Opinion
24-CV-2596 (LTS)
04-29-2024
ADONIS BETANCES, Plaintiff, v. CITY COMMISSIONER OF NYC CORRECTIONS; DEPUTY COMMISONER WARDEN; OFFICER OF CORRECTIONS ON DUTY DURING INCIDENT; SUPERVISORS, POLICY CREATORS, DESIGNERS OF CARE & CUSTODY CONTROL, PROTECTION OF DETAINEES; MEMBERS OF NYC HH MEDICAL TEAM, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff, who currently is detained at the North Infirmary Command (NIC) on Rikers Island, brings this action pro se. He asserts claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on allegations that he was injured on March 20, 2024, when he slipped and fell in the shower. By order dated April 8, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without prepayment of fees.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are drawn from the complaint. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee housed in the NIC on Rikers Island. The showers in the 6 south area of the NIC often were clogged and did not drain; as a result, as much as one-half to one inch of standing water would remain in the shower after washing. After months of taking showers with a clogged drain, on March 20, 2024, Plaintiff slipped in the standing water that remained after his shower. (ECF 1 at 4.) Plaintiff's head hit the wall, and he “blacked out.” (Id.)
Plaintiff's complaint is typed but, in some parts of the complaint, the ink is so light that the words are nearly or completely illegible.
Eventually, an officer woke him up and called medical personnel. Plaintiff remained lying in the water, however, for approximately 45 minutes. Finally, three officers lifted Plaintiff into a wheelchair and took him to the medical clinic. Because Plaintiff was not secured in the wheelchair, however, he fell out of the wheelchair and was left lying on the floor of the clinic.
At the medical clinic, Plaintiff “was not given pain killers, . . . outside medical [assistance], X-ray[s], or MRI.” (Id.) He was “cleared” and sent back to his housing unit even though he had a “laceration to the elbow.” (Id. at 5.) On March 22, 2024, Plaintiff returned to the medical clinic and stated that he “was having a problem closing his wrist.” (Id.) The remaining allegations in the complaint are largely illegible, and it is unclear what relief he seeks.
DISCUSSION
A. Deliberate indifference
Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the events giving rise to his claims. A pretrial detainee's claim of deliberate indifference arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29, 33 n.9 (2d Cir. 2017). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements: (1) an “objective” element, which requires a showing that the challenged conditions are sufficiently serious, and (2) a “mental” element, which requires a showing that defendant acted with at least deliberate indifference to those conditions. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29, 33 n.9.
To satisfy the objective element, a plaintiff must plead facts that “show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health” or safety. Id. at 30 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To satisfy the mental element, a pretrial detainee must allege facts showing that a jail official “acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Id. at 35. Negligence is not a basis for a Section 1983 claim for a constitutional violation. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986); Darnell, 849 F.3d at 36 (“[A]ny § 1983 claim for a violation of due process requires proof of a mens rea greater than mere negligence.”).
1. Clogged shower drain
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm to him from the clogged shower drain, which allowed water to pool. He argues that Defendants should have provided shower mats. (ECF 1 at 4.) Courts in this Circuit have routinely held that “allegations of wet floor conditions that cause a prisoner to slip and fall, standing alone, do not satisfy the first prong of a conditions of confinement claim.” Luckey v. Jonas, No. 18-CV-8103 (AT) (KNF), 2019 WL 4194297, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2019) (quoting Lopez v. Phipps, No. 18-CV-3605, 2019 WL 2504097, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2019) (collecting cases)). See also Strange v. Westchester Cnty. Dep't of Corr., No. 17-CV-9968, 2018 WL 3910829, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018) (“District courts in this Circuit have repeatedly held that, standing alone, a claim that a prisoner fell on a slippery floor and injured himself fails to satisfy the first prong of a conditions-of-confinement claim.”); Graham v. Poole, 476 F.Supp.2d 257, 260 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Although plaintiff alleges that defendants were aware of the dangerous condition of the shower floor and failed to rectify it, that amounts to nothing more than negligence.”).
Courts have also rejected the argument that shower mats are constitutionally required. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Nassau Cnty. Corr. Fac. 781 F.Supp.2d 107, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[T]he lack of a shower mat and/or water on the floor in the jail does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and, thus, is not actionable under Section 1983.”); Adams v. Perez, No. 08-CV-4834 (BSJ) (MHD), 2009 WL 513036, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2009) (holding that defendants' failure, even after plaintiff had filed a grievance, to equip prison showers with rubber mats was not “sufficiently serious”); Davis v. Reilly, 324 F.Supp.2d 361, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[F]ailure to provide shower mats does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation within the meaning of Section 1983 and, thus is not actionable.”).
Plaintiff's allegations of standing water in the shower are insufficient to allege that he was subjected to conditions in the NIC that “posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. These allegations, which do not allege facts beyond negligence, are insufficient to suggest that he was subjected to an objectively serious risk, in violation of his constitutional rights. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim based on allegations that Defendants' disregarded the clogged shower, because such allegations of negligence are an insufficient basis for a constitutional claim.
2. Medical claims
Plaintiff could be understood as asserting a number of potential medical claims: (1) that he waited for 45 minutes in the shower area before receiving medical treatment; (2) that he was left on the floor of the medical clinic for some period after slipping out of the wheelchair; (3) that a cut on his arm went untreated; and (4) that he received no treatment, or inadequate treatment, for an injury to his wrist. (ECF 1 at 4-5.) These claims suffer from two main deficiencies.
First, it is unclear against whom Plaintiff's claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs are asserted. Plaintiff names as defendants unidentified “members of NYC HH Medical Team” (ECF 1 at 1), but he has not supplied sufficient information to permit identification of such defendants. Based on the facts alleged, the Court cannot determine if Plaintiff intends to bring claims against some nurse or doctor who examined him, someone else who made a decision about what treatment he would receive, or someone present at the medical clinic who was aware that he had fallen from his wheelchair and failed to take any action. Second, even assuming that the alleged medical issues are objectively serious, Plaintiff does not allege facts that could give rise to an inference that a particular individual knew or should have known of a risk of harm to Plaintiff and disregarded that risk. It is unclear what individual or individuals were personally involved in the alleged incidents. Plaintiff's allegations are therefore insufficient to state a claim that any defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and for a risk of harm to him from the clogged shower for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
As noted, not all of Plaintiff's allegations are legible.
Nothing in this order prevents Plaintiff from bringing an action based on negligence or other state law in an appropriate forum.
LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid claim under Section 1983, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to provide more facts about his claims. First, Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the caption and in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint. For example, a defendant may be identified as: “Correction Officer John Doe #1 on duty August 31, 2010, at Sullivan Correctional Facility, during the 7-3 p.m. shift.”
The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff is responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights; how, when, and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 24-CV-2596 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, or seek an extension of time to do so, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted and decline supplemental jurisdiction of Plaintiff's state law claims.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.