Opinion
C/A No. 4:17-cv-01926-RBH-KDW
07-28-2017
Sepia Vonnetta Blackstock, Plaintiff, v. Patricia Ann Miller, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil action filed by a pro se litigant requesting to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the district court. I. Factual Background
Sepia Vonnetta Blackstock ("Plaintiff"), who appears to be a resident of Hartsville, South Carolina sues another resident of that town, seeking damages for alleged injuries to her reputation and status incurred as a result of certain actions taken by Defendant in 2007 in connection with two involuntary hospitalizations of Plaintiff. Compl. 5-6, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that she is bringing her Complaint under federal-question jurisdiction based on an alleged violation of her First Amendment right "to not be subjected to falsehoods that impugn [her] character." ECF No. 1 at 3. II. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324- 25 (1989); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
The Complaint in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted" or is "frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(I), (ii). Hence, under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se pleadings, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 97, holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980). The mandated liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a pleading to "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se Complaint under review in this case is subject to summary dismissal. III. Discussion
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a plausible federal constitutional claim because the First Amendment does not provide a private cause of action for defamation. See, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) ("Defamation, by itself, is a tort actionable under the laws of most States, but not a constitutional deprivation."); Sonnier v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette, No. 6:16-CV-1229, 2017 WL 778153, at *3 (Jan. 18, 2017) ("there is nothing in the First Amendment to create a private cause of action for either defamation or invasion of privacy"), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 778003 (W.D. La. Feb. 24, 2017); Davis v. City of Aransas Pass, No. 2:13-CV-363, 2014 WL 2112701, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 2014) ("there is no federal constitutional right to be free from defamation or slander"). It is well settled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal statute under which damage claims for constitutional violations may be raised, may not be used to assert defamation claims. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976) (interest in reputation alone does not implicate a "liberty" or "property" interest sufficient to invoke due process protection under § 1983); Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir.1994) (same); Oliver v. Collins, 904 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990) (same); see also Mowbray v. Cameron County, Tex., 274 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 2001) (public humiliation, scorn, and ridicule from being criminally investigated does not state plausible constitutional-violation claim). Moreover, any plausible claim for a First Amendment violation requires that the defendant qualify as a state actor. Kidwell v. Transp. Commc'ns Int'l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 297 (4th Cir. 1991) ("to raise the First Amendment argument, the [defendant's] actions must constitute state action"); St. Ledger v. Area Co-op. Educ. Servs., 228 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D. Conn. 2002) ("First Amendment applies only to individuals or entities engaged in 'state action'").
In this case, there is no indication that Defendant is a state actor or that any of Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated by Defendant's actions. Instead, Plaintiff appears to have "conflated state law claims of defamation and invasion of privacy with the First Amendment privilege that the media and publishers enjoy by virtue of their First Amendment right to free speech and freedom of the press." Sonnier v. Roman Catholic Diocese, No. 6:16-CV-1229, 2017 WL 778153, at *4. Defamation is a state-law based claim that may be considered by this court under its diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. Here, though, both Plaintiff and Defendant have South Carolina addresses and appear to be South Carolina residents; there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Newman-Greene, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 829 (1989) (complete diversity required); C.L. Ritter Lumber Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 283 F. 3d 226, 229 (4th Cir. 2002) (same); Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 464 (4th Cir. 1999) (same). Also, in absence of any plausible federal-question claim, there is no basis for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. ). See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, it is recommended that the district court dismiss the Complaint in this case without prejudice. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 324-25.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. July 28, 2017
Florence, South Carolina
/s/
Kaymani D. West
United States Magistrate Judge
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).