"Whether a reasonable time has elapsed is generally a question for the trier of fact." Bev Smith v. Atwell , 301 Mich. App. 670, 681, 836 N.W.2d 872 (2013) (citing Moore v. First Security Cas. Co. , 224 Mich. App. 370, 379, 568 N.W.2d 841 (1997) ). However, "[i]f reasonable minds could not differ ... the question of what constitutes a reasonable time should be decided on summary [judgment] as a matter of law."

Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.1205(1) ; see also Kelynack v. Yamaha Motor Corp. , 152 Mich.App. 105, 394 N.W.2d 17, 20 (1986). "Whether a reasonable time has elapsed is generally a question for the trier of fact," Bev Smith, Inc. v. Atwell , 301 Mich.App. 670, 836 N.W.2d 872, 879 (2013), but if reasonable minds could not differ, the question of what constitutes a reasonable time may be decided as a matter of law, Comput. Network, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp. , 265 Mich.App. 309, 696 N.W.2d 49, 58 (2005).

"If reasonable minds could not differ, however, the question of what constitutes a reasonable time should be decided on summary disposition as a matter of law." Bev Smith, Inc. v. Atwell, 836 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Comput. Network, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 696 N.W.2d 49, 58 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)).

This doctrine hinges on a distinction drawn between transactions involving the sale of goods for commercial purposes where economic expectations are protected by commercial and contract law, and those involving the sale of defective products to individual consumers who are injured in a manner which has traditionally been remedied by resort to the law of torts. Id. at 521–22, 486 N.W.2d 612 (internal citations omitted); see alsoBev Smith, Inc. v. Atwell , 301 Mich. App. 670, 688, 836 N.W.2d 872 (2013) (holding that the plaintiff's fraud-in-the-inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, and silent fraud claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine because they "essentially reiterated the allegations set forth in plaintiff's breach of contract claim."); and seeGeneral Motors Corp. v. Alumi-Bunk, Inc. , 482 Mich. 1080, 1080, 757 N.W.2d 859 (2008) (Young, J., concurring) ("[T]here is no way to characterize these identical allegations as separate claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement."). 1. Negligence

"In general, '[t]he question whether a [party] may be a merchant as that term is used in the U.C.C. is a question of law for the courts to decide by applying the U.C.C. definition of merchant to the facts in the case.'" Bev Smith, Inc. v. Atwell, 301 Mich. App. 670, 681, 836 N.W.2d 872, 879 (2013) (quoting Milwaukee County v. Northrop Data Systems, Inc., 602 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1979)). Defendant Alpine argues that it is not a "merchant" with respect to the coating products involved here and did not hold itself out as having any expertise in the coating of vinyl truck banners.

Not surprisingly, then, the courts have continued to apply the principle of Michigan law recognized in Rinaldo's Construction and Huron Tool, notwithstanding the Michigan Supreme Court's intervening decision in Cooper. In Bev Smith, Inc. v. Atwell, 301 Mich. App. 670, 836 N.W.2d 872, 882-83 (2013), for example, the Michigan Court of Appeals cited Huron Tool in holding that the plaintiff was "limited to its contractual remedies under the UCC," where the claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and silent fraud that the plaintiff also sought to pursue "essentially reiterated the allegations set forth in plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim." Similarly, a number of courts in this District have looked to Huron Tool — as well as other above-cited Michigan court decisions such as Hart and Rinaldo's Construction — in determining that tort claims were subject to dismissal for lack of allegations that the defendant had violated a legal duty arising separately from the parties' contractual relationship.

This Court has repeatedly explained that "there can be no fraud where the means of knowledge regarding the truthfulness of the representation are available to the plaintiff and the degree of their utilization has not been prohibited by the defendant." Bev Smith, Inc v Atwell, 301 Mich.App. 670, 688; 836 N.W.2d 872 (2013) (quoting Webb v First of Mich. Corp, 195 Mich.App. 470, 474; 491 N.W.2d 851 (1992)). In Atwell, this Court explained that, where the plaintiff had documents that disclosed in detail the things about which the plaintiff complained, and had a full and fair opportunity to inspect the vehicle before buying it, but did not do so, "the plaintiff fully possessed the means of discovering the truth or falsity of defendant's representations, and plaintiff s ability to utilize these means

"Whether the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) applies in a particular case is a question of law that we review de novo." Bev Smith, Inc v Atwell, 301 Mich.App. 670, 681; 836 N.W.2d 872 (2012). "When interpreting a uniform act, such as the Uniform Commercial Code, it is appropriate for this Court to look for guidance in the caselaw of other jurisdictions in which the act has been adopted."

"[T]here can be no fraud where the means of knowledge regarding the truthfulness of the representation are available to the plaintiff and the degree of their utilization has not been prohibited by the defendant." Bev Smith, Inc v Atwell, 301 Mich App 670, 688; 836 NW2d 872 (2013) (citation omitted). We also note that following their inspection, plaintiffs signed a document indicating that they had an opportunity to inspect the property and were satisfied with the condition it was in and were "accepting the property in its present condition."

Nonetheless, a party cannot demonstrate fraud if it had access to information about the truthfulness of the allegedly fraudulent assertion and the opposing party did not prohibit access to that information. Bev Smith, Inc v Atwell, 301 Mich App 670, 688; 836 NW2d 872 (2013). Plaintiffs first contend that Davison mischaracterized certain facts when arguing the summary disposition motion that was denied by the trial court in this case.