Opinion
Submitted March 15, 2000.
May 3, 2000.
In an action to recover damages for veterinary malpractice, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J), entered April 30, 1999, which, in effect, denied his unopposed motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.
Charles X. Connick, Mineola, N.Y. (Glenn P. McNamee and Barbara A. Myers of counsel), for appellant.
Greenberg Traurig, New York, N.Y. (Edward C. Wallace and Elizabeth L. Shields of counsel), for respondent.
DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., THOMAS R. SULLIVAN, SONDRA MILLER, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, HOWARD MILLER, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed, as a matter of discretion, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
Although actions should be resolved on the merits wherever possible (see, Cruzatti v. St. Mary's Hosp., 193 A.D.2d 579, 580), a court may, inter alia, strike the "pleadings or parts thereof" as a sanction against a party who "refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed [upon notice]" (CPLR 3126). While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter of the Supreme Court's discretion (see, Espinal v. City of New York, 264 A.D.2d 806; Soto v. City of Long Beach, 197 A.D.2d 615, 616), striking a pleading is appropriate where there is a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, Harris v. City of New York, 211 A.D.2d 663, 664; accord, Lestingi v. City of New York, 209 A.D.2d 384).
Here, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint (see, Espinal v. City of New York, supra). The plaintiff's willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from its failure to either comply with or object to the defendant's discovery demands for almost five years (see, Ranfort v. Peak Tours, Inc., 250 A.D.2d 747), coupled with its failure to offer any excuse for not responding (see, Porreco v. Selway, 225 A.D.2d 752). Thus, the defendant satisfied his initial burden of proving willfulness, and the burden shifted to the plaintiff to offer a reasonable excuse for its failure to comply (see, Furniture Fantasy v. Cerrone, 154 A.D.2d 506). As the plaintiff did not respond to the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, it offered no excuse to the Supreme Court for its failure to comply with the outstanding discovery demands. Therefore, we have not considered the plaintiff's proffered excuse, which is improperly offered for the first time on appeal.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint is granted.
RITTER, J.P., SULLIVAN, S. MILLER, LUCIANO and H. MILLER, JJ., concur.