Opinion
11492 16191/07 86121/07
09-18-2014
Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, White Plains (Gregory J. Spaun of counsel), for appellant-respondent. Blank Rome LLP, New York (William R. Bennett, III of counsel), for respondents-appellants. O'Dwyer & Bernstien, LLP, New York (Steven Aripotch of counsel), for respondent.
, Friedman, DeGrasse, Richter, Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, White Plains (Gregory J. Spaun of counsel), for appellant-respondent.
Blank Rome LLP, New York (William R. Bennett, III of counsel), for respondents-appellants.
O'Dwyer & Bernstien, LLP, New York (Steven Aripotch of counsel), for respondent.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Wilma Guzman, J.), entered June 25, 2012, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, denied summary judgment as to the Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on alleged violations of Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.7(e)(1) and (2), denied defendants' motion for summary judgment on their third-party claim for contractual indemnification against third-party defendant Solar Electric Systems, Inc. (Solar), and denied Solar's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint as against it, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant defendants conditional summary judgment on their third-party claim for contractual indemnification against Solar, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
Supreme Court properly denied the motions for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's cause of action under Labor Law § 241(6). Defendants failed to demonstrate, with respect to the Labor Law § 241(6) claim, that 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(1) is inapplicable to this case, given plaintiff's testimony that the she tripped over the electrical cord in the passageway (see Thomas v Goldman Sachs Headquarters, LLC, 109 AD3d 421 [1st Dept 2013]). Contrary to defendants' contention that the accident occurred in an open working area rather than a passageway, plaintiff and a Solar supervisor described the area as a small hallway or corridor. Defendants also failed to show that the cord did not constitute scattered materials for purposes of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(2). Contrary to defendants' argument, the evidence does not show that the cord was not left there by another trade that had departed before the accident occurred (see Kutza v Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc., 95 AD3d 590 [1st Dept 2012]). Supreme Court also properly granted summary judgment dismissing the common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 causes of action to the direct defendants (the project's owner and construction manager), which did not exercise supervisory control over the work.