In the Japhet Litigation, the Japhet Family sought to recover unpaid net profits from an NPI that Dan A. Japhet reserved in the Hogg-Japhet Lease when it was assigned to Humble. Bierscheid v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 606 S.W.3d 493, 501 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). Many of the Defendants party to this action were also sued by the Japhets.

Thus, if the terms of an agreement call for periodic payments while the agreement is in force, a cause of action for such payments may arise at the end of each period, before the contract is completed, even if the initial breach occurred outside the limitations period. Bierscheid v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 606 S.W.3d 493, 510 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied); see Lyle v. Jane Guinn Revocable Tr., 365 S.W.3d 341, 355 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); Hollander v. Capon, 853 S.W.2d 723, 726-27 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).

In contrast, if the agreement calls for periodic payments while it is in force, a cause of action for such payments may arise at the end of each period, before the contract is completed, even if the initial breach occurred outside the limitations period. Bierscheid v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 606 S.W.3d 493, 510 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied); see also Lyle v. Jane Guinn Revocable Tr., 365 S.W.3d 341, 355 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); Hollander v. Capon, 853 S.W.2d 723, 726-27 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the re-litigation of certain issues between parties which have already been decided. Bierscheid v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 606 S.W.3d 493, 533 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). To establish that Ifiesimama's trespass-to-try-title claim was barred by collateral estoppel, Haile and Alemu had to prove: (1) the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action; (2) those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action; and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the first action.

In Texas, parties generally bear their own costs unless a statute or other authority provides for them. See, e.g., Bierscheidv.JPMorgan Chase Bank, 606 S.W.3d 493, 545 (Tex. App.-Houston [1 st Dist] 2020, pet. denied). The DTPA empowers courts to award defendants their attorney's fees and court costs upon “a finding by the court that an action under [the DTPA] was groundless in fact or law or brought in bad faith, or brought for the purpose of harassment.”

The appellees counter by arguing that ownership over the lots was decided by Bierscheid v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 606 S.W.3d 493 (Tex.App.-Houston[1st Dist.] 2,020), and the appellants are precluded from litigating it now. They also insists that the lots were expressly covered by the leases and assignments.

To determine whether the first factor is met, courts consider "(1) whether the parties were fully heard, (2) that the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, and (3) that the decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal." Bierscheid v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 606 S.W.3d 493, 533 (Tex. App. 2020) (quoting BP Auto. LP v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, LLC, 517 S.W.3d 186, 200 (Tex. App. 2017)). The effect of the June 2013 Default Notice on the relevant statute of limitations was at the core of the Second Action.

JENNIE KAY LYLE BIERSCHEID, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF KENNETH R. LYLE, LYLE ENGINEERING COMPANY., HOUSTON BLUEBONNET LLC, E&H, LP, AMERICAN UNIVERSAL INVESTMENT CO., JENNIE KAY LYLE BIERSCHEID AND ESTHER SUCKLE, TRUSTEE OF THE SUCKLE 1999 LIVING TRUST v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK AND LLOYD BENTSEN III, INDEPENDENT CO-EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF JANE JAPHET GUINN, ET AL.; From Brazoria County; 1st Court of Appeals District (01-18-00652-CV, 606 S.W.3d 493, 07-16-20) ORDER

JENNIE KAY LYLE BIERSCHEID, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF KENNETH R. LYLE, LYLE ENGINEERING COMPANY., HOUSTON BLUEBONNET LLC, E&H, LP, AMERICAN UNIVERSAL INVESTMENT CO., JENNIE KAY LYLE BIERSCHEID AND ESTHER SUCKLE, TRUSTEE OF THE SUCKLE 1999 LIVING TRUST v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK AND LLOYD BENTSEN III, INDEPENDENT CO-EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF JANE JAPHET GUINN, ET AL.; From Brazoria County; 1st Court of Appeals District (01-18-00652-CV, 606 S.W.3d 493, 07-16-20) ORDER

. See Bierscheid v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 606 S.W.3d 493, 525 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied); Nw. Const. Co. v. Oak Partners, L.P., 248 S.W.3d 837, 848 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied); Southwind Grp., Inc. v. Landwehr, 188 S.W.3d 730, 736 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, no pet.); see also In re Great Lakes Ins. SE, No. 13-22-00124-CV, 2022 WL 3693534, at *7 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 25, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding trial court did not err in finding forum selection clause was waived where relator "waited almost two years to file its motion to dismiss based on the forum selection clause, engaged in discovery on the merits, and most tellingly, sought and was denied summary judgment on the merits").