Rule 13 affords the Court broad discretion in allowing the joinder of counterclaims “to expedite the resolution of all the controversies between the parties in one suit.” See Conoco, Inc. v. Pecora Oil Co., No. 85-c-8680, 1986 WL 4992, *1 (N.D. Ill. April 18, 1986) (citing Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1952); A.H. Gruetzmacher & Co. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 512 F.Supp. 194 (N.D. Ill. 1981)). The rule contemplates a liberal policy of avoiding “circuity of action” and “multiple litigation.”

The authorities cited under the new Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., uniformly hold that where the right of indemnification exists the indemnitor may be appropriately joined as third-party defendant under Rule 14. See Yap v. Ferguson (Milder), D.C., 8 F.R.D. 166; Greenleaf v. Huntingdon & B. T. M. R. & Coal Co., D.C., 3 F.R.D. 24; Lawrence v. Great Northern Ry. Co., D.C., 98 F.Supp. 746; Kerna v. Trucking, Inc., D.C., 3 F.R.D. 195; Sklar v. Hayes, D.C., 1 F.R.D. 415; Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., (Coston Supply Co.) D.C., 12 F.R.D. 123, and Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 7 Cir., 197 F.2d 842.           Third-party defendant argues that the third-party complaint should be dismissed because the rules of law pertinent to the defense of the third-party defendant differ from those of the defendant in that under the Federal Employers' Liability Act contributory negligence is only a partial defense and assumption of the risk is abolished as a defense, whereas the third-party defendant, being liable only upon a common law basis, should have free recourse to these defenses.

They are remedial and should be liberally construed." Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1952). B. AmSouth's Opposition1.

So here, even though the judgment was not on the merits in that it purported to be without prejudice as to the ultimate rights as between the two defendants, it was final as far as this proceeding was concerned in that it deprived the Railroad of its right, recognized by Rule 13(g), to have its cross-claim against the Drill Company adjudicated in the same proceeding . Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co. , 197 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1952) (emphasis added). [¶33] In Blair , the trial court certified that there was no just reason for delay in the entry of judgment on the Rule 13 claim, and an immediate appeal was then taken.

We decline to discard an established rule of law by relying on cases that offer no reasons. Chicago N.W. Ry. v. Minnesota Transfer Ry., 371 F.2d 129 (8 Cir. 1967); Zontelli Bros. v. Northern P. Ry., 263 F.2d 194 (8 Cir. 1959); Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842 (7 Cir. 1952); Patterson v. Pennsylvania Ry., 197 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1952).Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 432 F. Supp. 390 (W.D.La. 1977); International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 73 F.R.D. 57 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Gilbert v. General Electric Corp., 59 F.R.D. 267 (E.D.Va. 1973).

asons in the context of modern concepts of multidistrict litigation and the underlying purpose of third-party procedure to avoid duplication of litigation should be the basis for our assuming appellate jurisdiction. From the point of view of legality, Allegheny contends: (a) appealability is not to be decided by rote, Horizons Titanium Corp. v. Norton Co., 290 F.2d 421, 423 (1st Cir. 1961); (b) finality should not be construed so as to deny effective review of a claim fairly severable from the context of a larger litigious process, Swift Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana, 339 U.S. 684, 688-689, 70 S.Ct. 861, 94 L.Ed. 1206 (1950); (c) finality should be given a practical, not technical, construction and there should be a balancing of the costs of piecemeal review with denial of justice to the would-be appellant by delay, Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-153, 85 S.Ct. 308, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964) and (d) a dismissal "without prejudice" does not preclude appeal, Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1952). Of course, LeMay, backed by the district court, would scarcely concede that the claim was fairly severable.

It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship." See also Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 7 Cir., 197 F.2d 842, 845; Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern Pleading, 38 Minn.L.Rev. 423, 440-445, 39 Iowa L.Rev. 255; 3 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 13.13 (2d ed. 1948 and 1954 Supp.).

Both Rules 13 and 14 are "intended to avoid circuity of action and to dispose of the entire subject matter arising from one set of facts in one action, thus administering complete and evenhanded justice expeditiously and economically." Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir.). The aim of these rules "is facilitation not frustration of decisions on the merits."

See Zadig v. Aetna Ins. Co., 42 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1930). Cf. Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1942); 6 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 54.12[1]. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) provides, in relevant part:

The question of indemnity under the circumstances should have been disposed of in the main action. Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cement. Co., 215 F.2d 368 (10 Cir. 1954); Thomas v. Malco Refineries, 214 F.2d 884 (10 Cir. 1954); U.S. v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10 Cir. 1954); cert. den. 347 U.S. 975, 74 S.Ct. 786, 98 L.Ed. 1115; Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842 (7 Cir. 1952). See also Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2 Cir. 1959); Ford Motor Co. v. Milby, 210 F.2d 137 (4 Cir. 1954).