Summary
In Bird v. Hart (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 9, in a case involving facts similar to Spalding, the Supreme Court held that brake failure was a self-created emergency and cannot serve as a legal excuse for failure to comply with the assured-clear-distance-ahead provision of R. C. 4511.21; that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law; and, that the trial court should have directed verdicts in favor of plaintiffs on the questions of liability.
Summary of this case from Nomic v. PettryOpinion
Nos. 38690 and 38691
Decided March 31, 1965.
Negligence — Motor vehicles — Rear-end collision — Violation of assured-clear-distance-ahead statute — Section 4511.21, Revised Code — Sudden brake failure not legal excuse — Brake-equipment statute — Section 4513.20, Revised Code — Proximate cause — Directed verdict.
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.
These two actions were instituted in the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County. One was commenced by appellant Grace Bird for damages for personal injuries. The other was commenced by her husband, appellant Leon Bird, for damages for loss of services and consortium of his wife, for medical expenses incurred by reason of his wife's injuries and for property damage to his automobile. The cases were consolidated for trial.
At about 8:15 a.m. on November 5, 1960, Leon Bird was driving his automobile in a southerly direction on Torrence Road in Cincinnati, Ohio. His wife was riding as a passenger in the front seat. While he was stopped for a traffic light at the intersection of Torrence Road and Columbia Parkway, a vehicle driven by defendant, appellee herein, Adelaide B. Hart, who was also traveling south on Torrence Road, ran into the rear of his vehicle.
At the trial, defendant argued that the collision was not due to negligence but was the result of an unavoidable accident, the failure of her foot brake. She introduced evidence tending to show that due to a complete loss of brake fluid the foot brake was rendered useless, and that the brake failure was sudden and unexpected. Defendant claimed that an emergency was created by the brake failure, and that afterwards she acted as a reasonably prudent person would have done under the circumstances.
The trial court in its general charge explained the assured-clear-distance-ahead provision of Section 4511.21, Revised Code, and the brake-equipment statute, Section 4513.20, Revised Code, and told the jury that a violation of those statutes would constitute negligence as a matter of law. The subject of sudden emergency was covered in the general charge and by a special instruction. The jury was told that the defendant had the burden of proving that such an emergency existed. If the jury found that defendant was placed in an emergency situation through no fault of her own and did what a reasonably prudent person would have done under similar circumstances, it was told to return verdicts for the defendant.
The jury returned verdicts in favor of defendant. Judgments were rendered on the verdicts in both cases. The judgments were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The causes are before this court upon the allowance of motions to certify the records.
Mr. Frank J. Longano, for appellants.
Messrs. Rendigs, Fry, Kiely Dennis and Mr. Don Burkholder, for appellee.
In running into the vehicle ahead of her, defendant failed to stop within the assured clear distance ahead, in violation of the specific requirements of Section 4511.21, Revised Code. Unless her conduct was legally excused, such violation constituted negligence per se.
Under the authority of Spalding v. Waxler, 2 Ohio St.2d 1, the operator of a motor vehicle has control over its brake equipment and the maintenance thereof, and he has a statutory duty to maintain the brakes in good working order at all times. Ordinary care is not sufficient to constitute compliance. Therefore, the brake failure in the instant cases was a self-created emergency. Such an emergency cannot serve as a legal excuse for failure to comply with the assured-clear-distance-ahead provision of Section 4511.21, Revised Code.
Under the circumstances, there was no issue of sudden emergency or unavoidable accident in the cases. It was, therefore, error to give an instruction on the subject. See Ricks v. Jackson, 169 Ohio St. 254, 257.
In the instant cases, defendant was negligent as a matter of law. Although the question of proximate cause is ordinarily one for the jury (see White v. Ohio Power Co., 171 Ohio St. 148; Clinger v. Duncan, 166 Ohio St. 216), reasonable minds could only conclude that in the instant cases defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. The trial court should, therefore, have directed verdicts in favor of plaintiffs on the question of liability and submitted only the question of damages to the jury. See Kehrer v. McKittrick, 176 Ohio St. 192. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed.
Judgments reversed.
TAFT, C.J., MATTHIAS, O'NEILL, HERBERT and BROWN, JJ., concur.
ZIMMERMAN, J., dissents.
SCHNEIDER, J., not participating.
My view is that the majority holdings in the instant cases and in the case of Spalding v. Waxler, 2 Ohio St.2d 1, establish too drastic a rule against the driver of a motor vehicle who is unfortunate enough to collide with another vehicle due to a sudden failure of brakes or other equipment of which he had no prior warning and which he had no reason to foresee. He is now made virtually an insurer and cannot rely on the affirmative defense of unavoidable accident except in a very limited number of instances.
To my way of thinking, whether a particular occurrence involving a sudden, unexpected and unforeseen failure of motor vehicle equipment may constitute an unavoidable accident is a factual question for determination by the trier of the facts. Of course, the burden of proof rests on the one who asserts such defense.
It seems to me that my position is in harmony with the principle announced in paragraph two of the syllabus of Satterthwaite v. Morgan, 141 Ohio St. 447, 48 N.E.2d 653, where it was held that one "who has failed to comply with a safety statute regulating the operation of motor vehicles may excuse such failure and avoid the legal imputation of negligence arising therefrom by establishing that, without his fault and because of circumstances over which he had no control, compliance with the statute was rendered impossible." See, also, Bush, Admr., v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851, paragraph two of the syllabus; and Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427, paragraph four of the syllabus. Compare Millhorn v. Donaldson Baking Co., 117 Ohio App. 501, 193 N.E.2d 88.
Another case lending support to the position taken in this dissent is Lehman v. Hayman, 164 Ohio St. 595, 133 N.E.2d 97, an automobile collision case, where defendant got over onto the wrong side of the road, and in which a unanimous court decided that a motorist who, while driving, becomes suddenly stricken by a fainting spell or loses consciousness from an unforeseen cause and is thereby unable to control his vehicle is not chargeable with negligence, and such fainting or loss of consciousness is a defense to an action based on negligence if such loss of consciousness was not foreseen.
It is reasonable to suppose that the trier of the facts would entertain a sympathetic attitude toward a blameless plaintiff who sustained injuries in a motor-vehicle collision and would not absolve defendant on his claim of unavoidable accident unless he plainly showed the existence of such a situation.
I think that the judgments of the Court of Appeals herein, which court affirmed the judgments of the Court of Common Pleas, should be affirmed.