Opinion
19564-22
04-24-2023
BRIAN W. BLACK & CRYSTAL BLACK, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
Kathleen Kerrigan, Chief Judge
In the Petition filed to commence this case on August 25, 2022, petitioners seek redetermination of a deficiency purportedly determined for the taxable year 2020. Therein, petitioners refer to a purported notice of deficiency dated August 8, 2022. However, no such notice is attached. Instead, attached thereto is a Notice CP22A dated August 8, 2022, informing petitioners that, as they purportedly had requested, respondent has made changes to petitioners' Federal income tax return for the taxable year 2020, resulting in an amount due of $448.10.
On November 4, 2022, respondent filed (1) a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and (2) the Declaration of Annamay Peraza in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. In the Motion, respondent requests that this case be dismissed on the ground that no notice of deficiency, nor any other determination that would permit petitioners to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court for the taxable year 2020, has been issued to petitioners.
In the Motion and Declaration, respondent states that the aforementioned Notice CP22A was automatically-and erroneously-generated due to two inadvertent clerical errors made by Internal Revenue Service staff when inputting the information provided by petitioners on an amended return that they had submitted for the taxable year 2020. Respondent states that the errors resulted in an invalid assessment of $423. Respondent further states that an abatement reversing the invalid assessment has been inputted and that petitioners have been issued a refund of $446.13. Attached to the Declaration is a copy of petitioners' account transcript for 2020 indicating that such a refund was issued to petitioners on October 31, 2022.
On November 14, 2022, petitioners filed an Objection to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Therein, petitioners concede that, "[a]t least until now, * * * [whether a letter constitutes a notice of deficiency] has been Black (no relation) Letter Law," and that a CP22A "is not the usual form" by which respondent would determine a deficiency, but they nevertheless argue that the Court should find that the Notice CP22A issued to them constitutes a notice of deficiency for purposes of invoking the Court's jurisdiction in this case.
In their Objection, petitioners appear to confirm their receipt of the refund referenced in respondent's Motion to Dismiss, see supra p. 1 n.1, stating that they "are not unhappy that their $60 ticket to Tax Court saved them from months of increasingly intimidating demand notices, or waiting for a refund." However, they argue that "they deserve some assurance that it will not happen again."
On December 7, 2022, respondent filed a Reply to petitioners' Objection. Therein, respondent argues that the Notice CP22A "does not state that it is a notice of deficiency or that respondent has made a determination of a deficiency, [n]or does it give any indicia that it is a notice of deficiency." Accordingly, respondent argues, "it cannot be considered a notice of deficiency that confers jurisdiction on this Court." For the reasons that follow, we agree with respondent.
The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and we may exercise our jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by Congress. See § 7442; Hallmark Research Collective v. Commissioner, No. 21284-21, 159 T.C., slip op. at 11 (Nov. 29, 2022). Where, as here, this Court's jurisdiction is duly challenged, our jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown by the party seeking to invoke that jurisdiction. See David Dung Le, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 268, 270 (2000), aff'd, 22 Fed.Appx. 837 (9th Cir. 2001); Romann v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 273, 280 (1998); Fehrs v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 346, 348 (1975). To meet this burden, the party "must establish affirmatively all facts giving rise to our jurisdiction." David Dung Le, M.D., Inc., 114 T.C. at 270.
All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
In a case seeking redetermination of a deficiency, as here, our jurisdiction depends in part upon the issuance of a valid notice of deficiency. See §§ 6212, 6213(a); Rule 13(a); Hallmark Research Collective, slip op. at 15 ("It is elemental that the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction where the Commissioner has not determined a deficiency and a statutory notice of deficiency has not been sent to the taxpayer-petitioner.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, the notice of deficiency is known as "the taxpayer's ticket to the Tax Court" because, without it, there can be no prepayment judicial review by the Court of the deficiency determined by the Commissioner. Mulvania v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 65, 67 (1983); see also Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 165 n.4 (1976) ("A deficiency notice is of import primarily because it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a taxpayer's suit in the Tax Court for redetermination of his tax liability."); Murray v. Commissioner, 24 F.3d 901, 903 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he Tax Court has no jurisdiction to redetermine an alleged deficiency unless the IRS first issues a notice of deficiency."); Hallmark Research Collective, slip op. 15 ("No court has ever denied * * * that the Tax Court's jurisdiction over a deficiency case depends on the issuance of the [notice of deficiency].").
Section 6212(a) authorizes the issuance of a notice of deficiency, and while that section does not prescribe any particular form, at a minimum the notice must (1) advise the taxpayer that the Commissioner has, in fact, determined a deficiency and (2) specify the year and the amount of the deficiency. Abrams v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 1308, 1310 (1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1986), and aff'd, 814 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1987), and aff'd sub nom. Spector v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1986), and aff'd sub nom. Donley v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1986), and aff'd sub nom. Becker v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1986), and aff'd sub nom. Alford v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1986), and aff'd sub nom. Gaska v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1986). "It is well established that the Court lacks jurisdiction over a petition that is filed with respect to a letter from the Commissioner to the taxpayer that was not intended to constitute a notice of deficiency." Bourekis v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 20, 26 (1998); see also Kellogg v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 167, 172 (1989); Abrams, 84 T.C. at 1310; Lerer v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 358, 362-66 (1969); Guaba v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-251, 2000 WL 1131909 at *3; Schoenfeld v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-303, 1993 WL 257286 at *3 n.2; Kane v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-272 ("One of the most important factors to be determined is whether respondent intended the letter to be a notice of deficiency.").
In this case, it is clear that the Notice CP22A attached to the Petition does not constitute a notice of deficiency. It does not state that it is a notice of deficiency, nor does it state that any determination has been made. See Abrams, 84 T.C. at 1310. Moreover, the Notice CP22A does not bear any indication that respondent intended the document to be a notice of deficiency. See Kellogg, 88 T.C. at 172; Lerer, 52 T.C. at 362-66. Without a notice of deficiency, petitioners lack a "ticket to the Tax Court," and their attempt to invoke the Court's jurisdiction in this case must fail. See Versteeg v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 339, 340-41 (1988).
In consideration of the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that respondent's above-referenced Motion is granted, and this case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.