Opinion
67748.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 29, 1984.
Aggravated assault. Gwinnett Superior Court. Before Judge Jackson.
J. Curtis Hanks, for appellant.
W. Bryant Huff, District Attorney, Stephen E. Franzen, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, his sole contention is that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence an in-custody statement allegedly obtained from him against his will.
The police officer who obtained the statement testified that he advised the appellant of his Miranda rights and that the appellant acknowledged his understanding of these rights. Although the appellant argues that he was intoxicated and in need of medical care for a knife wound at the time, his testimony at trial was to the contrary. Also, the appellant's trial testimony contains many of the same incriminating admissions which appear in his statement to police and in many respects is merely an elaboration of that statement. Held:
Factual and credibility determinations made by a trial judge following a Jackson v. Denno hearing will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. See Johnson v. State, 233 Ga. 58 ( 209 S.E.2d 629) (1974); Ingram v. State, 137 Ga. App. 412 (1) ( 224 S.E.2d 527) (1976). See also Johnson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 333, 334 ( 280 S.E.2d 379) (1981); Ivey v. State, 147 Ga. App. 227, 228 ( 248 S.E.2d 334) (1978). The stringent standards set forth in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128 ( 226 S.E.2d 922) (1976), cited by the appellant, relate to juveniles and do not apply to statements given by adults.
The trial court did not err in concluding from the totality of the circumstances that the appellant had given his statement freely and voluntarily, after full advisement of his Miranda rights. See generally Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 590-591 ( 261 S.E.2d 349) (1979).
Judgment affirmed. Shulman, P. J., and Pope, J., concur.