Opinion
8:00CV486
May 14, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the following motions: (1) filing no. 41, the "Motion for Summary Judgment" filed by the defendant, Farmland Foods, Inc.; and (2) filing no. 55, the "Defendant Farmland Foods, Inc.'s Motion to Strike [and] Motion in Limine." In the Amended Complaint (filing no. 19), the plaintiff, Tadesse Beyene, alleges claims of employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and the Civil Rights Act of 1886, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
The plaintiff, who is Ethiopian, alleges that his race, national origin and/or color constituted a motivating factor in the defendant's decisions to suspend, and then to discharge, the plaintiff from his job as a trimmer in the defendant's Night Bone Department. The plaintiff also, or in the alternative, alleges that the defendant made the adverse employment decisions at issue in this case in retaliation for a charge of racial discrimination previously filed by the plaintiff with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission in June of 1999.
Viewing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, this litigation grew out of the following events, briefly summarized. On November 9, 1999, an incident involving the plaintiff and a co-worker, Sam Baccam, resulted in a cut to Baccam's finger. The defendant has a Policy on Safe Personal Conduct which prohibits horseplay, defined as "acting in such a manner as to endanger the safety of fellow employees or himself . . ." On November 9, 1999, the defendant's Night Superintendent, David Moore, suspended the plaintiff, characterizing the incident as horseplay.
See, e.g., Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992).
The defendant does not indicate whether the co-worker, Baccam, also received a suspension. Subsequently, the defendant's Superintendent, Jim Schaben, determined upon further investigation that the plaintiff's role in the incident constituted an accident and not horseplay. Thereafter, the parties' versions of events differ.
According to the defendant, after the defendant's human resources personnel invited the plaintiff back to work, they directed the plaintiff to attend a meeting on November 12, 1999. The defendant alleges that the plaintiff did not attend the meeting and did not appear for work, or call in, on November 13 and 15, 1999. The defendant then characterized the plaintiff as a "voluntary quit" and fired him on November 15, 1999.
The plaintiff denies understanding that he had been ordered to attend the meeting on November 12, 1999. Moreover, when he arrived back at work on November 12, 1999, personnel in the "guard shack" refused to permit the plaintiff to enter the premises and told the plaintiff that he was not allowed on the defendant's property. Neither party disputes that on November 9, 1999, the defendant's employees had confiscated the plaintiff's identification badge.
The Eighth Circuit has cautioned that summary judgment should seldom be used in cases of alleged employment discrimination. See, e.g., Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994):
In reviewing the discrimination claim de novo, we keep in mind the caution that summary judgment should seldom be used in employment-discrimination cases. . . . Summary judgment is appropriate only in "those rare instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion." . . . Because discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant.
Accord Smith v. St. Louis University, 109 F.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). That admonition seems particularly appropriate in litigation such as this in which the plaintiff is proceeding pro se and has little or no proficiency in the English language. The court finds that genuine issues of material fact, primarily the motivating factor(s) for the defendant's suspension and discharge of the plaintiff, preclude the entry of summary judgment in this case. Therefore, filing no. 41, the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, will be denied.
In filing no. 55, the defendant seeks to strike, and moves in limine to exclude, all evidence of the plaintiff's "economic or emotional distress damages" for the reason that the plaintiff provided incomplete and late answers to interrogatories. The motion will be denied. If the defendant requires another opportunity to depose the plaintiff, an appropriate motion may be filed. Regarding economic damages, the court notes that if the defendant has offered, or decides to offer, reinstatement to the plaintiff, an unreasonably rejected offer of reinstatement limits the economic relief available to the plaintiff thereafter. Smith v. World Insurance Co., 38 F.3d 1456, 1466 (8th Cir. 1994); Naylor v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 875 F. Supp. 564, 581-82 (N.D.Iowa 1995).
The plaintiff is hereby notified that he is responsible for obtaining the services of an interpreter if an interpreter will be necessary during the trial of this case. The court has no funds to cover such expenses in a civil case. If the plaintiff will require an interpreter in order to participate fully in the pretrial conference scheduled for June 13, 2002, at 3:30 p.m., the plaintiff shall bring an interpreter to the conference.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
(1) That filing no. 41, the "Motion for Summary Judgment" filed by the defendant, Farmland Foods, Inc., is denied;
(2) That filing no. 55, the "Defendant Farmland Foods, Inc.'s Motion to Strike [and] Motion in Limine," is denied; and
(3) That the plaintiff is responsible for obtaining an interpreter for trial, and if needed, for the pretrial conference.