U. Ms. Greenlaw has not opposed the request for judicial notice or questioned the authenticity of the subject documents. Fed R. Evid. 201; see also Singh v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 17-cv-02211-DMR, 2017 WL 11471761, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2017) (taking judicial notice of MSPB decisions); Blackman-Baham v. Kelly, No. 16-CV-03487-JCS, 2017 WL 679514, at *3 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2017) (taking judicial notice of MSPB appeals); Dornell v. City of San Mateo, 19 F.Supp.3d 900, 904 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (taking judicial notice of public records from EEOC proceedings “whose accuracy is not in dispute”). The Court also takes judicial notice of Ms. Greenlaw's own description of the discrimination alleged in the subject documents.

are what is necessary to raise a factual jurisdictional challenge-not an agency's FAD. See, e.g., Blackman-Baham v. Kelly, 2017 WL 679514, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2017) (“the Court looks to the underlying EEO Complaint to determine whether Plaintiff has exhausted her claims”); Collins v. McDonald, 2016 WL 11744753, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2016) (when determining administrative exhaustion “district courts should consider whether the new claims were actually considered in the administrative proceedings”)

Thus, each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act." Blackman-Baham v. Kelly, Case No. 16-cv-03487-JCS, 2017 WL 679514, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (claims based on conduct occurring more than 45 days before initial EEO counselor contact are time-barred); see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) ("[d]iscrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify.

While the requirement to contact an EEO counselor with regard to those claims was tolled, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b), Mr. Winns's MSPB appeal did not encompass the subsequent events culminating in the discrete, separate 2015 adverse termination action. See Blackman-Baham v. Kelly, No. 16-cv-03487-JCS, 2017 WL 679514, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2017) (construing the term “matter” in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b) to refer to the underlying employment action rather than the discrimination claim). “Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify, [

There is, however, no evidence of this pursuit. In her opposition, Plaintiff also cites Blackman-Baham v. Kelly, 2017 WL 679514 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2017), for the proposition that a plaintiff's failure to respond to an EEOC acceptance-of-claims letter should not be considered a failure to cooperate with the same. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 7-8.

This notice requirement, however, is distinct from a traditional exhaustion requirement—in other words, a plaintiff need not fully pursue an administrative claim with the EEOC or the analogous state agency in order to bring a claim in federal court. See Bankston v. White, 345 F.3d 768, 770 (9th Cir. 2003); Blackman-Baham v. Kelly, 2017 WL 679514, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2017). If a plaintiff files a federal suit without satisfying the notice requirement, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "[s]uspension of proceedings is preferable to dismissal with leave to refile."