr. Maltsberger's belief that Prozac, linked to disinhibition, was "implicated in Ms. Espinoza's death," and that Dr. Healy's writings concerning a connection between disinhibition, suicidal ideation and SSRIs have contributed to that belief. But the Court reiterates:
the Plaintiffs have not shown that Dr. Maltsberger has any data, from clinical experience, scientific literature or elsewhere, that SSRIs trigger suicidal thoughts or violent behavior in individuals who are not contemporaneously experiencing the agitation of symptoms of akathisia, mania, hypomania or disinhibition. Espinoza did not suffer from any of these conditions when she committed her violent acts. Dr. Maltsberger believes that an individual in whom an SSRI has produced disinhibition can deteriorate psychologically over time to a point where her self-respect is so eroded that she may calmly and not impulsively plan to kill her children and herself. Given Dr. Maltsberger's credentials and experience, his belief is not to be lightly dismissed, but it remains just that, a belief, "an insightful, even an inspired hunch . . . that lacks scientific rigor."
* * * *
Even if the available information concerning causal links between (I) SSRIS; (2) akathisia, mania, hypomania, mixed states or disinhibition; and (3) suicidal thoughts or violent behavior is sufficiently reliable to be admissible, it is not probative of whether Prozac could cause suicide or violent behavior in one who appeared to have calmly planned her actions. The available information is connected to the circumstances surrounding the deaths in this case "only by the ipse dixit of the expert."
Op. Order at 25, 26-27.
Reconsideration "should not be granted where the moving part[ies] seek solely to relitigate an issue already decided." Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257. The Plaintiffs have not pointed to a clear error of law or of fact, or any matter that the Court overlooked, that would warrant reconsideration of the Court's Daubert ruling.
The Plaintiffs' second point is that a rebuttable presumption of causation in this failure to warn case precluded summary judgment, regardless of the absence of expert testimony on specific causation. Mot. for Recons. at 5-6. As the Court stated, assuming that Plaintiffs could demonstrate that Lilly had a duty to warn and failed to provide an adequate warning, thereby triggering a rebuttable presumption that Espinoza would "read and heed" the warning, they cannot show without expert testimony that had Espinoza heeded the warning, she and her children would not have died. Op. Order at 29. Expert testimony that the deaths were caused even in part by Prozac is unavailable in this case as a result of the Daubert ruling.
The Plaintiffs have not shown error of law or fact or matter overlooked by the Court that would warrant reconsideration of its proximate cause ruling. Accordingly, because the Plaintiffs have not identified controlling decisions or data that the Court overlooked, or clear error of fact or of law, the standard for granting their motion for reconsideration has not been met. Plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration (Docs. 130 131) are hereby denied.