Opinion
CIV-24-292-G
06-11-2024
RYAN LEE BLACK, Plaintiff, v. YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES OF ENID, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AMANDA MAXFIELD GREEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Ryan Lee Black (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1, at 2). The matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Doc. 4). The undersigned has reviewed the Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As explained fully below, it is recommended that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint.
I. The Court's Duty to Screen Prisoner Complaints
Federal law mandates the screening of each complaint in a civil action filed by a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at § 1915A(b).
The court's review of a complaint under § 1915A(b)(1) mirrors that required for reviewing a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court must accept Plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “review[s] the complaint for plausibility; that is, to determine whether the complaint includes enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A complaint fails to state such a claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint, however, are not assumed to be true; legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
“[A] pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that although courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, courts “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint”). Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a court's application of “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing Iqbal). “A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. The court, however, may not serve as Plaintiff's advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
II. Overview of Complaint
Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth four claims against eight defendants. (See Doc. 1). In Claim One, Plaintiff alleges that he “was offered a screening when arrested and the ADA sent the youth and family services to [him] asking [him] if [he] wanted the screening [and] [he] agreed [but] never received screening due to [his] past cases sex offense.” (Doc. 1, at 10). Plaintiff brings Claim One against Defendant Youth and Family Services of Enid in its official capacity; Defendant Melissa Blanton, Garfield County Assistant District Attorney, in her official and individual capacities; and Defendant Daylon Rivers, employee of Garfield County Jail, in his official and individual capacities. (Id. at 4, 7, 10). For relief on Claim One, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of $500,000. (Id. at 11).
In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges that jail staff failed to follow the detainee handbook rules and “put[] [him] in a place not safe from verbal and physical harm due to [his] sex case.” (Id. at 11). Plaintiff claims that he was “placed on Alpha Pod for 60 days” and that “this allows others not sex offenders to have the ability to verbally harass [him] and/or possibly physically harm [him] or cause [him] to harm someone else.” (Id. at 13). Plaintiff brings Claim Two against Defendant Daylon Rivers, employee of Garfield County Jail, in his official and individual capacities. (Id. at 7, 11). For relief on Claim Two, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of $700,000. (Id. at 12).
In Claim Three, Plaintiff alleges that he “was charged as a juvenile and questioned without [his] parents' permission and bound over as an adult as well as not provided with defense/legal coun[se]l that wanted actually to defend [him] in the matter.” (Id. at 14). He further alleges that Defendant Timothy Bebee “did not provide [him] with proper coun[s]elship or good ad[e]qu[a]te legal advice and should not been convicted as an adult.” (Id.) Plaintiff brings Claim Three against Defendant Timothy Bebee, Plaintiff's court-appointed attorney; Defendant Ireen Asia, Garfield County Assistant District Attorney; Defendant Michael J. Fields, Garfield County District Attorney; and Defendant Enid Police Department, each in their official and individual capacities. (Id. at 6, 8, 14). For relief on Claim Three, Plaintiff seeks $700,000,000. (Id. at 15).
Finally, in Claim Four, Plaintiff alleges a “lack of professional courtesy and being verbally put down by a person of authority or position of which is supposed to protect and serve.” (Id. at 15). Plaintiff brings Claim Four against Defendant Dustin Albright, Enid Police Department Sex Offender Registry Officer, in his official and individual capacities. (Id. at 6, 15). For relief on Claim Four, Plaintiff seeks $200,000 and “[Defendant] Albright's badge to be stripped from him ....” (Id. at 15).
III. Analysis
A. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted In Claims One, Two, and Four.
With regard to Claims One, Two, and Four, Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient facts to state claims for relief that are plausible on their face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Young, 554 F.3d at 1256. Indeed, Plaintiff provides few if any facts specifically describing the alleged violations of his rights, including when they allegedly occurred, what each individual allegedly did, or what harm Plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result.
Plaintiff's Claims One and Four fail to set forth any legal right that Plaintiff believes Defendants violated. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at Arapahoe County Justice Center, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed (the plaintiff); and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated”). And, liberally construing Plaintiff's Claim Two as a failure-to-protect claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff has failed to set forth an actual injury, merely arguing that placement in Alpha Pod “allows others not sex offenders to have the ability to verbally harass [him] and/or possibly physically harm [him] or cause [him] to harm someone else.” (Doc. 1, at 13) (emphasis added). This does not suffice. See Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1214 (10th Cir. 2018) (inmate failed to state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim where “there is no allegation that he suffered any injuries from th[e] placement”).
In a case such as this one, where Plaintiff has brought claims against multiple defendants, “it is particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff has failed to do so, and the Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's Claims One, Two, and Four for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Plaintiff's Claim Three is Barred by Heck v. Humphrey .
Plaintiff's Claim Three for damages premised upon ineffective assistance of counsel is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). “[T]he district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487. See also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) - if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration.”). On the other hand, “if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
Plaintiff's allegations in Claim Three regarding ineffective assistance of counsel leading to his conviction, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff's conviction. Because his conviction has not been invalidated, Heck applies to preclude the claim. See Williams v. Weber Cnty., 562 Fed.Appx. 621, 622-23 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Because Plaintiffs' claims necessarily implicate the validity of their convictions, and because they all seek damages for their counsels' alleged ineffectiveness, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Defendants.”).
C. Dismissal of Entities Not Subject to Suit
“In order to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must ‘allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.'” Bruner v. Baker, 506 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (10th Cir. 2007). In addition to Plaintiff's failure to state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff has sued many entities that are not amenable to suit, as set forth below.
1. Defendant Youth and Family Services of Enid Is Not a State Actor and Thus Not Subject to Suit Under § 1983.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendant Youth and Family Servies of Enid in its official capacity on Claim One, alleging that he “was offered a screening when arrested and the ADA sent the youth and family services to [him] asking [him] if [he] wanted the screening [and] [he] agreed [but] never received the screening due to [his] past cases sex offense.” (Doc. 1, at 10-11). Defendant Youth and Family Services of Enid is a private non-profit organization. See https://yfsemd.org/about-us/ (last accessed June 10, 2024). Though private conduct is typically outside the purview of Section 1983 claims, an exception exists when the private conduct “allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly attributable to the State.” Wasatch Equality v. Alta Ski Lifts Co., 820 F.3d 381, 387 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th Cir. 1995)). The Tenth Circuit has applied four tests in determining when to hold private action accountable as state action:
[I]n some instances this court has applied a symbiotic-relationship test, asking whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private party that there is a ‘symbiotic relationship' between them. In others, this court has applied a nexus test, asking whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. In still other instances, this court has applied a jointaction test, asking whether the private party is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents. And finally, this court has applied a public-function test, asking whether the private entity exercises powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.Wasatch Equality, 820 F.3d at 386-87 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Wittner v. Banner Health, 720 F.3d 770, 775-781 (10th Cir. 2013) (applying each of the four state action tests to a private medical facility and two of its employees); Johnson v. Rodrigues, 293 F.3d 1196, 1203-06 (10th Cir. 2022) (applying each of the four state action tests to a private adoption agency and adoptive parents).
Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to plausibly establish that Defendant Youth and Family Services of Enid (YFSE) and either the jail, the ADAs, or the state district court had a symbiotic relationship, a close nexus, or engaged in joint action, or that YFSE exercised a public function. Plaintiff has therefore not adequately pled that Defendant YFSE acted under color of state law. Moreover, as discussed above, Plaintiff has not established that he had any legal right to a screening by YFSE. Thus, Plaintiff's Claim One against this defendant must be dismissed. See, e.g., Castillo v. Prater, No. CIV-23675-D, 2023 WL 9546946, at *7 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 21801 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 2, 2024) (plaintiff's factual allegations were insufficient to plead a plausible claim that Palomar performed as a state actor); Arndt v. Peery, No. CIV-21-584-R, 2021 WL 5182667, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 8, 2021) (plaintiff's factual allegations were insufficient to plead a plausible claim that the YWCA performed as a state actor).
2. Defendant Enid Police Department Is Not An Entity Subject To Suit Under § 1983.
In Claim Three, Plaintiff alleges that he “was charged as a juvenile and questioned without [his] parents' permission and bound over as adult as well as not provided with defense/legal counsel that wanted actually to defend [him] in the matter.” (Doc. 1, at 14). Plaintiff brings Claim Three against, inter alia, Defendant Enid Police Department, seeking monetary damages. (Id. at 3, 8, 14). “Generally, governmental sub-units are not separate suable entities that may be sued under § 1983.” Hinton v. Dennis, 362 Fed. App'x 904, 907 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that a county criminal justice center was not a suable entity under § 1983). Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that sheriff's departments and police departments “are not legally suable entities.” Lindsey v. Thomson, 275 Fed. App'x 744, 747 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Dunbar v. Hammans, 2021 WL 1521589, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 25, 2021) (“A police department is not a suable entity under § 1983.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1143781 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 25, 2021). Thus, Plaintiff's Claim Three against Defendant the Enid Police Department should be dismissed.
3. Defendants Assistant District Attorneys Melissa Blanton, Ireen Asia, and Michael Fields are Immune From Suit Under § 1983.
Plaintiff also alleges Claim Three against Defendant Ireen Asia and Defendant Michael Fields, Garfield County Assistant District Attorneys. (Doc. 1, at 14). Likewise, Plaintiff brings his Claim One against Defendant Melissa Blanton, Garfield County Assistant District Attorney. (Id. at 4, 10). “[I]t is well established that [a]bsolute immunity bars suits for money damages for acts made in the exercise of prosecutorial . . . discretion.” Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court holds that
acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity. Those acts must include the professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial or before a grand jury after a decision to seek an indictment has been made.Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). The alleged actions of Defendants Asia, Fields, and Blanton fit squarely into this immunity, and thus the claims against them should be dismissed.
4. Defendant Timothy Beebe Is Not a State Actor and Thus Not Subject to Suit Under § 1983.
Plaintiff names his court-appointed attorney Timothy Bebee as a defendant on Claim Three. (Doc. 1, at 14). “[I]t is well established that neither private attorneys nor public defenders act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when performing their traditional functions as counsel to a criminal defendant.” Dunn v. Harper Cnty., 520 Fed.Appx. 723, 725-26 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Barnard v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188, 1189 (10th Cir. 1983)). See also Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497, 501 (10th Cir. 1979) (“Lawyers do not act under color of state law solely by engaging in private litigation on behalf of their clients.”). Plaintiff has supplied no facts suggesting that his attorney was performing anything other than traditional functions as counsel or in any way acting under color of state law during his representation of him. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Claim Three against Defendant Bebee should be dismissed.
IV. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object.
In accordance with the forgoing analysis, the undersigned recommends that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1).
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court on or before July 2, 2024, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2).
The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to file a timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives his right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge and terminates the referral unless and until the matter is re-referred.