Opinion
C. A. 3:24-3126-JFA-PJG
07-19-2024
Rodrick Blair, Plaintiff, v. Harris Teeter; North Carolina Industrial Commission; Ace American Insurance Company; Bank of America; Wells Fargo Bank; Mehta and McConnell Injury Lawyers; Viral Vikram Mehta; Edward A. Sweeney; George Lee Martin; Terry Rogers; Leigh Lockleer; Alexandra Rose Hagerty; Alexandra Saldana; Sedgwick Claims Management Services; Taryn Mecia; Pope Ayland Sweeney and Santaniello, L.L.P., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Rodrick Blair, proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes this case should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and issuance and service of process.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed this action on a standard form complaint utilized by the court. Plaintiff indicates that he was terminated by Defendant Harris Teeter in July 2021. In a section of the form asking for a short and plain statement of his claim, Plaintiff indicates that “Defendant [sic] committed wire and mail fraud in my workman [sic] comp contract and settlement deceiving me of right to sue.” (Compl., ECF No 1 at 9.) Plaintiff also indicates he raises a breach of contact claim because his North Carolina workers' compensation injury had nothing to do “with a labor issue or sign release agreement” and the defendants colluded with members of the North Carolina Bar. (Id.) Plaintiff further indicates the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission would have awarded him damages if the defendants had not defrauded him of his right to sue. Though Plaintiff does not explain who the defendants are in this case, he appears to name his former employer, Harris Teeter; North Carolina's workers' compensation state agency; Harris Teeter's workers' compensation insurer; and attorneys, witnesses, and other parties involved in his North Carolina workers' compensation case. Plaintiff indicates that he seeks damages against the defendants.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The court concludes that this case is subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff does not clearly state a claim for relief, though he does expressly indicate there was a “breach of contract” and he claims the defendants committed “wire and mail fraud.” However, wire and mail fraud are criminal offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, in which Plaintiff has no standing to seek relief for in a civil case. See generally Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”). But in light of the court's duty to liberally construe the Complaint due to Plaintiff's pro se status, the court construes the Complaint as raising claims for mail and wire fraud pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1964, and state law breach of contract claims against the defendants.
However, Plaintiff's Complaint does not meet the federal pleading standards. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Here, Plaintiff fails to provide any facts about the defendants that would explain how any of them were involved in the purported mail and wire fraud or breach of contract. See Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 126 (4th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e do not require a complaint to contain detailed factual allegations. But we do require sufficient facts to allow the court to infer liability as to each defendant. This is baked into Rule 8's requirement that the complaint ‘show' the plaintiff is entitled to relief.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff provides no facts that would put the defendants on notice of how or why they would be liable to Plaintiff for damages. See North Carolina v. McGuirt, 114 Fed.Appx. 555, 558 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of a complaint under Rule 8 where “the complaint . . . does not permit the defendants to figure out what legally sufficient claim the plaintiffs are making and against whom they are making it”). Relatedly, Plaintiff provides no allegations that would show that mail and wire fraud were committed, or that a defendant breached a contract. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to provide a short and plain statement showing that he is entitled to relief, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); and Plaintiff fails to state claims for mail and wire fraud or breach of contract upon which he could plausible seek relief as to any defendant, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
See generally Chisolm v. TranSouth Fin. Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The elements of mail fraud are (1) a scheme disclosing an intent to defraud, and (2) the use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme.”); see also Chambers v. King Buick GMC, LLC, 43 F.Supp.3d 575, 594 (D. Md. 2014) (“Thus, when mail and wire fraud are asserted as predicate acts in a civil RICO claim, each must be pled with particularity required by Rule 9(b).”).
See generally Branch v. High Rock Realty, Inc., 565 S.E.2d 248, 252 (N.C. 2002) (“The elements of a claim for breach of contract are (1) existence of a valid contract and (2) breach of the terms of that contract.”).
Alternatively, the court concludes that even assuming Plaintiff stated a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted, Plaintiff fails to provide any indication that venue is proper in the District of South Carolina. A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b). Plaintiff provides no indication that any of the defendants are residents of South Carolina or subject to the court's personal jurisdiction, nor does Plaintiff provide any indication that any of the events giving rise to this action occurred in South Carolina. To the contrary, the facts provided by Plaintiff show that the events giving rise to this case occurred in North Carolina, and most if not all of the defendants reside in North Carolina. Consequently, venue does not appear to be proper in the District of South Carolina.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that this case be summarily dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).